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ABSTRACT
Essential life-needs are commonly supplied to end-users by complex and
heterogeneous technological systems that have many potential failure-points and
hence contribute vulnerability. The vulnerabilities under consideration in this study
are those arising from the length and complexity of the technological system used
to bring these life-needs to the end-user. Public awareness of dependence is
evidenced at the corporate and national level by the expenditure of time and effort
on infrastructure hardening, and at the individual level by a range of self-sufficiency
and personal preparedness movements. Although the awareness of such
dependence is commonly described using a term such as vulnerability, this term is
imprecisely defined, and a lack of quantifiable measures hampers assessment of
the absolute and relative value of methods that are designed to decrease
vulnerability.
Published studies of infrastructure systems, supply chains, power
distribution systems, communications and other networks have shown concern for
system owners but little specific concern for the vulnerability of the end-user. Studies
using network theory have considered homogeneous networks but these are not
applicable to the heterogeneous technological systems that supply individuals. Risk
analyses are highly dependent upon expert identifications of hazards and
probabilities, and do not address situations in which there are intentional threats or
long time-frames.
A review of published material indicated a need to consider the vulnerability
of individual urban-dwelling end-users, and particularly apartment-dwellers, to the
essential services that are available only via technological systems. The research
question "For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of
vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used,
and what reductions can be obtained by changes to the technological approach or
configuration” was formulated to consider this need. A review of issues associated
with the assessment of vulnerability also demonstrated the significance of the
configuration of a technological system and a need to assess the contribution to
vulnerability that is caused by heterogeneous technological systems. The number
and the type of weaknesses in a technological system are shown to be a calculable
property of the configuration of that technological system, and the metric of the
number and type of weaknesses is well described by the term "exposure". The
exposure metric is not dependent on the completeness of a brainstorming exercise
to identify hazards, does not require any assessment of hazard probability and is

shown to be a valid measure of the contribution of the technological system to the
end-user's vulnerability with respect to that specific system.
The research question is addressed by describing example cases in which
services are delivered to a representative end-user. A number of possible examples
were considered and six were chosen to represent a broad variety of goods and
services, and a variety of technological systems used in the supply process. The
exposure of the selected technological systems was examined. The investigations
identified specific contributions to vulnerability and evaluated the effectiveness of
possible approaches to reduce these vulnerabilities.
Measurement of the exposure of the examples and the hypothesised
changes to the examples showed that this approach was capable of identifying
contributors to vulnerability and of quantifying the reductions offered by hypothetical
changes. Issues that were examined as hypothetical changes to the technological
systems included the development of open-standards for the specification of
intermediate products (allowing alternative providers), the introduction of highly
decentralised options for services that are currently highly centralised and the
application of re-purposable components. Analysis showed that application of the
exposure metric generated insights and options that were not identified by risk
analysis approaches; hence, this metric contributes to both practice and the
academic field.
Hypothesised changes to the examples were assessed in terms of both
effectiveness and nature. These changes were shown to offer significant reductions
in vulnerability, achieved in some cases by reducing dependence on large and
centralised systems and achieved in other cases by ensuring alternative sources for
intermediate streams. Specific technological gaps, including the lack of power
storage technology, were identified.
This study has demonstrated the contribution of technological systems to
users' vulnerability. The study has also quantified this contribution to vulnerability for
a range of cases and shown approaches for reduction of vulnerability.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1

The research field
Many life-needs that are essential to urban dwellers are supplied by complex

technological systems. These systems have many weaknesses, which are potential
failure-points and each of which is exposed to hazards. Risk management
practitioners attempt to identify risks, but may fail either because a weakness is not
identified or because a malicious and hence non-random hazard targets that
weakness. The number of individual or combinatorial weaknesses in a technological
system is shown to be a definable property of that technological system and a metric
of the exposure, and thus a measure of the vulnerability contributed by that system.
By studying both the number and the nature of individual or combinatorial
weaknesses, for a number of real and modified technological systems, this study
identified more secure approaches to supplying the representative end-users with
goods and services that are essential to their lifestyle and livelihood.
The research must build upon a theoretical base and make a contribution to a
theoretical field. A number of interdisciplinary theories address aspects of complex
systems that assume multiple interacting and interrelated parts; these include general
systems theory, sociotechnical theory, complexity theory, catastrophe theory and
chaos theory. The scope of application of these theories will be examined, to
determine the field to which this thesis contributes.
Sociotechnical theory is associated with organisational development and
deals specifically with the interactions between employees and technology in their
workplaces. It has origins in the Tavistock Institute in London, as reported by Long
(2013). Sociotechnical theory emphasises the concept of "joint optimisation" as
described by Cooper and Foster (1971) and proposes approaches to the design of
task combinations and organisation structures in which the relationships between
social, psychological and technical elements lead to both productivity and employee
well-being. Task analysis, job rotation and process design are techniques that are
commonly used, and typical results include increasing the responsible autonomy of
teams, as proposed by Hackman and Oldham (1980), and the adoption of whole task
concepts (i.e. job enlargement for employee groups, in order to generate a perception
of the meaningfulness of tasks). Applications of sociotechnical theory assume that the
1

technology is capable of producing the goods or services for which it is designed, and
consider people in their roles as operators of the technology. The current research
considers people, who are the end-users, in their role as consumers rather than
operators of technology, and considers the technology features that contribute to the
secure operation of the technology, rather than assuming the capability of the
technology. Hence, this research neither significantly derives from nor contributes to
Sociotechnical Theory.
Chaos theory studies the dynamic response of systems in which the
configuration and response functions are known and static, but are highly sensitive to
the initial conditions as proposed by Alligood et al. (1997). Whereas chaos theory
implicitly assumes that the outcome of a system is deterministic and continuous,
catastrophe theory, e.g. as described by Igorevich (1992) and by Shil'nikov et al.
(1999), applies mathematical analyses to systems in which the response functions to
one or more variables are known, and thereby predicts the condition types and values
at which the system dynamic response is unstable. The principles of catastrophe
theory are used in some publications that are related to resilience, and authors such
as Starossek and Haberland (2010) speak of "disproportionate collapse" in the
context of civil engineering structures. Both chaos theory and catastrophe theory
assume a known system configuration, with known response functions that are
continuous within defined value ranges. It could be argued that representing a
complex technological system with Boolean algebra is simply an example of a very
specific and time-invariant response function and hence is an expression of
catastrophe theory; however, both chaos theory and catastrophe theory are observed
to be primarily concerned with dynamic responses and continuous response limits of
a particular system rather than comparisons of the number and nature of technological
weaknesses of a range of systems.
General systems theory was originally proposed by von Bertalanffy (1968, p.
32), who noted that "... there exist models, principles, and laws that apply to
generalised systems or their subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the
nature of their component elements, and the relationships … between them. It seems
legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of
universal principles applying to systems in general”. Although end-user vulnerability
to technological systems is within this definition, the general systems theory scope,
2

which is commonly categorised (Edson et al., 2016, p. 8) into three major domains,
viz. philosophy, science and technology, is broader than necessary; for the purposes
of the current research, it is necessary to consider only "systems engineering".
Several definitions of "system" are found within the "systems engineering” field; the
technological systems that supply goods and services to end-users are "systems"
within the definitions presented by IEEE Std 1220-1998 "A set or arrangement of
elements and processes that are related and whose behaviour satisfies
customer/operational needs and provides for life cycle sustainment of the products."
and ISO/IEC 15288:2008 Systems and Software Engineering – System Life Cycle
Processes "A combination of interacting elements organised to achieve one or more
stated purposes". NASA's Systems Engineering Handbook (1995) states that
"System engineering is a robust approach to the design, creation, and operation of
systems … the approach consists of identification and quantification of system goals,
creation of alternative system design concepts … selection and implementation of the
best design”. A similar definition is offered by Schlager (1956). Hitchins (2008) states
that "Systems engineering (SE) is an interdisciplinary field of engineering, that
focuses on the development and organization of complex systems. It is the art and
science of creating whole solutions to complex problems”.
In the context of the current research, the system goals are the delivery of
defined services at defined service levels to an end-user; however, as the focus is on
the vulnerability contributed by the complex technological systems to those system
goals, the research can be considered to apply primarily to the development of
engineering systems theory. The research develops approaches to the quantification
and description of technological vulnerabilities, as these affect end-users; as such, it
contributes to and extends a specific aspect of engineering systems theory and risk
management practices.
The research has application to several related fields as follows. As the supply
of goods and services that are essential to the selected group of end-users commonly
involves critical infrastructure, the research contributes to the infrastructure research
field, but is distinct because it is not focused on the security of the critical infrastructure
per se. The supply of goods to the defined end-users generally also involves supply
chains, however although this research has applications to theories of supply chain
operation it is distinct because the focus is on end-user security as affected by the
3

complete technological system rather than the final supply chain security and
profitability. A subset of the supply chain research field is the “network” field which
includes computer networks and water supply networks. This research has
applications to the network research field, but is distinct because it does not restrict
consideration to networks that transmit only a single product.
1.2

The research topic

1.2.1

Related research topics
For the selected end-user group, i.e. high-density-housing urban dwellers,

goods and services that are essential for their lives are delivered by complex
technological systems. Researchers including Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004), Kumar
et al. (2010), Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) and Timashev and Tyrsin (2011), and
publications such as AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 and BS OHSAS 18001:2007,
contribute to the large foundational base devoted to assessing the failure probabilities
of specific technological systems, that are exposed to hazards for which historical
measures of statistical probability exist or for which practitioners may assess
probabilities based upon their experience. Authors including Chopade and Bikdash
(2011), Gómez et al. (2011), Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) and publications including
ISO GUIDE 73:2009 (Risk Management) propose definitions of “vulnerability” as a
concept that correlates the state of a nominated technological system either
statistically or in a "snapshot" with the probability of the occurrence of some hazard,
to generate a more sophisticated assessment of the probability of failure. There is
variation in the level of sophistication of the published approaches, from simple
assessments of overall system loading by authors such as Günneç and Salman
(2011) to more sophisticated correlations such as those proposed by Haimes (2006).
Within this body of literature, the configuration and the components of the
technological system are generally not described in detail, and are assumed to be
static. The lack of definition of the system configuration and its correlation with
outcomes makes it difficult to identify the major technological contributors to end-user
insecurity, and makes it unlikely that these useful works will allow the effects of
proposed improvements to be quantified and ranked.
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The literature that includes significant comment on "resilience", e.g. by Nair et
al. (2010), Shua et al. (2011) and Afgan and Veziroglu (2012), generally considers a
nominated system’s time-domain response to a disturbance and implicitly assumes
that the hazard level will not cause the system to fail. In the context of these
publications, a disturbance is considered to be the occurrence of a hazard at a given
level. A variation on this definition of “resilience” is provided by authors such as Strigini
(2012), who seek to assess the hazard level or process state at which breakage
occurs, and categorise that level as the “maximum tolerable disturbance”.
Considerations of “resilience” under these definitions must assume a particular and
complete technical system. The necessity of considering multiple components, each
having complex response functions, can be expected to result in significant
computational modelling. A further variation is proposed by Muñoz and Dunbar
(2015), who consider the system properties linked to the capability of a supply chain
to recover as an important contributor to its resilience.
The vulnerabilities of computer or communication networks have been studied
by a large number of authors including Tu (2000), Doyle et al. (2005), Strigini et al.
(2007), Misra et al. (2010), Liu and Zhang (2011), Idika and Bhargava (2012) and
Lowis and Accorsi (2011), power distribution systems have been studied by Baldick
et al. (2009), Buldyrev et al. (2010) and others, and water distribution networks have
been studied by authors including Werbeloff and Brown (2011) and Yazdani and
Jeffrey (2012). All these are examples of homogeneous systems that transmit a single
product through a network. Such systems have been extensively studied using graph
theory, which implicitly assumes that the same product or service is transmitted along
all edges. This assumption is quite fundamental and is demonstrated by a simple
illustration, as follows. Consider a graphical representation that shows node A linked
to node B, which links to node C, and that also shows a link from node A to node C.
An analysis that considers the effect of removing node B, or removing the link B‒C,
will be meaningless if A‒C carries electrical power whereas A‒B‒C carries potable
water. This limitation is particularly relevant for the current research because the
systems under study are heterogeneous. As might be expected, some authors
propose approaches that impinge upon broader topics: both Lewis et al. (2016) and
Ray et al. (2016) and Ouffoué et al. (2017) consider systems that they characterise
as “heterogeneous”, but in each case the description applies to the particular
5

characteristics of the nodes (equipment type and characteristics) rather than the
definition of what flows between the nodes. In each of the cases described by these
authors, that which flows between each node is essentially identical (digital
information).
Authors including Van Blaricum et al. (2005) and Chopade and Bikdash (2011)
recognise the significance, to the “vulnerability” of infrastructures, of interconnections
between different infrastructures, e.g. water and power; however, the analysis of real
infrastructural systems by modelling all interdependencies has generally been
considered to be impractical, although Haimes and Jiang (2001) have presented a
high level approach. Proposed simplification options have included overlaying
interacting homogeneous systems based on geography, such as the GIS database
approach proposed by Van Blaricum et al. (2005). The interactions of several overlaid
systems are assessed by modelling a geographically localised disaster, assumed to
cause failure of each homogeneous system node within range of the disaster. Other
options have included making various simplifications of the configuration and reliance
upon expert assessment of the probabilities of a hazard, as proposed by Yazdani et
al. (2011), and a coincidental weakness or the adoption of a system-of-systems
approach, as proposed by Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008). Although publications
dealing with “risk” and “vulnerability”, for example those by Gheorghe and Vamanu
(2004) and Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011), and publications including AS/NZS ISO
31000:2009, require assessments of the probability that a hazard will occur, they
seldom define a time-horizon during which the risk probability is assessed, and almost
always require expert assessment of probability.
Authors such as LePoire and Glenn (2007) show awareness of intelligently
misguided, intentional or directed hazards, and Wang et al (2015, p1674) note the
distinctive nature of intentional hazards and the "... significant uncertainties due to
behaviors of different rationality", but it is proposed that the distinction between
intentional hazards and random hazards has not been fully appreciated, and it has
not been appreciated that the consequence of this distinction is that a guided hazard
must be treated as having a probability of occurrence p = 1.0 in a consideration of
“risk”, because effort and intelligence will be used to target the hazard at an accessible
weakness. Intelligently misguided hazards can certainly not be assessed in the same
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way as randomly occurring hazards with a statistical probability, but must be
considered as “attacks”, as noted by Nair et al. (2010) and others.
1.2.2

Refinement of the research topic
“Vulnerability”, “risk” and “exposure” are key terms in this thesis; they occur

throughout the reviewed literature and appear very commonly throughout this thesis.
As a precursor to clarification of the research field, it is important to note that these
terms are in common use, but with broad definitions such as those proposed in ISO
GUIDE 73:2009. Furthermore, within specific fields, e.g. the definition of “risk” in the
insurance field, some of these terms have acquired more tightly defined meanings.
Some authors including Haimes (2006, 2011) have proposed somewhat tighter
definitions but other authors, including Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) and Wang et al.
(2012), have proposed variations or alternative definitions. A definition is essential if
any measure of vulnerability is to be developed.
The clarification of the research opportunity noted that published material has
not adequately considered how end-user supply security is affected by the
configuration of the heterogeneous technological systems used. The clarification of
the research opportunity also failed to reveal a metric that adequately quantifies the
vulnerability of such technological systems. As every hazard must necessarily be
linked to a weakness in a technological system, and because the probability of a
hazard occurring must tend towards p = 1.0 with time, or be treated as having p = 1.0
in the case of directed hazards, the number of weaknesses in a technological system
is a critical factor in determining the contribution of a particular technological system
to the end-user’s vulnerability. This issue has been noted by Mishkovski et al. (2011)
in the literature related to computer networks, but has not been explored for
heterogeneous systems that are typical of those that deliver goods and services that
are essential for the lifestyle of the identified group of end-users. Specifically, a more
rigorous and quantitative approach to characterising the technological vulnerability of
end-users makes it possible to quantitatively compare systems and to quantitatively
compare alterative proposals for modifications to a system. The approach needs to
be demonstrated by applying a range of examples of technological systems to the
delivery of selected goods or services to an urban end-user, and quantifying those
technological characteristics that specifically contribute to vulnerability at the end-user
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level. Chapter 4 of this thesis progressively develops and justifies the concept of the
vulnerability and exposure of a technological system, and defines this as the number
of critical weaknesses in that technological system. A theoretical basis is developed,
an approach for implementation is proposed and evidence to demonstrate that the
proposed approach does offer answers to the research questions is presented.
Having developed a theoretical basis for evaluating the contribution of
technological systems to end-user vulnerability, a methodology for selecting
examples of technological systems that supply goods or services to end-users, and
for applying this theoretical basis to these example studies, is developed. Each
technological system that is studied is described in sufficient detail to demonstrate
how the current system supplies a specific product or service to end-users.
A measure of the technological vulnerability is calculated for each of these
examples, thus effectively modelling the working of the example system. This
measure, which is labelled as the system “exposure”, measures the number of ncomponent/stream failures that will cause failure of the system’s designed output, and
the {E1, E2... En} exposure metric is shown to offer a valid measure of the vulnerability
that the technological system imposes on the end-user. When operating within design
parameters, technological systems produce outputs as long as inputs are available.
For real systems, operation within design parameters cannot continue indefinitely and
maintenance, i.e. replacement of generally pre-identified and commonly substitutable
components, is required periodically. Over more extended timeframes, technological
systems can also reach the point where they are inherently incapable of performing
their function due to a need for maintenance, and eventually will also reach a point
where redesign or replacement is required. These three time-frame scenarios are
distinct and have separate implications for the end-user’s vulnerability. The relevant
time-frame is defined for each example studied in this work.
The analysis then considers alternative technological scenarios, including
alternative configurations and components, for each of the examples, and examines
the effect of each change. Based on the hypotheses developed, several alternative
technological configuration scenarios are examined within each study example, and
allow testing of hypothetical approaches for exposure reduction. Each example study
and each related scenario therefore generate a measure of the technological system’s
exposure; this allows a quantitative comparison between the levels of exposure
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determined for each of the example studies, and conclusions on the relative
vulnerability of end-users to the current technological systems. Each example study
and each related scenario also allow an analysis of the specific processes and inputs
that contribute to the exposure.
The technological configuration issues that have contributed to the calculated
metrics of exposure are compared between each of the example study results,
allowing the development of hypotheses for the general reduction of vulnerability. It is
expected that the exposure of many technological systems could be significantly
reduced by a small number of techniques, including open specification of intermediate
products that would allow many alternative suppliers of these, decentralisation and
localised generation of intermediate products, and some specific technologies that
have inherently short supply chains. As several types of technological system are
proposed as the basis of the example cases, the effect on the end-user "exposure" of
generic approaches to reducing "exposure" can be tested.
1.2.3

Research question
The process of developing the research question is shown in Figure 1 and is

presented in detail later in this thesis. As a result of the process illustrated in Figure
1, the research question of this thesis is:
For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of vulnerability
can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used, and
what reductions can be obtained by changes to the technological approach or
configuration?
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Figure 1: Development of research question.
This research question can be broken down into two parts, identified as RQ(a)
and RQ(b).
RQ(a): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of
vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are
currently used?
RQ(b): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what reductions in
vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach
or configuration?
1.3

Illustration of the research field
Two examples are described simply to provide an introductory and high-level

illustration of the field of interest of this thesis, and also an illustration of the types of
conclusions that are expected. Aspects of these illustrative examples are examined
in the thesis.
1.3.1

Illustrative examples of the research field
An initial review of the technological systems used to dispense petrol to an

end-user at a petrol station, showed that simple financial transactions were required
at several levels – purchase of delivered goods, purchase of power, payment of
wages and the purchase of wholesale goods, and hence were a significant subsystem
requiring consideration. At present, such transactions commonly require Electronic
Funds Transfer at Point Of Sale (EFTPOS), which requires last-mile communications,
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datagrams, local routers, interbank communications and centralised bank transaction
verification. Alternative approaches, including the use of gold coins, “bitcoin”, e-wallet,
cash or cheque media, would each involve significantly different technological
systems for usage, and would have significantly different numbers of points of
exposure.
The Longnow Foundation’s (020161) “Rosetta” project has created an
extremely durable data-storage disk containing high-density information that can be
read using a microscope. In contrast to this approach, media attention has been
drawn to the real danger that long technology chains using proprietary specifications
for intermediate products will result in information, which is the “service” provided by
this example, becoming unavailable to the end-user. This phenomenon has been
noted as a potential cause of a “digital dark-age”, in which much information becomes
effectively unavailable.
For both the financial transaction, and the information retrieval examples, it is
proposed that quantifying the number and the nature of the exposure points in the
base case will reduce both user vulnerability and system exposure, and it will be very
useful to consider alternative technological approaches for delivering the same goods
and demonstrating the changes to the number and nature of the exposure points. The
value of such review is dependent on a consistent approach, and on adequately
addressing the practical difficulties: these issues are considered in section 4.5.4 of
the thesis.

Having taken a consistent approach, and addressed the practical

difficulties as proposed, it is considered that a review of even two examples suggests
that it may be possible to identify some generalised approaches to reducing
technological contribution to end-user exposure.
1.3.2

Illustrative example of the research nature
In the course of refining the research scope, a pilot study was carried out. This

study attempted to quantify a measure of exposure for a specific example case, viz.
the supply of petrol to a patron of a petrol station in New Zealand. A simple approach
was used to codify the processes and streams involved, and to identify and quantify

1

For an organisation whose projects include the design of a “10,000 year-clock”, the date

format “02016” is used instead of “2016”.
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the level of exposure. Although a more detailed and rigorous approach is used in the
analysis of the example cases, the pilot study indicated that the proposed approach
is practical and can generate valid metrics. The research examines this and all other
example studies in depth and proposes and examines variations on elements, to
evaluate the effects of hypothesised changes; such variations were not proposed or
examined in the course of the pilot study.
1.4

Significance of the work

1.4.1

Significance of the research field
Infrastructure exists in order to deliver goods and services; however, it is

argued that the focus should be on end-user security rather than on critical
infrastructural security per se. The level of research and expenditure aimed at
improving the security of critical infrastructure is ample evidence of the importance of
delivering goods and services to end-users. Many nations expend significant monies
on infrastructural security; specific governmental functions are commonly dedicated
to this. This is evidence of the significance attached to the functioning of critical
infrastructure. Proceeding from this observation to establishing the significance of this
research requires only the establishment of a distinction between the focus of critical
infrastructure and the focus of this research. The observation that the critical
infrastructure field does not specifically examine implications for end-users provides
this proof. The special 2013 section of IEEE Technology in Society Magazine, devoted
to risk, has highlighted the issue and, by acceptance of a guest editorial by Robertson
and Michael (2013), has provided further indication of public interest in the research
topic. It may be noted that major journals, including Elsevier’s Technology in Society,
IEEE’s Technology and Society, the Journal of Science, Technology and Human
Values” and others, are devoted to researching the influence of technology on society
generally. It can reasonably be proposed that the existence of these journals indicates
a level of interest in the research topic.
1.4.2

Value of the research outcomes
To establish the value of the research requires a confirmation that the research

offers some incremental and definable value and hence contribution to the field. The
research develops and demonstrates a reproducible metric of the exposure of a
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specified technological system that is intended to deliver goods or services to a
specific category of end-user. Such a reproducible metric allows the ranking of
technological systems according to their level of exposure, and allows options for a
reduction in exposure to be assessed. Both of these capabilities contribute to
economic value. The research demonstrates utility that is not available from current
techniques, and the experience gained identifies aspects for future refinement.
1.4.3

Application of the research results
The reduction of the vulnerability of an end-user by reducing the exposure of

a technological system supplying essential goods or services is inherently valuable to
each user. An approach that refines the sources of vulnerability and allows a public
body (that is ultimately responsible to end-users for the efficient delivery of services)
to assess the relative value that can be achieved by alternative approaches is
valuable for prioritising financial and human resource usage.
1.4.4

Original contribution of the work
This thesis analyses material that is not adequately covered in the literature,

and demonstrates two specific gaps:
(a)

The existence of an approach for quantifying the technological vulnerability
that a heterogeneous technological system incurs for users dependent on
goods or services that the technological system produces.

(b)

The need for an emphasis on end-user(s), rather than on either a corporate
supply chain or a national infrastructure.
The development and application of an exposure metric for heterogeneous

systems addresses these gaps and is a contribution to the systems engineering field.
Specific and general conclusions regarding approaches to the reduction in
vulnerability for end-users demonstrate a valuable application within the systems
engineering field.
1.5

Scope of the work
Following development of the research questions, the research initially

develops and validates a method for quantifying technological vulnerability. The work
then proceeds by selecting several exemplars of technological systems by which
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goods or services are delivered. These exemplar systems are described and are
shown to be representative of common systems for the delivery of the selected
services. The vulnerabilities presented by these exemplar systems are analysed, and
hypothetical improvements are also analysed. From these analyses, detailed and also
generalisable conclusions are derived.
The research seeks to identify the extent to which end-users’ security is
“exposed” by current technologies for the delivery of goods and services; such
weaknesses are defined as those that are inherent in the configuration and
specification of the technological systems, and not those that are the dynamic
response of those systems to random inputs, which relate to the modelling of dynamic
responses. The research therefore does not propose to include dynamic modelling;
the theoretical basis for the research includes a more detailed justification of this
concept.
1.6

Conclusion
The Population Reference Bureau (2009) reports that about 50% of the world's

population currently live in cities, compared with an estimated 14% in 1900 and a
projected 75% by about 2050. Efficient technological systems for the production and
distribution of goods and services have not only enabled city living, but have also
created dependence upon those systems for the continued lifestyle of these city
dwellers. This issue has been widely recognised, but significant aspects have not yet
been fully studied. This work examines the extent of vulnerabilities that are incurred
by typical urban dwellers by examining a range of typical technological systems. The
research considers existing approaches and identifies a specific field requiring study.
Following a study of typical examples, some general conclusions emerge and provide
insight into approaches to reducing the vulnerability of individuals. Initial decisions to
focus on individual urban-dwelling end-users, technological systems and static
analyses were made and are justified.
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2.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1

Introduction
The literature review is designed to establish the published underpinning of

the proposed field of study. As the field of study is initial broadly defined and interfaces
with other fields of study, the literature review considers published material that is
peripheral to as well as central to the field of study. The analysis of the literature allows
clarification of the scope of the study and confirms its unique contribution. As
developed in Chapter 1, the research field and the research topic emphasise
technological vulnerability and the end-user.
The research topic and research field also propose to assess options for
decreasing end-user vulnerability; to meet this criterion, the evaluation of vulnerability
must be robust and defensible, and sufficiently precise to allow alternative
technological paths to be evaluated. Specifically, the technological characteristics,
configuration or other distinguishing features of any technological system must
contribute to a measure of end-user vulnerability in such a way that changes to these
inputs are reflected in the numerical value that is generated – and hence, assuming
sufficient precision, allow the exposure of one technological system to be compared
with that of another, or variants to be compared with the original. Guan et al. (2011,
p. 151) note this issue, commenting that “... the ability to determine whether or not
risk reduction is achieved when modifications are made is important”. Werbeloff and
Brown (2011) speak of the Australian water system principle of “security through
diversity”. The proposed research may conclude that a diversity of supply options is
a key to decreased vulnerability – but the proposed research will come to this
conclusion by a researched process, rather than adopting it as an initial philosophy.
2.2

Background to review of previous work
Four broad groupings of persons who experience some vulnerability to

technological failures are identified: individual, community, nations and corporates.
The significances of technological failures for each of these groupings are significantly
different. At a national level, “developed countries” have interconnected networks for
the delivery of power, communications, transport and also sewage and water
supplies. The national functioning and economic well-being of such countries is
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currently dependent on those technological functions. Media attention shows that
nations are aware that breakdown of their major infrastructure would be harmful – and
that this threat is perceived to increase as systems become larger and more
interconnected. Corporates generate profit by using technological functions and
existing services and supply chains. They are always aware of risks to their profit and
revenue streams, and use their resources to maximise profit. In contrast, individuals
and small communities have a wide range of needs. Currently, most individuals,
particularly in developed countries, depend upon a range of long “supply chains” and
many technological processes for their basic needs. Unlike corporates or nations,
individuals and communities generally have limited deployable resources or
alternative sources of supply. The regular emergence of “survivalist” movements, the
commonly observed interest in cottage skills and the regular emergence of concerns
(whether well founded or not) about the technological breakdown of “society”, as
noted by authors such as Tainter (2003), are all considered to be responses to a
sense of personal insecurity arising from a dependence on matters beyond the
individual’s abilities or resources to control.
The literature review establishes the existing foundational basis of published
material on the topic and refines the scope of the proposed study. The literature
review seeks to clarify an original and valuable contribution, and to establish the
foundations upon which the contribution can build. In order to do this, both the
underpinning and the new aspects of the proposed field of research must be
described. The proposed field of study has several distinctive aspects, and the
literature review establishes the underpinning for each. These aspects are as follows.
(a)

The study explores the vulnerability of the end-user, rather than the profit of a
corporate entity operating a supply chain or of an infrastructure owner.

(b)

The study seeks to “quantify” its outcome; terms that are quantifiable and
approaches to quantifying vulnerability are important.

(c)

Many networks are homogeneous, e.g. a communications network comprises
only optical fibres or coaxial cables, and transmits only a single service, such
as data packets. In complete contrast, the goods and services upon which the
end-user relies incorporate processes that take inputs and create new outputs,
and hence are not homogeneous. Within this work, such networks are
identified as inhomogeneous or heterogeneous.
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(d)

The requirement to evaluate the ways in which technology contributes to
vulnerabilities implies the identification of generic features that contribute to
the vulnerability of existing systems, and is not constrained to increasing the
resilience of specific systems.

(e)

Whereas natural disasters and major environmental failures may trigger
technological failures, the identified field of study addresses “technological
systems”, regardless of geographical proximity, in contrast to “disaster
survival” or “disaster management”, which relate to multiple systems within a
defined geography.

2.3

Methodology for identification and review of the seminal literature
A list of terms, and regular expressions derived from them, was derived from

the description of the research field and formed the basis of a search strategy. The
literature survey commenced with keyword searches of major academic databases,
e.g. Scopus. Synonym searches were used because many variations of keyword
definitions were found and, in many cases, terms were found to be poorly defined.
The initial search produced a large number of papers and their value to the proposed
field was assessed. From that group of publications, a more closely targeted group
was identified; key authors were also identified. Finally, the papers were categorised
and the references from seminal works were reviewed where relevant. The review
was considered to be fit for purpose when key references from newly identified papers
were primarily to publications already identified.
2.4

Definition of terms used in the literature
Terminology such as risk, hazard, vulnerability and resilience is in common

use, but is linked to a range of definitions. As the clarification of terminology, for the
purposes of this research, became a central topic of the thesis, understanding the
published definitions was a significant aspect of the literature review. The relevant
terms, and their published descriptions and definitions, are summarised as follows.
2.4.1

Hazard
The UN’s “Total Disaster Risk Management Approach” (Guzman (n.d.)

provides the following definition: “Hazard is a phenomenon, an event or occurrence
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that has the potential for causing injury to life or damage to property or the
environment”. Similar definitions are stated elsewhere by authors such as Scawthorn
et al. (1999). In contrast, ISO GUIDE 73:2009 “Risk Management — Vocabulary”
defines Hazard (3.5.1.4) as a "source of potential harm". The use of the word
“potential” implies that there is not an unavoidable causality between “hazard” and
“harm”. That definition implicitly allows the concept of either a de minimus for the level
of hazard, or the existence of as-yet-undefined parameters that result in a “hazard”
causing, or not-causing, a “harm”. If the published definitions of “hazard” do not
establish an immediate and causal relationship between hazard and harm, then it is
important, within this thesis, to determine why, and to define the logical “gap” – i.e.
what aspect must be additionally defined to establish the immediate and causal
relationship between hazard and harm. Researchers such as Wang et al. (2012) note
that different “hazards” may fall within different time-frames, although their paper
considers only “long term” and “focussed” categories.
A number of relationships between hazard and harm are presented in the
literature; clearer definition of these relationships is central to the topic of this thesis
and will be developed in following sections. Several published relationships can be
listed.


A statistical probability that a hazard causes a harm, e.g. Russian roulette.



A dependence on the extent to which the hazard can be prevented or
mitigated. It can be noted that acute appendicitis is very unlikely to be fatal if
even basic medical or surgical facilities are available.



A dependence on the level of the hazard – carries the implication that, below
a given level of hazard, mitigation is guaranteed; otherwise mitigation is
impossible.



A case where a “hazard” will always and inevitably cause a harm, e.g. by the
exploitation of a software flaw.

2.4.2

Harm
Haimes (2011) considers that “harm” is synonymous with damage and, by

extension, hurt, disaster or loss. Haimes (2011) therefore considers that “harm” is the
inevitable, actual result of a hazard that is outside a tolerable limit. Some publications
such as AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 effectively define “risk” as “potential harm”. Many
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publications have considered harm in terms of networks such as water supply
systems, electricity distribution systems or communications networks. Günneç and
Salman (2011, p. 502) note that:
“Connectivity is defined as the probability that nodes of a network remain connected,
whereas network performance targets the functionality of a network. Connectivity
measures include (i) Two-terminal reliability (the probability of a path existing between
two specific nodes), (ii) All-terminal reliability (the probability that every node is
connected with every other node), and (iii) K-terminal reliability (the probability that
every pair of nodes in a specified node subset K is connected), as described in Konak
& Smith (2006)”.

These researchers effectively equate “harm” to the network with loss of
connectivity, and hence these definitions of connectivity do serve to refine the concept
of “harm” to a network. Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012) note, in the context of water
distribution systems, that many real networks have few input nodes and many output
nodes.
2.4.3

Risk
The published literature includes a variety of definitions of “risk”, and the

variety is notable, considering the common usage of the term. Aven and Guikema
(2015, p. 2162) state that risk is defined by considering a set of scenarios, and for
each the probability of that scenario, and the consequences of that scenario. Similarly,
BS OHSAS 18001:2007 states that "... [r]isk is a combination of the likelihood of an
occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure(s) and the severity of injury or ill health
that can be caused by the event or exposure(s)”. These definitions are commonly
used by risk practitioners, combining probability with the magnitude of the
consequences.
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 “Risk Management ‒ Principles and Guidelines”,
defines risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives”. In this definition, uncertainties
include events that may or may not occur, and uncertainties caused by ambiguity or
a lack of information. “Objectives” is plural, and “uncertainty” encompasses all
possible factors, across all possible circumstances, i.e. the definition is extremely
broad. Similarly, ISO GUIDE 73:2009 “Risk Management — Vocabulary” defines risk
as the "effect of uncertainty on objectives" and also (section 3.6.1.3) as a "structured
statement of risk usually containing four elements: sources, events (section 3.5.1.3),
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causes and consequences" A risk source (section 3.5.1.2) is an "element which alone
or in combination has the intrinsic potential to give rise to risk". An event (section
3.5.1.3) is the "occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances". A hazard
(section 3.5.1.4) is a
"source of potential harm - NOTE Hazard can be a risk source (3.5.1.2). Likelihood
(3.6.1.1) is defined as the "chance of something happening” - NOTE 1 In risk
management terminology, the word “likelihood” is used to refer to the chance of
something happening, whether defined, measured or determined objectively or
subjectively, qualitatively or quantitatively, and described using general terms or
mathematically (such as a probability (3.6.1.4) or a frequency (3.6.1.5) over a given
time period".

Exposure (section 3.6.1.2) is defined as the "extent to which an organization
and/or stakeholder (3.2.1.1) is subject to an event” Consequence (section 3.6.1.3) is
defined as the "outcome of an event (3.5.1.3) affecting objectives". Probability (section
3.6.1.4) is defined as the "measure of the chance of occurrence expressed as a
number between 0 and 1, where 0 is impossibility and 1 is absolute certainty”. For
insight into the origins of the term, the Oxford English Dictionary cites the earliest use
of the word in English (with the spelling as risque) as from 1621, and with the spelling
as risk from 1655. It defines risk as: “(Exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury, or
other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation involving such a
possibility”. It is noted that this definition emphasises probability, rather than certainty
of “harm”.
Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) conclude that risk can be described in the
form of Equation 1.

Equation 1
This definition is similar to the OHSAS definition, but adds the concept of
“vulnerability”. Kumar et al. (2010, p. 3717) study supply chains. They state that "[r]isk
in supply chains can be defined as the potential deviations from the initial overall
objective that, consequently, trigger the decrease of value-added activities at different
levels”. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004, p. 614) state that
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"the risk of a disruptive event equals the probability of the event’s occurring, times the
measure of event consequences powered to a subjective consequence perception
exponent... Webster’s Dictionary (e.g. the Landoll, Ashland, Ohio, USA edition, 1993)
retains, in the entry for “risk”, the instrumental ingredients of the formula. Indeed,
according to that source, there are: ’... Risk (noun) – A chance of suffering or
encountering harm or loss”.

Timashev and Tyrsin (2011) develop the concept of system entropy as a more
complete definition of the risk of failure. This definition is applied to a pipeline, with
several known defects, any of which could cause failure within a given time interval if
(over)pressure is known. This definition is useful and, in principle, could be extended
to other systems, but the cases in which it is practical to gather such data are limited.
Practitioners in the insurance industry identify an object that is the subject of potential
harm as “the insured risk”; although this definition has very limited acceptance outside
the insurance industry, it serves to illustrate the breadth of definition that exists.
There are two primary distinctions within the published definitions of risk. The
first relates to the “vulnerability" aspect. Some researchers recognise three factors ‒
the probability of a hazard, the vulnerability to that hazard and the magnitude of the
consequence; other authors recognise only two factors, viz. the probability of a hazard
and the magnitude of the consequence. This difference is simply a question of
granularity of definition. The "two factor" group implicitly defines the "event" as one
that exceeds the resilience of the system, and so inevitably results in the
consequential harm. The second difference relates to the difference of focus between
consequences and causes. The definition offered by Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004)
considers the effect of one, well-defined event on the consequences; in contrast,
definitions such as those in the Oxford English Dictionary and AS/NZS ISO
31000:2009 implicitly consider the cumulative probabilities of all of those hazards,
which individually would be associated with the quoted consequence.
Based on the above definitions, four parameters are commonly assumed to
contribute to “risk”: defined harm, defined hazard, time-frame (implicit) and
“vulnerability”. It is useful to examine each of these parameters individually. Defined
hazard must include a metric; most quantitatively defined “hazards” exist continuously
at some nominal level, and their significance can be assessed only if a metric is
quoted. However, qualitatively, defined hazards can be assigned a Boolean level (1
or 0) of existence. The "probability" of a defined hazard can be properly defined only
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if a set of known environmental parameters is defined; it could then be proposed that,
if a large number ('n') of parallel universes existed, each having precisely that same
set of known parameters, and if a given hazard occurred in 'y' of them during an
observation period of ‘m’, then the probability of that hazard is expressed in Equation
2.

Equation 2
If the assumption is made that hazards occur randomly, then a treatment that
models stochastic hazard events and corresponding mitigation measures could be
applied as described by Dimitrova et al. (2015). Assumptions of randomness are
problematic, however: If the probability of catastrophic failure of aircraft structures in
the era when the British “Comet” went into service had been considered, a statistical
measure might have been developed. Once the phenomenon of metal fatigue was
clearly understood and the knowledge applied, a statistical probability of catastrophic
failure remained, but the shape of the probability curve was changed. Effectively, one
of the previously unknown factors had become known, and was hence removed from
the definition of that “risk” – but, as many unknown factors remained, a “risk” could
still be computed. The concept of “risk” actually sidesteps the issue of whether
hazards are inherently deterministic, but with factors as-yet-undiscovered, or whether
hazards are inherently probabilistic in the sense used in the quantum mechanics field.
For the purposes of this work, “risk” can be defined adequately in terms of a
probabilistic function of properties that are not defined. For that subset of cases in
which simple parameters can be measured across a very large number of superficially
identical objects, e.g. failure rates of light bulbs, it might be claimed that historical
records can legitimately be used to predict the future probability profile – although,
even for this stereotypical case, whether environmental variables such as global
warming will affect the relationship between historical record and future risk might be
questioned. For the vast majority of cases, this approach is at best impractical and,
commonly, it is actually meaningless. After many space-shuttle launches, the
Challenger was destroyed when a solid rocket casing joint failed. Computing the
probability of failure, immediately after the loss of the Challenger, based on historical
records would be useless because future launches did not proceed at the
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temperatures that caused the failure of the solid rocket seals. After many more
launches, another shuttle was lost because of a heat-shield breach; computing the
failure probability after that event may have been slightly more accurate because no
effective method for identifying or fixing future heat-shield breaches was found. The
key issue is that, once known factors are eliminated, engineers very seldom have
enough historical data to predict risk with other than a very wide margin. The
difficulties of assigning probabilities to rate events is well-known, and in the first issue
of the Risk Analysis journal, Weinberg (1981, p. 5) speaks of large and rare failures,
and notes that "in neither instance is it practical to build enough nuclear reactors or
DC-l0’s to observe the failure rate".
Vulnerability to a defined hazard effectively represents some assessment of
the causality linking a defined hazard to a defined harm. Conceptually, this could be
expressed as a probability, or as a trigger or maximum tolerable level for the hazard.
The vulnerability to a defined hazard will also be dependent on the precise state and
configuration of the current system. It must also be observed that the same defined
harm may be linked to more than one defined hazard. This is a significant issue and
one that must be addressed later. It may further be observed that a time-frame must
be defined, in order to assess the probability of a given hazard occurring; with no timeframe, it can be assumed that every hazard will exceed the tolerance level at some
time. This issue is particularly significant to the scope of this thesis. Finally, the initial
system state would need to be defined since for a particular hazard, over the same
time-frame, if the effect of a defined level of hazard is to be assessed. This can be
illustrated by considering a power line that is operating at 99% of its rated capacity; a
“hazard” comprising a 2% demand spike will cause a “trip” and hence a harm,
whereas the same demand spike would cause no harm to the power line if it had been
loaded at only 90% of capacity. Using the same example, it can be noted that other
hazards may be unaffected by the loading of the power line, and hence would have
different vulnerability levels.
Korombel and Tworek (2011) have researched (p 51) the "assessment of
investment project risks in business practice" and conclude that risk management
should combine qualitative and quantitative information, yet conclude by describing a
classical risk assessment tool.
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The extent and breadth of the risk assessment and analysis field make a
simple summation difficult. It is reasonable to note that although techniques such as
Dephi method (Hallowell 2010) can be used to improve qualitative assessments of
risk, even seminal authors such as Aven (2012, p. 1655) note that the risk field lacks
clarity on many concepts and principles. In a later paper, Hansson and Aven (2014)
review the process of risk assessment and while noting the development of the field,
continue to note the difficulties of both qualitative assessments and broad consensus.
2.4.4

Reliability-related terms
A number of commonly used terms measure system performance. These

measures are commonly reported historically, e.g. a power station’s availability is
commonly reported in an annual report. These are well-accepted terms, are often
defined carefully and have contractual significance. Such terms include “Reliability”,
“Mean time between failures (MTBF)”, “Mean time to failure (MTTF)” and “Mean time
to repair (MTTR)”, generally as proposed by Wang and Doucette (2016). MTTR is
commonly stated in simple terms of the time taken to repair the component or system,
or to restore functionality following the observation of a failure. Predictions of future
performance may be attempted on the basis of historical observations of availability
and the MTBF, but are imprecise because the conditions under which the historical
values were observed are unlikely to be repeated exactly. These are system
performance metrics, and are included for completeness despite the limited
applicability to end-user vulnerability.
Reliability: Yazdani et al. (2011, p. 1574) state "The reliability of a water
distribution system is usually defined as the probability of non-failure over a given
period of time”. This definition assumes some particular system, under some
particular operating conditions. In engineering systems, reliability is often expressed
as the MTBF or the Mean time to repair (MTTR), which is the average, over a large
sample of an identical and defined component or system operating under similar
conditions, time to failure. Not only are the definitions of probability different, but the
assumptions are also distinct. The MTBF is the result of observing a population of
identical systems under similar operating conditions, whereas Yazdani et al. (2011)
implicitly define a period of time and a unique system and operating conditions.
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Design redundancy: Yazdani and Jeffery (2012) propose a concept of design
redundancy in terms of the presence of independent paths available in the case where
main supply paths fail. For a single component, a second identical component
installed in parallel offers a redundant capacity. There are some specific cases, e.g.
pipeline isolation valves, where components installed in series are used sacrificially
to provide redundancy.
Engineering systems are sometimes specified to contain “N‒1” or “N‒2”
redundancy; these terms are commonly assumed to mean that there is no single
failure (N‒1) or no two individual failures (N‒2) that can cause a system failure. It
might also be observed that these criteria are almost impossible to achieve in practice;
few power stations will have a second control room, a second cooling water outfall or
a duplicate high voltage switchyard. Assessing the effectiveness of redundancy is
also difficult; two valves installed in parallel may be exposed to overpressure or
corrosion from the same source – and so the existence of a “redundant” valve does
not guarantee that the failure rate is halved. External alternative sources represent a
practical approach to decreasing the inevitability of a particular “harm”; as an example,
if a process depends on hydrogen generated by an electrolysis plant, a connection
enabling supply from compressed hydrogen bottles will clearly mean that a hydrolyser
failure does not necessarily cause a system failure.
Availability: In the context of engineering systems, e.g. a power station,
“availability” is often contractually guaranteed in terms of (MTBF ‒ MTTR)/MTBF.
Availability is generally considered to represent the proportion of time for which a
system is available, assuming normal scheduled maintenance.
2.4.5

Vulnerability
Published definitions of “vulnerability” include that of Wang et al. (2012, p.

3328), who state that “vulnerability is seen as a global system property that expresses
the extent of adverse effects caused by the occurrence of a specific hazardous event”.
This definition defines vulnerability as a ratio of the harm to the hazard, and can
therefore be distinguished from the maximum tolerable disturbance concept, which
does not assess the significance of the “harm” arising when tolerable disturbance
levels are exceeded. Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) define vulnerability, simply and
without detailed justification, as the opposite of resilience. ISO GUIDE 73:2009 “Risk
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Management — Vocabulary” defines vulnerability in Section 3.6.1.6 as "... intrinsic
properties of something resulting in susceptibility to a risk source (3.5.1.2) that can
lead to an event with a consequence”. Chopade and Bikdash (2011) describe the
vulnerability of an infrastructural system in terms of the probability that a disturbance
causes some stated minimum consequence within a defined interval of time. This is
very close to the "maximum tolerable disturbance" definition of vulnerability, although
with reference to probability. In this context, Chopade and Bikdash (2011) do note
that, for a power system, the consequence would be described in terms of loss of
capacity (MW) or of power delivered (MWh). This is very specifically a networkoriented approach; if the normal charge for 1 MWh of power was applied, a dollar
value could be quantified. If the power outage caused death because an individual’s
heart‒lung machine failed, this would simply not be registered. These authors present
consequences as an aggregation of the loss: probability product.
Gómez et al. (2011, p. 215) offer definitions for vulnerability, illustrating both
the number of issues to be considered and the lack of a single accepted and clear
definition. They suggest that "... vulnerability is a concept tightly related to a hazardous
event (i.e. there is not vulnerability if there is not a threatening event)”. These authors
consider that a complete approach to vulnerability will need to model all attack vectors
and will generate attack graphs. These authors also discuss (p. 216) the possibility
that Bayesian approaches, which use risk analysis and the concept of survivability,
i.e. the system performs when the hazard is within a given level, may be useful. The
third approach discussed by these authors uses graph theory metrics as measures of
vulnerability. Adger (2006, p. 269) quotes "The central idea of the often-cited IPCC
definition (McCarthy et al., 2001) is that vulnerability is degree to which a system is
susceptible to and is unable to cope with adverse effects". Papers related to computer
systems, e.g. Lowis and Accorsi (2011), commonly equate “vulnerability” with the
existence of a software design flaw that can be exploited by a malicious person. A
subtle distinction should be drawn here: for a pipeline with various faults, and
corrosion rates that have probabilistic functions – as noted by Timashev and Tyrsin
(2011) – failure at a particular time has only a probabilistic function. In contrast, a
software weakness, such as a stack overflow opportunity, will cause the “harm” every
single time a malicious operator chooses to exploit this “vulnerability”. Khatri and
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Vairavamoorthy (2011) represent an urban water system using a system-of-systems
approach. They propose a relationship as expressed in Equation 3:

Equation 3
Using a relationship as expressed in Equation 3, they establish the
"vulnerability" quantity by reference to the configuration established in the "system-ofsystems representation". Actual values seem to be derived using a modified “Delphi
approach” rather than as a quantitative value derived from the configuration and
components of the system. According to Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011), resilience
describes the ability of a system to recover from failure to some state that is
acceptable (without specifically defining acceptable). These authors effectively
propose an average-unplanned-outage duration as “gamma”. They also provide a
formula for system vulnerability that closely equates to an "average availability” figure,
and is of the form expressed in Equation 4:

Equation 4
Werbeloff and Brown (2011, p. 2362) state that:
“The concept of 'vulnerability' is a dynamic concept and as such is difficult to define …
Underpinning these varied understandings of vulnerability, is recognition of the need
to maximise resilience, and thereby decrease vulnerability, in the face of increasing
variability in or disturbances to natural resources. For this research, vulnerability is
understood to mean 'the degree to which a system is susceptible to and is unable to
adapt in advance and in response to shocks and adverse effects from social and
environmental change”.

There is no attempt to quantify either the “degree” that is quoted or vulnerability per
se; the definition equates vulnerability with the converse of resilience, introduces
concepts of adaptability (as contributors to resilience) and uses the word “susceptible”
in a sense that is almost synonymous with the definition offered for vulnerability.
Akgun et al. (2010, p. 3561) state that
"... [v]ulnerability can be defined as a ‘‘weakness in the system defended” in a most
common and simplest way. Indeed, more vulnerable means easier to be damaged or
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harmed. Although a comprehensive list of vulnerability definitions can be found in Ezell
(2007)”.

These authors also state (Section 2, p. 3562) "... vulnerability highlights the notion of
susceptibility to a scenario, whereas risk focuses on the severity of consequences
within the context of a scenario”.
Starossek and Haberland (2010), in the context of engineering structures,
suggest that vulnerability should be considered as the opposite (antonym) of
robustness and should be linked to the concept of damage tolerance. They particularly
examine the situation in which an initial event triggers a progressive and catastrophic
failure. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004, p. 614) quote a dictionary definition as
“Vulnerable (adjective) – Open to physical injury or attack; (hence) vulnerability”.
Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) offer the following definition: a "... vulnerable system is
defined … as a system that operates with a reduced level of security that renders it
vulnerable to the cumulative effects of a series of moderate disturbances”. These
authors include reference to "N‒1” and “N‒2" redundancy approaches. They also
state (p.1) that:
“At present, there is not a commonly accepted vulnerability index or assessment
method for power systems. If a power system loses a significant portion of its ability
to carry the power flows due to cascading line outages, it is considered a vulnerable
configuration”.

Piwowar et al. (2009, p. 1873) present a useful discussion and propose a very
simple index of system vulnerability, as expressed in Equation 5:

Equation 5
They also take a "lookup table" approach to threat magnitude, noting (on p. 1877)
that:
“Our methodology can be very useful to prevent or mitigate the effects of a potential
attack. It has been created to answer the amazing increase of international threats. It
takes into account several parameters to be as exhaustive and efficient as possible”.

This paper presents a thorough approach for evaluating a specific system but it is
neither generalised nor theoretically based. It is essentially an extension of simple risk
analysis. According to Estrada (2007, p. 296):
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“In a network representation of a food web, nodes represent species and links
represent who eats whom in the ecosystem (Proulx et al., 2005). This kind of
representation permits to analyse the similarities and differences between complex
systems of very different nature, ranging from technological to biological and social
systems (Strogatz, 2001; Albert and Barabasi, 2002) ... [m]ost food webs have lessskewed uniform or exponential DDs (Dunne et al., 2002a)2. However, they also display
high fragility to intentional removal of the most connected nodes”.

This paper illustrates an interesting distinction, stating on p. 297 that:
“We start by defining informally the concept of network expansibility. A food web
having ‘‘good expansion’’ properties is the one that cannot be divided in at least two
isolated ‘‘large’’ parts by disconnecting a ‘‘small’’ number of nodes or links (Sarnak,
2004; Gkantsidis et al., 2006). These nodes or links, which make the function of
bridges between these parts, are known as bottlenecks. Consequently, a ‘‘Good
Expansion Network’’ (GEN) is a network without bottlenecks”.

The paper includes a useful discussion of the correlation between degree distribution
(DD) and bottlenecks, and Good Expansion Networks (GENs). Agarwal et al. (2001,
p. 142) state that the objective of their paper is “... to present the basis of this new
general theory of vulnerability which is applicable to all systems that can be
represented as a graph e.g., traffic networks, pipe flows, electrical circuits etc.” The
researchers also state that "A system is vulnerable if any damage from any action or
source produces consequences that are disproportionately large in comparison with
that damage”. They quite reasonably note that a system may be vulnerable under one
type of "attack" but not under another and continue (p. 150):
“Vulnerability is defined as the susceptibility of a system to disproportionate
consequences in the event of damage or failure and is measured using a vulnerability
index. This is the ratio of the consequences to the relative damage demand. Thus the
higher the vulnerability index the more vulnerable a system. Because both
consequences and relative damage demand are non-dimensional numbers the
vulnerability index can be used to compare the quality of the form of two … different
systems”.

Not only is it difficult to quantify a ratio of damage to hazard but also, for the
common case where a harm (inaccessibility of some goods or services) is nominated
in advance, an index value based on the smallest disturbance that will cause failure

2

Degree Distribution (DD).
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is an inadequate description of the total vulnerability induced by the system. It is moot
whether a system having hundreds of weaknesses that can fail with a moderate level
of hazard causes more vulnerability than a system having a single weakness that
would fail with a low level of hazard. Einarsson and Rausand (1998, p. 535) state that:
“The vulnerability concept has yet not been given a generally accepted definition for
technological applications. In some of the references cited above, vulnerability is
considered to be similar to the risk concept, although with a somewhat broader
interpretation. The threats referred to are often external to the system, and may
involve deliberate actions. In this paper, we will use the term vulnerability to describe
the properties of an industrial system that may weaken its ability to survive and
perform its mission in the presence of threats”.

Similarly, Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) consider electrical power systems, and propose a
definition in which a vulnerable system is defined as a system that operates with a “…
reduced level of security that renders it vulnerable to the cumulative effects of a series
of moderate disturbances”. These researchers also note the possibility of "N‒1 and
N‒2" design redundancy approaches.
Martin (1996, p. 2‒3) takes a significantly different view from that of previously
quoted researchers, stating that:
“... [t]he system's vulnerability can be defined as the chance that a specified change
in the environment leads to disruption of the usual purposes of the system … A
technological system can be said to be resilient in the face of a particular threat if it is
capable of maintaining its purposes when the threat is realized… vulnerabilities are
defined in relation to particular threats”.

The first part of Martin’s statement considers the probability that a hazard will cause
some defined harm, while the second part of the statement appears to consider a
maximum tolerable disturbance for a nominated theat.
Aven and Guikema (2015, p. 2169) state that “…vulnerability can be viewed as risk
conditional on the threat or the attack, and various vulnerability metrics can be
defined, such as the expected loss given a specific attack.”
A Complete Guide to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) as
noted by Mell et al (2007 section 1.7), provides the following definitions.
““Vulnerability”: a bug, flaw, weakness, or exposure of an application, system, device,
or service that could lead to a failure of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. “Threat”:
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the likelihood or frequency of a harmful event occurring. “Risk”: the relative impact that
an exploited vulnerability would have to a user’s environment”.

The authors of this document use the term vulnerability to mean design weakness
and it can be reasonably assumed that, every single time the CVSS-defined
vulnerability is exploited, the harm will result. With that observation, the term threat
does not mean defined hazard, but rather hazard probability, and if, for example, a
hacker were to exploit a vulnerability a hundred times per minute, presumably the
frequency of a harmful event occurring would need to accommodate this situation.
Several categories of definition can be identified from these published extracts, and
are presented in Table 1.
Category

Definition

Harm to

The ratio of “harm” to “hazard” is a common definition, used by

hazard ratio

authors such as Agarwal et al. (2001. p. 142), Starossek and
Haberland (2010) and Wang et al. (2012).

Resilience

Some authors (Starossek and Haberland, 2010; Werbeloff and
Brown, 2011; Afgan and Veziroglu, 2012) define “vulnerability” very
simply as the opposite of “resilience”. Specific metrics for resilience
include (a) the time for a system to return to a “normal” state
following a disturbance or (b) an integral of the “disturbance effect”
with respect to time.

Maximum

Maximum tolerable disturbance is noted as a measure of

tolerable

vulnerability by authors such as Starossek and Haberland (2010)

disturbance

and Gómez et al. (2011). This definition relates to the capability of
the “system” to adjust its performance to accommodate the
“disturbance”, e.g. a chemical processing plant may change its
operating conditions to accommodate changing properties of the
feedstock. This definition also relates to the spare capacity of the
system (an electric grid operating substantially below its rated
capacity may be able to “absorb” the disturbance caused by a line
failure – whereas a grid that is operating at rated capacity cannot).

System

Vulnerability is considered as a system property, recognising

property

multiple threats, by authors including Piwowar et al. (2009, p. 1873).
These authors present a useful discussion and propose a very
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simple index of system vulnerability: W = ∑[weighting*vuln(y)].
Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) offer the definition a "... vulnerable system
is defined in [1] as a system that operates with a reduced level of
security that renders it vulnerable to the cumulative effects of a
series of moderate disturbances”.
Susceptibility

Susceptibility of consequence to risk is stated in ISO 73, Chopade

of

and Bikdash (2011) and Martin (1996). Martin (1996, p. 2) states

consequence that a system’s vulnerability can be defined as “... the chance
to risk

(probability) that a specified change in the environment leads to
disruption of the usual purposes of the system”. This category of
definition assumes that there is a probability (0 ≤ p ≤ 1.0) that an
event will cause a harm. This definition takes no account of the
system’s capability to adjust to, or absorb, the “disturbance”.

A zero

A specific known weakness, for which a system has zero tolerance.

tolerance

If the probability that a particular event will cause a specific harm is

factor

1.0 (i.e. is certain), then the system can be said to have zero
tolerance to that event. Merriam Webster's Dictionary (n.d.)
presents two definitions of "vulnerable": (a) "easily hurt or harmed
physically, mentally, or emotionally" and (b) "open to attack, harm,
or damage". In both cases, the adjective implies a normal
application to a noun (person), and both definitions distinguish a
person who has few or poor defences against harmful attack, or
whose defences can be overcome without a requirement for a
powerful attack.

Table 1: Published definitions of terms
Adger (2006, p. 277) includes a significant comment in the paper’s conclusion,
stating that "I have reviewed divergent methods and epistemologies in vulnerability
research. The diversity and apparent lack of convergence over time are, in many
ways, a reflection of the divergent objectives of the research and the phenomena
being explained … this diversity, I argue is a strength and sign of vitality, not a
weakness, of vulnerability research."
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Whether diversity can be equated with strength is moot, but Adger’s identification of
diversity of terminology is considered a valid summation.
2.4.6

Exposure
The term “exposure” is used in ISO GUIDE 73:2009 “Risk Management —

Vocabulary”, and is defined (3.6.1.2) as the "... extent to which an organization and/or
stakeholder … is subject to an event”. This “definition” could more accurately be
considered as a description, because no enumeration or quantification is associated
with the term “extent”. The lack of any quantification or categorisation of “extent”
leaves the opportunity for such a definition to be proposed.
2.4.7

Resilience

“Resilience” is yet another term that is commonly used, yet for which an adequate
definition is non-trivial. It is also a term that, according to many authors, lacks a wellestablished definition. A number of definitions are offered by authors, including
Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012) quoting Bruneau et al. (2003), who defined resilient
systems as those with the properties of (1) reduced failure probabilities, (2) reduced
failure consequences and (3) reduced time to recovery. Such systems are
characterised by the four infrastructural qualities of robustness, redundancy,
resourcefulness and rapidity and incorporate the notions of risk (probability of failure
and its consequences), reliability, recovery, and system tolerance both pre- and postfailure. System vulnerability is consequently regarded as the antonym of resilience.
The “resilience engineering” sub-discipline of engineering has attempted to capture a
definition of “resilience”: Hollnagel (2011), quoted by Duffey (2012), defines resilience
for an organisation in terms of the ability to respond to upsets by maintaining or
regaining some nominal state. Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) and Afgan and
Veziroglu (2012) each describe resilience in a very similar way but without Hollnagel’s
focus on organisations. These authors effectively propose an average-unplannedoutage duration as “gamma”, which is to be minimised. They also propose a formula
for system vulnerability in the form of Equation 6 which equates to an "average
availability” figure.
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Equation 6
Shua et al. (2011, p. 264) state that:
“At present, researches on measuring method of supply chain resilience are limited,
and quantitative studies are scarce, which is not enough to provide accurate
theoretical basis for practical applications.” and (p. 265) that “From the definition, we
noted that resilience could be measured in two ways: the time needed for achieving a
normal state; the gap between the normal state and the original state … Therefore,
we define resilience as the rapidly recovery ability to an equilibrium after the supply
chain is attacked by a disturbance and we use the recovery time to measure…this".

These researchers propose modelling each element in a supply chain using a
proportional-differential response sub-model. Each element would therefore have a
time-dependent response and a rate-of-change-dependent response. This means
that the response of the supply chain, in terms of return-to-equilibrium, can be
calculated from the interconnected response of the elements. Their primary
conclusion (p. 268) is that:
“Therefore, this model is useful for engineering management. It makes clear that
increasing safety inventory, improving the efficiency of reserve capacity and
strengthening the abilities of coordination within the cost margins could enhance
supply chain elasticity”.

Nair et al. (2010, bottom of Col2, p. 54) state that no satisfactory definition of
vulnerability has been established, and (p. 54, 55) that "... resilience has been defined
in terms of the number of failures that a computer network can sustain while remaining
connected”. In this paper, the resilience measure (p. 55) is stated as "... the resilience
definition adopted here for an IM component … can be expressed as the postdisruption fraction of demand that can be satisfied using specific resources while
maintaining a prescribed level of service". These authors use a graph theory notation,
but define capacity and other constraints for each link (p. 56). The risks to each link
are assumed to be known probabilistically. They consider four specific attack
scenarios and a network consisting of five components each with less than five
constraints. This allows a resilience index to be computed for each of several levels
of budget-for-repair, allowing economic evaluations to be made. Afgan and Veziroglu
(2012) make reference to the concept of “maximum tolerable disturbance”. This
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definition implies that “resilience” is related to the scope or quantum of a "hazard" that
does not result in “harm”, i.e. the hazard level is below some defined "maximum
tolerable disturbance". They also propose that, if a system parameter is
instantaneously “perturbed”, and a given time is required for the system parameter to
return to “normal”, then the resilience of the system for that parameter can be defined
in terms of the area under the “response‒time” curve. The resilience of the system as
a whole is established by a sum of normalised resiliencies to individual parameters.
Despite most researchers’ assertions that a definition is not generally accepted, there
is a general acceptance of one key point: resilience refers to the path by which a
system returns to “normal” following the occurrence of a “hazard”. This distinguishes
the definition of “resilience” by establishing that it refers to levels of hazard that do not
exceed the capacity of a system to either absorb, or adjust to, the presented hazard.
The published definitions therefore fall into three broad categories.
(a)

Definitions similar to that adopted by Nair et al. (2010, p. 55), i.e. "... the
resilience definition adopted here for an IM component [alpha] can be
expressed as the post-disruption fraction of demand that can be satisfied using
specific resources while maintaining a prescribed level of service" or p. 54‒
55) "resilience has been defined in terms of the number of failures (or the level
of disturbance) that a computer network can sustain while remaining
connected", are unique to these researchers.

(b)

Definitions similar to that adopted by Afgan and Veziroglu (2012), who propose
that, if a system parameter is instantaneously “perturbed”, and a given time is
required for the system parameter to return to “normal”, then the resilience of
the system for that parameter can be defined in terms of the area under the
parameter‒time curve. The definition proposed by Shua et al. (2011, p. 264),
i.e. "... [f]rom the definition, we noted that resilience could be measured... the
time needed for achieving a normal state”, is a less sophisticated approach.

(c)

Definitions such as that developed by Strigini (2012), establish the concept of
“maximum tolerable disturbance”. The concept asserts that, for a hazard
below the “maximum tolerable disturbance”, the system will eventually return
to its original state and hence only transient “harm” will be caused. In contrast,
a hazard greater than the “maximum tolerable disturbance” will cause a longlasting harm.
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2.4.8

Robustness
Several types of definition of robustness have been proposed. Within the

biological field, Kartascheff et al. (2009) equate community robustness with the
fraction of species that survive after a defined event. This definition is oriented more
closely towards the collective end-users, and hence has value. It is perhaps
unfortunate that, in more technical fields, “robustness” is more commonly interpreted
‒ e.g. by Derrible and Kennedy (2010) – as descriptive of a network that has a high
“maximum tolerable disturbance” value. According to Chopade and Bikdash (2011, p.
1):
“Robustness signifies that the system will retain its function and resources largely
unchanged or nearly unchanged when exposed to perturbations. Resilience implies
that the system can adapt to regain a stable acceptable level of performance after
perturbations but the new state may be significantly different [5]… ”

Their reference in [5] is to Holmgren (2006). Starossek and Haberland (2010, p. 3)
state that, in "... [s]umming up these definitions, robustness refers to the ability of a
structure not to respond disproportionately to either abnormal events or initial
damage”.
Leong and Doyle (2016) propose p1511 that "A robust system is equivalent to
a setup where a person can balance a stick easily because uncertainties inherited in
the human sensorimotor system affect the stick balancing task minimally. A fragile
system implies otherwise. ". They offer a detailed mathematical treatment of stickbalancing problem, but the paper concludes by noting the trade-off between
robustness and efficiency and that delays (mathematically) actually tend to increase
robustness. These authors also refer to "heterogeneous" by which they infer the
eyeball, brain, nerve system, musculature combination, i.e. a relatively narrow
context.

2.4.9

Survivability
Published references include those by Einarsson and Rausand (1998, p. 535),

who state "A system is said to survive an accident (or some other disturbance) if it is
able to operate from a specified time after the accident, and to regain a similar market
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position as it had prior to the accident”. Levitin and Lisnianski (2001) state (abstract)
that
“... vulnerable systems, which can have difference states corresponding to different
combinations of available elements composing the system... Both the impact of
external factors (attack) and internal causes (failures) affect system survivability,
which is determined as probability of meeting a given demand”.

A very similar approach is proposed by Korczak et al. (2005). Sajdak and Karni (2006)
propose that it is necessary to define assailant capabilities for each type of threat.
They state that to do this fully is infeasible, and therefore suggest that an integrated
probabilistic approach is required. Sheldon et al. (2004, p. 293) state that "...
[s]urvivability of a system can be expressed as a combination of reliability, availability,
security, and human safety”. Other researchers have considered discuss antimalware approaches to increasing the “survivability” of a wireless information
network. Jiang and Xue (2011) address a similar issue, using similar terminology.
Richards et al. (2008) define survivability in terms of the capability of a system to
minimise (without quantification) the effect upon the delivery of some value of a
defined disturbance. These authors propose a highly descriptive, framework
approach, as opposed to an approach using and generating well-defined numerical
values. Zhao and Xu (2009) consider the survivability of scale-free networks, and note
the effectiveness of establishing new links between low-degree nodes in this regard.
Gómez et al. (2011, p. 216) argue that Bayesian approaches use risk analysis and
the concept of survivability – i.e. the system can be expected to perform at design
level, while a hazard is within a given range of levels. Wang et al. (2011) state (in their
abstract) that "... [n]etwork security assessment is critical to the survivability and
reliability of distributed systems”. Finally, Li et al. (2012) state that network topology
is a promising approach to improving network survivability.
Serageldin and Krings (2015) acknowledge the potential for malicious acts, and the
potential for these to affect "survivability". No definition of "resilience" is provided, but
"resilient",

"survivability"

and

"fault

tolerant"

terminology

is

used

almost

interchangeably.
These published definitions and descriptions fall into two categories, i.e. those
in which a homogeneous system, such as a wireless network, may or may not
continue to offer its service. These cases are only marginally distinguishable from the
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discussions of “maximum tolerable disturbance” in the context of “vulnerability”, and
it is therefore argued that the “vulnerability” definition could be used in these cases,
and those in which there is a complex system, e.g. a warship, that is subject to multiple
“hazards” and may have varying levels of serviceability. The concept of serviceability
also needs careful definition: if a ship sinks, it has clearly not survived; if the ship’s
guns and engines are functioning, but its radar is not operational, an enemy aircraft
can approach with impunity, so that the medium-term survivability is problematic at
best.
2.4.10 Critical reflections on published definitions
Several common themes have appeared in the reviewed works.


For many of the terms, published definitions are not agreed upon.



Many of the definitions offered lack precision. Specifically, it can be noted that
the scope of the harm is not always identified – and failure to define the “harm”
precisely leads to ambiguity when other risk, hazard and vulnerability issues
are considered. In the context of this study, it is particularly important to
distinguish whether a specified “harm” is to the profit of a network-owner, or to
the end-user of network services.



Many of the offered definitions are not precisely scoped. It is notable that timeframes are seldom defined, but these actually have a practical significance.
Over a sufficiently long time-frame, the probability of almost any event tends
towards 1.0.



Many definitions note that, when high-level failures, i.e. harms, are
considered, multiple hazards must be considered and each hazard will be
associated with specific probabilities, maximum tolerable disturbance levels
and other factors. Despite noting the need to consider these factors, there is
both lack of precision and lack of agreement on the relationship of terms.



Few authors quantify the definitions offered.
The lack of precision of definitions, the lack of agreement on definitions and

the lack of quantification of relationships between relevant factors present difficulties.
This thesis must propose and justify a definition of vulnerability and approaches to
quantification.
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2.5

Application fields that are studied in the literature
Many related fields are very well covered in the literature: disaster

preparedness, engineering risk and some aspects of infrastructure robustness are
obvious examples. These fields overlap; however, each also has unique aspects.
Several “dimensions” have therefore been distilled from the reviewed literature, and
are summarised in the following table.
Dimension

Aspects

Harm object

•

Society, humanity or ethnic group

•

Region or city, or small community

•

Specific supply chain, commonly a commercial venture

•

Homogeneous network, e.g. a computer, water or power
supply network

Danger (hazard)

•

An individual

•

Natural disaster, e.g. volcanic eruption or an earthquake,
characterised by localised multi-system failures

•

General failure of a specific, homogeneous system, e.g.
communications, internet or finance systems

•

Specific hazard to a specific system, e.g. broken fibreoptic cable, malware on computer system, structural
member or equipment item failure

Time-frame

•
•
•

•

•

Immediate, i.e. typically immediate to a few hours; affects
non-storable consumables, e.g. electricity
Short term, typically a few days; a period during which
stores can be consumed
A “beyond-storage” time-frame in which reasonable
storage is exhausted, and failure occurs unless there is
a functional supply chain
“Maintenance” time-frame, typically months or years; the
time in which failure becomes common without
maintenance
“Replacement” time-frame, often years; after which the
equipment has reached the end of its working life

Table 2: Application fields in the literature
The initial literature survey revealed that certain application fields have been
the subject of significant study. These fields are described in the following sections.
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2.5.1

Society
Distinguishing what issues and aspects genuinely have “societal” significance

is no trivial exercise. Tainter (2003) has attempted to distil the issues that have truly
been causal in historical collapses of particular societies: his conclusion, in essence,
is that historical societies have collapsed when the burden of maintaining the society
has exceeded the benefit to its members. Tainter also states that his analysis is not
valid for current “society”, primarily because of the high level of interconnectedness
and interdependence of our current society. Diamond (2005) concludes that societies
fail when a critical component of their environment, e.g. forestation, soil or water
source, is damaged beyond regeneration. Earlier authors such as Adam Smith (1723‒
1790), as explained by Hayek (1976) and Toynbee (1934) have pointed out that such
ubiquitous concepts as perpetual growth are inherently impossible. Numerous
publications, e.g. Carreño et al. (2007), consider the consequences of geographically
localised natural disasters. Posner (2004) attempts to consider some of the societywide catastrophe scenarios from a risk and cost-of-mitigation approach. The literature
review revealed publications that analyse failures of historical societies; however,
although these suggest “vulnerabilities”, the literature review did not reveal any
publications that claim, with any adequately reasoned basis, to assess the
requirements for the survival of today’s society.
2.5.2

Ecosystems
The vulnerability of ecosystems has been studied by several authors who

generally consider a geographically defined area holding a variety of species, each of
which has evolved to the point where its viable options for food and survival are
limited. For example, Kartascheff et al. (2009) study ecosystem stability, but their
paper is of limited applicability because it defines stability in terms of the number of
species and their connectedness within an ecosystem. The paper does consider the
adaptation of a web, in terms of foraging adaptation, and defines the robustness of
entire communities (in terms of the fraction of species that survive after population
dynamics). The paper also identifies four types of food web model, i.e. random,
cascade, niche and nested hierarchy. Briske et al. (2010) study the vulnerability
characteristics of ecosystems and, although offering few quantitative approaches,
present some useful concepts, including (p. 37) the idea that “... [t]hresholds are
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defined as boundaries in time and space in non-equilibrial systems that separate
alternative stable states (i.e., dynamic regimes) organised around unique attractors
or equilibrium points”.
2.5.3

Infrastructure
Researchers, including Gómez et al. (2011), assert the importance of current

infrastructure to society. As national infrastructures are clearly associated with
technological contributions to end-user vulnerability, these must receive careful
consideration. However, it is significant that works previously cited do not specifically:
(a)

justify the “essential” nature of the infrastructures identified;

(b)

propose a clear definition that allows “infrastructure” to be identified and
distinguished from systems that are “not infrastructure”;

(c)

include, in considerations of vulnerability, the option of supplying end-user
services in a different manner;

(d)

consider the possibility of a disruptive technology, e.g. a major breakthrough
in energy storage and solar cell technology, which would make power
transmission grids irrelevant.
Published papers that examine infrastructural vulnerability include those by Li

et al. (2012) who, in the context of homogeneous systems, consider that network
functionality is commonly measured by average path length and connectivity.
Chopade and Bikdash (2011) initially focus on the vulnerability of SCADA systems;
however, their second major topic is the vulnerability of critical infrastructures, which
they identify as including power supplies, communications, transportation, water
supplies and buildings. Although this paper focuses on a somewhat narrow scope of
interdependencies, it does attempt to analyse the techniques that might be applied to
the modelling of interdependencies. Haimes and Jiang (2001) and Eusgeld et al.
(2011) address the issue of infrastructural interdependence, Eusgeld et al specifically
studying the interdependencies between the communications infrastructure of
SCADA systems and the electrical power distribution infrastructure. Gómez et al.
(2011) open their paper with the following statement:
“Socioeconomic development and sustainability highly depend on the construction
and operation of infrastructure networks. Therefore, robustness, reliability, and
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resiliency of infrastructure networks are vital to the economy, security and wellbeing
of any country”.

Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011, p. 2) state that "Examples of infrastructure
networks include urban roads, rail network, power grid, gas pipeline networks, water
distribution networks, and supply chains”. Although not specifically quoted as
examples of “infrastructure”, the authors note (p. 10‒11) "... western Australian gas
pipelines and... the sewer system”. Akgun et al. (2010, p. 3561) add “airports” to the
list of critical infrastructures, and describe infrastructures as
“Critical facilities are the systems that have a high impact to the psychology, health
and welfare of the population, and are essential to the operations of the economy and
government such as airport, dam, governmental facility, harbor, nuclear power plant
and oil plant”.

Oliva et al. (2010, p. 76) identify "Infrastructures such as energy grids,
transportation networks and telecommunications systems are critical to the welfare,
economy and security of every developed country”. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008, p.
1) state that:
“Infrastructures like energy and water supply networks, transportation systems,
telecommunications and, more recently, the IT realm are so vital, ubiquitous and
interlaced with the fabric of the societal dynamics and life that their sudden
unavailability, denial of service, or impairment may severely affect the security, welfare
and social health of an entire nation”.

Moore et al. (2007, abstract) state that:
“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Directorate of Information Analysis &
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), Protective Services Division (PSD), contracted the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Innovative Technologies Institute, LLC
(ASME ITI, LLC) to develop guidance on Risk Analysis and Management for Critical
Asset Protection (RAMCAP)" and "Underlying the need for a technical vulnerability
process was the realization that the potential for infrastructure protection initiatives far
exceeds the resources available”.

Nazarova (2006, p. 567) identifies the following:
“Economic, social, ecological, transportation, and other complex systems cover
practically all spheres of real life. Many of them, such as telephone, telegraph,
Internet, water pipelines, and fuel and power complex are geographically distributed
systems. The level of development of the country’s economy, and in extreme
situations, the lives of people depend on their state and quality of functioning”.
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Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004) note a list of infrastructures including
transportation infrastructures, communication systems, electricity transmission
systems, banking systems, water delivery infrastructure and process industries.
If it were possible to obtain power via solar cells, batteries and an inverter with
reliability and costs lower than via power station and transmission lines, then
individuals would do so. Similarly, if it were possible for individuals to safely treat
sewage less expensively than via centralised treatment plants, then citizens would
exert considerable pressure to gain permission to do so. Current infrastructural
system design has evolved under the twin pressures of adequate performance and
citizen pressure to minimise cost. Therefore, infrastructural systems do have several
characteristics. Firstly, large infrastructures will inevitably resist change (possess
inertia), and either actively or passively discourage alternative technical approaches
to the supply of needs. Secondly, the studies of infrastructural vulnerability tend to
emphasise the complete infrastructure as a unit – yet a power supply grid that splits
temporarily into sections, each of which has one generator, or a water grid that splits
into sections, each with one reservoir, causes little concern to the end-user. Some
authors do acknowledge this issue; for example, Werbeloff and Brown (2011) speak
of the “Security through Diversity” (STD) implementation strategy that is being
adopted for water supply in parts of Australia. Finally, it may be noted that, as an
infrastructure grows, so does the cost of both maintaining the infrastructure and
protecting it against both intentional and unintentional attack. This is effectively the
scenario examined by Tainter (2003) and, if unchecked, could lead to a service in
which costs exceed value. The interdependence of infrastructures is widely
acknowledged, e.g. by Haimes and Jiang (2001), but approaches for quantifying the
interdependencies and adequately addressing them are not well developed.
2.5.4

Supply chains
Studies of supply chains are generally focused on the interests of a corporate

owner, and hence extend neither to raw materials or processing steps nor to the enduser. Significant publications relating to supply chain robustness and/or vulnerability
include Chen and Lin (2012) who consider (Section II(A)) that complex supply chain
networks can be represented in graph theory notation, as a set of vertices
representing enterprises and edges representing flows between enterprises. They
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apply a simulation algorithm that systematically "breaks" nodes, starting with highestdegree nodes (p. 593), and recalculates nominated graph properties after each
iteration, equating these graph properties with supply chain vulnerability. Specifically,
this paper asserts (p. 594) that
“... under the restriction of a certain connectivity, the biggest remove scale of nodes
or edges which a complex supply chain network can bear is called the invulnerability
degree or stability degree of the network”.

Kumar et al. (2010, p. 3717) study supply chains and appear to equate risk
with harm, stating that
"Risk in supply chains can be defined as the potential deviations from the initial overall
objective that, consequently, trigger the decrease of value-added activities at different
levels”. They also state (p. 3719) that "This paper addresses such issues by
identifying and measuring various risks present at every level in a supply chain and
decides the optimal policy with minimum risk factors and overall cost".

They develop a generic mathematical model for a four-tiered supply chain approach,
i.e. suppliers, plants, warehouses and markets, and notation to allow the identification
of routes between one tier and the next below. Further, they note (p. 3727) that
"This hypothetical supply chain can be structured as a multiobjective mixed integer
programming (MOMIP) model. In this paper, the objective is to minimise the total cost,
TC, of the supply chain operation which includes supplier cost, production cost,
warehouse associated cost and market cost”.

Estrada (2007, p. 296) make a definitional simplification allowing a network
analysis of a food web. They state:
"In a network representation of a food web, nodes represent species and links
represent who eats whom in the ecosystem (Proulx et al., 2005). This kind of
representation permits to analyse the similarities and differences between complex
systems of very different nature, ranging from technological to biological and social
systems (Strogatz, 2001; Albert and Barabasi, 2002 ... ".

Similarly, Ludema (2006) provides an overview of supply chain terminology, quotes
graph theory and also identifies supply chains as "nearly decomposable systems".
The scope of the supply chain literature varies considerably: Kumar et al.
(2010) consider a generic manufacturing, warehousing and transport operation. As
previously noted, the defining quotation within their paper (p. 3727) is:
"This hypothetical supply chain can be structured as a multiobjective mixed integer
programming (MOMIP) model. In this paper, the objective is to minimise the total cost,
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TC, of the supply chain operation which includes supplier cost, production cost,
warehouse associated cost and market cost”.

In other words, for a closely defined subset of possible “supply chains”, they
demonstrate an analytical approach to maximising profit to the chain-owner, for
operations between some defined raw materials supplied to their warehouses and
some product available in a retail outlet. In contrast, Chen and Lin (2012) use a graph
theory approach similar to that used for homogeneous networks such as computer
communication networks. Their paper does not draw upon any actual measured data
or representations of real supply chains; it is effectively a theoretical exercise in the
application of graph theory.
2.5.5

Computer and communication networks
As Forester and Morrison (1990, p. 462) state "As society becomes more

dependent on computer and communications technologies, we also become more
vulnerable to computer and communications breakdowns”. Authors who have
published significant works in the field of computer and communications networks
include Idika and Bhargava (2012, p. 75), who state that
“… a security metric (or a combination of security metrics) is a quantitative measure
of how much of an identifiable security-relevant attribute an entity (e.g., a network)
possesses. In this work, we focus on improving three previously proposed attack
graph-based security metrics: the Shortest Path metric, the Number of Paths metric,
and the Mean of Path Lengths metric”.

Liu and Zhang (2011) examine a range of vulnerability reporting approaches, and
propose a composite scoring system to address perceived weaknesses of these
approaches. Tu (2000) has a single aim: to establish that the internet is, in fact, a
"scale-free" network, using the definitions of Barabási and Bonabeau (2003). Strigini
et al. (2007) comment extensively on the vulnerability and resilience of computer
networks, but without advocating specific approaches. In a seminal work, Doyle et al.
(2005) note the well-reported characteristics of scale-free (SF) networks, and
conclude disappointingly (p. 6) that
“It is certainly appealing that SF network models can avoid all Internet-specific
structures, such as protocol stacks, technological or economic constraints, and user
heterogeneity, yet make interesting and testable predictions. Unfortunately, this fact
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yields results that collapse when tested with real data or when examined by domain
experts”.

These analyses of “computer networks” have several characteristics. Firstly,
homogeneous networks are assumed, i.e. only one commodity flows through every
connection of the network, and there is basically one type of “node”. Secondly, there
is implicitly an ability to re-route traffic on an ad-hoc basis. It is noted that, whereas
these characteristics allow interesting options for academic study, they are limited to
narrow and tightly defined fields.
2.5.6

Power supply grids
As with computer networks, power supply grids offer scope for analysis, and

for optimisation as well as the examination of vulnerabilities. Although few authors
make note of the fact, they are actually not homogeneous because a grid would
commonly include more than one voltage level. Power grids are also distinct in their
operational characteristics: whereas a water supply is still “useful” if the flow is minimal
and a computer network is still “usable” if the dataflow reduces to a very slow baudrate, neither the power users nor the grid operators or the grid protection systems will
tolerate frequency excursions of more than about 1 Hz or voltage excursions of more
than a few percent from nominal values.
Researchers who have published significant analyses of the vulnerabilities,
risks and resilience issues of power supply grids include Buldyrev et al. (2010, p.
1025), who start by noting the problem of cascading failure across networks. They
state that
“We present exact analytical solutions for the critical fraction of nodes that, on
removal, will lead to a failure cascade and to a complete fragmentation of two
interdependent networks. Surprisingly, a broader degree distribution increases the
vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failure, which is opposite to how a
single network behaves”.

This paper cites a real-world situation "... power network and an Internet
network (a supervisory control and data acquisition system) that were implicated in
the blackout that affected much of Italy on 28 September 2003”. The approach taken
in this paper (p. 1025) is
“To model interdependent networks, we consider for simplicity, and without loss of
generality, two networks, A and B, with the same number of nodes, N. The functioning
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of node Ai (i51, 2, …, N), in network A, depends on the ability of node Bi, in network
B, to supply a critical resource, and vice versa”.

Baldick et al. (2009, p. 1) state that a "... vulnerable system is defined in [1] as
a system that operates with a “reduced level of security that renders it vulnerable to
the cumulative effects of a series of moderate disturbances”. The paper also makes
reference to "N‒1 and N‒2" design redundancy approaches. They also state (Col2,
p. 1) that
"At present, there is not a commonly accepted vulnerability index or assessment
method for power systems. If a power system loses a significant portion of its ability
to carry the power flows due to cascading line outages, it is considered a vulnerable
configuration”.

These researchers state (p. 2) that the "... TRELSS (Transmission Reliability
Evaluation of Large-Scale Systems) … is an industrial tool used to identify cascading
failure problems", and state (p. 4) that "... [t]he combinatorial growth in the number of
ways cascading failures can occur make them very difficult to analyze, and … develop
a continuous-time Markov chain model of a dependability system that explicitly tackles
this problem”. A graph theory approach to modelling a power grid system is proposed,
and these authors note the difficulties of this approach, stating (p. 5) that
“A cascading failure model based on small-world networks was proposed in … and
can be used to identify the vulnerable lines. The model assumes that a node will fail if
a given fraction γ of its neighbors have failed. Starting with initial failures on a few
isolated nodes, the process will become cascading when these initial failures lead to
subsequent failures due to exceeding of the fraction γ”.

The assumption of adjacent node failure is valuable, reflecting real world experience.
The researchers however conclude (p. 7) that a clear solution has not been found,
and state that
“Since power system cascading is diverse, complicated, and computationally
intractable, there is no single model, tool or approach that can address all aspects of
cascading or answer all the questions about managing the risk of cascading failures”.

The
2.5.7

Water supply networks
Water supply networks are functionally different in several respects from

power supply grids: end-users commonly have at least a nominal amount of storage,
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and the supply network may still be considered to be “functional” even if the quality of
supply decreases and the flow is reduced to a tiny fraction of the design flow; the
“design specifications” for the system are much less stringent. As with power supply
grids, water distribution “networks” tend to have few supply points and many smaller
off-take points. Water supply systems have been studied by many researchers,
including Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012), who model water distribution systems as
weighted, directed graphs, concluding that
"... the demand adjusted entropic degree provides a measurement of node centrality
refined and suited to the analysis of spatially organized infrastructure networks with
limited connectivity. In the absence of hubs and highly connected nodes, which are
responsible for a great percentage of network connectivity and regarded as the points
of vulnerability to targeted attacks in scale-free networks”.

This paper considers two well-documented real water distribution systems, and
concludes that critical nodes can, at least theoretically, be identified, commenting that
less sophisticated graph analysis techniques did not succeed in identifying more
critical nodes because they lacked the more sophisticated approach to edge
weighting and the weighting of the significance of specific nodes. Werbeloff and
Brown (2011) comment specifically on the cities of Melbourne and Perth, in the light
of severe stresses on water supplies, and Australia’s national decision to adopt a
“security through diversity” policy for increasing the security of urban water supplies.
According to these researchers (p. 2362):
“It is increasingly recognised that traditional urban water systems are ill-equipped to
effectively address these complex and interrelated challenges (Vlachos & Braga 2001;
Brown et al. 2009), leaving cities vulnerable to the effects of variable water conditions”.

This is a discussion paper, presenting a broad range of options under headings of
"threshold capacity", "coping capacity (damage restriction during an emergency)",
"recovery capacity" (damage reaction after an emergency) and "adaptive capacity"
(envisioning proactive planning). Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011) note that there are
fundamental differences between infrastructure networks, stating that geographical
constraints on systems such as water distribution networks impose severe restrictions
on network layouts, and require different analyses from systems without geographical
constraints. They also note (p. 4) that a proper representation of a water distribution
network would need to include pipe loss factors, pump capacities etc., but this is too
hard; they therefore adopt a simplified approach, treating networks as undirected
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graphs and "... statistical properties of network topology and applications of graph
theory to identify the structural patterns and building blocks of the networks”. Four
real-world water distribution systems are studied; the authors note the usefulness of
the graph metric, stating (p. 6) that
"... central-point dominance … which, in the analysis of flow networks, may be used
to indicate how network flow is controlled by centrally located point(s), or to quantify
the degree of concentration of the network layout around a center. Central-point
dominance is calculated by taking the mean over the betweenness centrality values
of all nodes indexed by the maximum value of betweenness (achieved at the most
central-point)”.

These researchers describe “link-per-node ratio”, “central-point-dominance” and
“clustering coefficient” values, which they claim is an indicator of path redundancy,
but later say (p. 7) that it is not a good measure. They also propose (p. 7) the use of
a “meshedness coefficient” as a better measure of redundancy. They additionally
state (p. 10) that
"One of the most important objectives in the operation of WDNs is to maintain the path
connectivity between the source(s) and the consumers (network nodes) and make
such path connectivity as short and efficient as possible. Therefore, instead of
assessing the efficiency based on the connectivity between all pairs of nodes, it is
more appropriate to measure the efficiency based on the connectivity between a root
node such as a reservoir and other nodes in the network”.

One such measurement is reported as the network’s route factor and is proposed as
the average of the individual route factors for each water source (to a defined point).
This is a remarkably simplistic approach to the issue. The paper comments on the
value of graph theory metrics, noting that it is possible to establish a threshold for the
random removal of nodes, for a specified degree distribution, and is related to the loss
of a network’s large-scale connectivity. They recognise (p. 12) that the actual
functional requirement of the network is the provision of water, and that supply nodes,
i.e. reservoirs, are most important even if these do not appear as highly connected.
They state (p. 12) that
“To this end, the structural vulnerability and robustness of a WDN may be investigated
by quantifying the level of optimal-connectivity of network design, by identifying critical
locations and the most influential components followed by studying their failure
consequences on network performance... one way to identify the critical locations in

49

WDNs is by detecting the cut-sets, i.e., the sets of components whose removal results
in disconnection”.

However, they also note that, for sparse networks such as most water distribution
networks, the measurements (route factors) generally equate to “1” and there is a
need for some other (undefined) measurement to apply to structural vulnerability and
fault tolerance. The paper’s conclusion states that
"Network robustness and structural vulnerability were investigated by using
techniques to identify the influential components and critical locations (e.g.,
articulation points and bridges) and quantifying the network’s well-connectedness with
respect to the existence of such locations, in the absence of degree-based hubs and
given the sparse structure of networks. Descriptive measurements, including those
derived from the spectral analysis of network connectivity and Laplacian matrices,
quantified the level of structural network tolerance against failures and removal of
components and enabled a basic comparison between different network designs”.

The scope of the study by Yazdani et al. (2011, p. 1577) is Kumasi, in Ghana, which
has a population of over 1.5 million people with rapidly growing water consumption
industries. Specifically, these authors state the scope of their work as
"We created four hypothetical network expansion options, starting from a tree-like
expansion with no loops, gradually moving toward more looped structures which are
deemed better-conceived networks with greater redundancy. Subsequently, we
performed the calculations for various resilience metrics and compared the results
with those from the unexpanded network to assess how robust the expansion options
are and how they contribute to enhancing or degrading the overall system robustness
and its ability to deliver service”.

These researchers note the effects of oversimplification in their concluding statements
(Col 2, p. 1577) that
"The proposed methodology may therefore be regarded as a relatively quick-toimplement precursor to more detailed trade-off analyses... However, it should be
borne in mind that purely topological measurements may only partially describe the
network structure and fail to entirely characterize its properties... This shows that
oversimplification of water distribution systems into abstract graph models is
extremely useful but far from sufficient for a comprehensive assessment of system
resilience and its robustness against perturbations and hazards …”

It is significant that water supply and power supply systems are both recognised as
homogeneous, and that in both cases researchers who have applied graph theory
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approaches conclude their research with warnings of the limitations of that approach
and the dangers of oversimplification.
2.5.8

Transport systems
Transport systems have much in common with water distribution systems;

both are geographically constrained and are considered to be “functional” even if
capacity is severely reduced. However, they have a key difference, which also
distinguishes them from computer systems: the transport medium is capable of rerouting – this is a function not of the “nodes” but uniquely of the actual medium
(vehicles) using the network. Derrible and Kennedy (2010, p. 3679) study transport
systems, emphasising
“In this paper, robustness deals more specifically with alternative paths offered to
transit users and likelihood of accidents/failures. Performing such an analysis is all the
more important considering it fits in the broader context of resilience (i.e. how cities
can respond to major disruptions)... On a larger scale, by looking at 22 transit systems
(bus and tramway) in Poland, Sienkiewicz and Holyst [41] found that some systems
appeared to show a scale-free behaviour, with scaling factors ranging from 2.4 to 4.1;
most systems also appeared to be small-worlds”.

The paper also notes (p. 3683) that "As a result, we prefer to use another
indicator... degree of connectivity... Mathematically, it is essentially identical to the
clustering coefficient defined above”. They continue on to define a robustness metric
(p. 3684), noting that a "... particularly adequate robustness indicator is the concept
of associativity that was introduced by Newman”. This paper is significant because it
studies a large number of real transport networks, but its only contribution is to
illustrate how these real-world networks correlate with theoretical scale-free/small
world networks. Nair et al. (2010) consider a large “InterModal” transport system, i.e.
a large port complex, which is categorised as a “transport system”, but is actually a
diverse production system in the port of Swinoujscie in Poland. These researchers
comment (bottom of Col2, p. 54) that no satisfactory definition of vulnerability has
been established. The paper references many other authors' attempts to measure
resilience and suggests (p. 55) that
"... the resilience definition adopted here for an IM component [alpha] can be
expressed as the post-disruption fraction of demand that can be satisfied using
specific resources while maintaining a prescribed level of service”.
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The same paper uses a graph theory notation, but defines (p. 56) capacity and
other constraints for each link. The risks to each link are assumed to be known
probabilistically. The paper proposes the calculation of a resilience index for each of
several levels of budget-for-repair, allowing economic decision making.
2.5.9

Analyses of interdisciplinary fields
Several papers address a number of fields. These papers include Werbeloff

and Brown (2011, p. 2362), who comment that
"It is increasingly recognised that traditional urban water systems are ill-equipped to
effectively address these complex and interrelated challenges (Vlachos & Braga 2001;
Brown et al. 2009), leaving cities vulnerable to the effects of variable water conditions”.

Akgun et al. (2010) propose a “…fuzzy integrated vulnerability assessment model
(FIVAM)” that is based on fuzzy set theory and a multiple attribute rating technique.
They also propose “…fuzzy cognitive maps (FCM) methodology…” and the use of
group decision making. They propose that these can be applied to any major
infrastructure. Robertson (2010) starts by noting the hierarchy of needs as proposed
by Maslow (1943) and correlating these with the current technological approaches
used for their supply. Crutchfield (2009) discusses the issues of technological fragility
without addressing specific details ‒ and certainly without offering any metrics or
approaches for improvement. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008) present a very broadscoped paper, which treats the whole world as "system of systems" and adopts the
approach of identifying a large number of "indicators", for which public data are
available, and using an algorithmic approach to combining these to show "surfaces",
whose shape can be interpreted to indicate vulnerability. LePoire and Glenn (2007)
present a qualitative analysis of the effects of technological advances both to aid and
to counter the threat of terrorism. Svendsen and Wolthusen (2007) use a modelling
approach built on graph-theory principles and present a more sophisticated model of
interdependent infrastructures, including the representation of flows and the storage
of components at nodes. However, their conclusion includes the statement that they
“... have presented an abstract model of critical infrastructures which aims to capture
essential properties of different infrastructure types while retaining an overall
computational complexity which makes it amenable for large-scale analyses. This
necessarily is less accurate than domain-specific models, but it does allow for the
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modeling of interactions and interdependencies which such domain models cannot
capture”.

Homer-Dixon (2006) notes that his three examples illustrate that society’s fate is
always uncertain, and that devastation can happen at any time (regardless of the
strength of the society), caused by a variety of complex factors. Van Blaricum et al.
(2005, p. 226) state that
"One promising tool for conducting the analyses described above is being developed
by the U. S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC). "Fort Future"
is an integrated suite of planning and simulation tools. One part of Fort Future is called
the Virtual Installation, or "VI". The VI is a GIS-based computable model of a
community. It includes buildings, utilities, and the transportation network and it can be
overlaid onto aerial photos for context”.

Three aspects of this paper are of particular interest: (1) it acknowledges the
interconnectedness of the utilities; (2) it is built around the use of a single (opaque)
computer simulation package; (3) despite reliance on that package, it does recognise
that running simulations with different types of redundancy and backup etc. will allow
the user to investigate the effect on multiple interconnected utilities. The main
assumption by Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004, p. 616) is that
“... operational definition of vulnerability adopts the emergent, consensual
understanding of vulnerability as a system’s virtual openness to lose its design
functions, and/or structural integrity, and/or identity under the combined interplay of
two sets of factors: U. Risk-featuring factors; and V. Management response-featuring
factors”.

In this paper, U and V are identified as membership functions of fuzzy sets and the
authors go on to note (p. 616) that "... an operable system may thereby appear as: •
Stable, and thereby featuring a low vulnerability; • Critically unstable/vulnerable; or •
Unstable, and thereby featuring a high vulnerability”. This is effectively a
representation of a complex system by using a large set of "indicators", each of which
is represented in fuzzy set notation. They conclude (p. 626) that
"Generic QVA models may be developed that, however, may not be universally
applicable ... That implies, inter alia, a sound choice of the U- and V-type physical
indicators, supported by a clear identification of the chief underlying concerns about
the targeted system’s safety. • It is submitted that, from the safety standpoint,
resilience may be less relevant than vulnerability. Resilience may come into play if,
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and when, the issue of making the vulnerability countermeasures cost-effective would
come into consideration.”

Rinaldi et al. (2001, p. 11) discuss a useful case study, and while they quote
interdependency, the description is arguable more closely related to the issue of
single points of failure for multiple systems. The case study is described as
“In the case of the Galaxy 4 failure, the loss of a single telecommunications satellite
led to an outage of nearly 90% of all pagers nationwide … From an interdependency
perspective, it also disrupted a variety of banking and financial services, such as credit
card purchases and automated teller machine transactions, and threatened key
segments of the vital human services network by disrupting communications with
doctors and emergency workers”.

Their definition (p. 3) is noteworthy: "This additional complexity exhibited by a system
as a whole, beyond the simple sum of its parts, is called emergent behaviour and is a
hallmark of...” complex systems. The paper defines several types of interdependence
between infrastructural systems, which need to be acknowledged. The paper also
notes (p. 19) the concept of coupling order ‒ of interdependence. The authors of the
paper propose viewing connected infrastructures using an “agent” approach (p. 20)
and they suggest (p. 16) that "... a comprehensive analysis of interdependencies is a
daunting challenge. Today’s modelling and simulation tools are only beginning to
address many of the issues outlined above: the “science” of infrastructure
interdependencies is relatively immature”. The paper also presents several
conclusions, including the six dimensions of interdependency, i.e. type of failure,
infrastructural characteristics, state of operation, types of interdependencies,
environment and coupling and responsive behaviour.
2.6

Published analytical techniques, related to technological vulnerability

2.6.1

Analysis and classification of published techniques
Amongst the literature relevant to the thesis topic, several analytical

techniques were identified. This section describes these techniques. This section
attempts to use a terminology that is uniform across the various named techniques. It
also attempts to define the techniques in terms of the inputs that are used in principle
or in practice, the outputs generated and the potential applicability to the field of study.
The boundaries of these analytical techniques are not clearly defined: some authors
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attempt to optimise resources expended against additional reliability to obtain reduced
vulnerability of systems such as supply chains, power distribution networks and water
distribution systems. These analyses also overlap with the operational analysis field
and related optimisation techniques.
2.6.2

Risk-based techniques
Risk-based techniques are characterised by the use of probability factors,

sometimes by a combination of a hazard-probability factor, a vulnerability-probability
factors and a potential harm. Classical risk analysis has been useful to the
engineering community, although it could be argued that this is due more to the
enforced discipline of completing a risk-register than to the rigour of the analytical
approach. In the context of computer networks, Idika and Bhargava (2012, p. 75) state
that "... a security metric (or a combination of security metrics) is a quantitative
measure of how much of an identifiable security-relevant attribute an entity e.g., a
network possesses”. Moore et al. (2007, abstract) state that:
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), contracted the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers Innovative Technologies Institute, LLC (ASME ITI, LLC) to
develop guidance on Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection
(RAMCAP) … a process is needed to identify the priorities for allocating these limited
resources. This process should be based on guidance that defines consistent,
objective, and integrated application of risk analysis methods”.

Einarsson and Rausand (1998, p. 535-536) state that "... risk is the “opposite”
of safety”. Some approaches to improving the estimation of probability have been
proposed. Timashev and Tyrsin (2011) develop the concept of system entropy, as a
more complete definition of the risk of failure: this definition is applied to a pipeline,
with several known defects, any of which could cause failure within a given time
interval if overpressure is known. The definition is useful and, in principle, could be
extended to other systems, but the cases for which it is practical to gather such data
are limited. Taking a quite different approach, Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011)
quote “Dempster‒Shafer theory”, which is a qualitative research technique that is also
intended to improve the assessment of probability. Newton et al. (2006) consider
Bayesian belief networks, for a similar purpose.
In summary, risk analysis is a topic upon which a huge amount has been
written: the papers described above are a small portion of the body of literature, yet
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are considered to span the seminal literature and be generally representative. The
specific issues that limit the applicability of risk analysis to the research topic can be
enumerated as follows.
(a)

The term “risk” is generally used in the sense of a “defined harm”. This is
distinctly different from the colloquial use of the term, which is more commonly
associated with simple probability, e.g. “a high risk activity”.

(b)

Various approaches, e.g. Dempster‒Shafer belief systems and Bayesian
probability calculations have been proposed to improve the consensus of
expert opinions of probability.

(c)

Approaches such as “system entropy” can, assuming the availability of very
detailed data, improve assessments of risk probability.

(d)

Definitions show a curious lack of precision in the degree to which they link
defined harm, strictly and only, to a defined hazard. Most risk definitions in
principle relate a “harm” only to a single specified hazard – yet “risk matrices”
commonly list major “harms” and a limited set of hazards that cannot even
remotely encompass the range of hazards that link to the defined risk.

(e)

Time-frames are seldom if ever defined, making the assessment of hazard
probability somewhat subjective.

(f)

Although a “scoring matrix” rather than a numerical multiplication is used, the
approach does tend to obscure the difference between large-harm events with
low probability and low-harm events with comparatively high probability.

(g)

Although the use of the term “vulnerability” acknowledges, semantically, that,
in many practical cases, the existence of a hazard does not inevitably lead to
the defined harm, the term generally is poorly defined and obscures a large
and very complex topic.

2.6.3

Accumulated scoring approaches
A number of authors have noted that, for many practical “harm” events, there

is a large range of types or categories of “hazard”; lacking any uniformity, these
authors have attempted to consider each disparate type of hazard separately, and
then to merge or separately represent the resulting metrics. Similarly for
“vulnerability”, some authors have developed metrics for “vulnerability” using various
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definitions of the term and various levels of precision of the terminology, and have
developed a metric of the general form of Equation 7.

Equation 7
where each “S” score is obtained from a lookup table that uses textual definitions of
various degrees of some attribute and assigns a numerical score to each ‒ or groupconsensus approach. As an example, Liu and Zhang (2011) analyse several
computer-vulnerability reporting systems and propose a composite scoring system.
The “scoring” approach is very common and coarse definitions (e.g. “High” “Medium”
and “Low”) are used in matrix representations of risk and consequence, in many risk
management systems, e.g. AS/NZS 4360:2004. MacKenzie (2014) considers various
types of indices, including numerical, colour-codes and letters, and recommends that
risk indices should be numerical and mapped from specific risk values. The
researcher also proposes that decisionmakers should consider developing measures
that are derived from several such values.
Several researchers have recognised the difficulties of quantifying networks
that are heterogeneous and that have factors that are not readily codified with graph
theory notations, and have attempted to address these issues by developing numbers
of separate indices and then combining these indices into a single value. Examples
of this approach are included in the work of Zhang et al. (2009), who propose
integrating the use of several types of index, including the capability of supplying
power safely, static voltage security, topological vulnerability, transient security and
risk indices. Afgan and Veziroglu (2012) envisage a set of "quality indicators". A
"disturbance" moves one of these from its static value and the system recovers, i.e.
returns to the static value over a time interval. The authors integrate the disturbances
over time, then apply a weighting factor to each of these integrals using a separate
weighting factor for each integral and then add the sum of the (weighting*integral)
values to derive a "resilience index" for the system. Wang et al. (2012) assert that no
single approach to the vulnerability of interdependent infrastructures, and hence a
framework of analysis, is required. They consider several graph-theory-base network
metrics as possible design criteria, consider long-term vulnerability and specific
vulnerabilities separately and attempt to rank the significance of critical components.
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Khatri and Vairavamoorthy (2011) offer what is effectively an accumulated scoring
approach, because they use a consensus approach to developing vulnerability
indices, and values for fuzzy set inputs. Gheorghe and Vamanu (2008, p. 3) state that
"A virtual example of vulnerability analysis, using an indicator-based diagnosis, for the
case of New Zealand is being presented, by way of an illustration” and "... whereas
for risk one does have a formula, that says that, the risk of a disruptive event equals
the probability of the event’s occurring, times the measure of event consequences
powered to a subjective consequence perception exponent”. In contrast, there is no
similar formulation for vulnerability. These researchers conclude (p. 8) that
"The exercise reported in this paper should be considered an investigation window
into the complex topics of vulnerability assessment... model adopted to understand
and quantitatively estimate the vulnerability of complex interdependent ‘system of
systems’”.

Moore et al. (2007) and Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004) also describe accumulated
scoring approaches. Accumulated scoring approaches have a common defining
characteristic: they identify a set of factors, then develop, by consensus or lookup
table or other approach, numerical values that may be precise or fuzzy for each of
these factors and then arithmetically manipulate the numerical values to develop a
single indicator value. The strength of this approach is that almost any list of “factors”
can be addressed and the weakness is that each of the “factors” actually has
dimensions, but the factors are treated as dimensionless when they are combined.
Two specific problems can arise from this weakness: firstly, the factors may be
interdependent; secondly, the numerical treatment can obscure underlying issues; for
example, one system may score high on one factor and low on another factor whereas
another system may have opposite scores for the same factors, generating the same
combined index.
2.6.4

FMEA and related approaches
“Failure modes and effects analysis” (FMEA), USDoD (1980) considers a well-

defined and generally simple engineering system, tabulating for each individual
component the consequences of failure (categorised as “fail open”, “fail closed” or “fail
fixed”). The FMEA approach will generally show just how many “hazards” can
contribute to a single defined “harm”.
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2.6.5

Networks and graph theory
A significant number of publications, e.g. Chopade and Bikdash (2011) and

Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012), apply the basic notations of graph theory in their
analyses; this approach therefore warrants a close examination. A network is
represented as a collection of nodes that are connected by “edges”. These can be
represented as a two-dimensional matrix of nodes, with the matrix values
representing the connections between each node. It is also quite possible to represent
a graph as a simple table in which each tuple corresponds to a “connection” or “edge”,
and records the start and end vertex and the edge details. Having represented a
network either as a table or as a matrix, various analyses can be applied. Scale-free
or “small world” networks can be distinguished, as explained by Barabási and
Bonabeau (2003) and others. “Connectedness” or various other metrics such as
spectral gap, algebraic connectivity, clustering coefficient, meshedness coefficient
and degree distribution can be calculated, as described by Yazdani and Jeffrey
(2012). Those researchers use these approaches to describe the topological
characteristics of a network and propose that the meshedness coefficient and the
algebraic connectivity coefficient are particularly significant. The effect on the path
between two vertices can be calculated, if a specific vertex or a set of vertices is
removed. The effect on the path between two specified vertices can also be assessed,
if one or more nodes are removed. Many analyses of this type have referenced the
seminal work of Barabási and Bonabeau (2003), who showed that a “scale-free”
network is robust against random node attacks but is vulnerable, in terms of network
performance, to attacks on specific, highly connected nodes. A network, as
considered in this paper, is always homogeneous. Although this conclusion has not
been disputed, other authors such as Yazdani and Jeffrey (2012, p. 3) state that "The
algebraic connectivity of a graph is a non-negative number whose magnitude
represents structural robustness against efforts to decouple parts of the network”.
These authors then move from an examination of the difficulty of assigning adequately
representative values to edge weights, to the use of the “entropic degree... a
quantitative measure of node importance by which network nodes may be ranked
according to their centrality and failure induced impact on network performance”.
These authors consider that their key finding is that the “demand-adjusted entropic
degree” provides a measurement of node centrality and is useful for the analysis of
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infrastructure networks that are geographically constrained. Yazdani and Jeffrey
(2012a) also develop several mathematical descriptors of water supply networks, and
attempt to correlate these with measures of "robustness". Graphical representations
allow these researchers to do several things, i.e. to apply rules and algorithms to
adjacent vertices or nodes, to model the concept that proximity increases the
probability of consequent failure, to statically or dynamically reassign either signed or
unsigned weightings to the edges, modelling their “capacity”, and to analyse the
number and location of vertices that must be removed before specified sections of the
network become isolated. Graphical representation also allows the number and
location of “edges” that must be removed before specified sections of the network
become isolated – or before the path capacity between them degrades to some
nominated level. By hypothesising changes to the network, it is possible to investigate
the effect, on any of the above assessments, of adding redundant edges at various
points of the network. Li et al. (2012), for example, focus completely on the efficiency
of methods for adding various targeted links to a "network" in order to achieve
specified "network parameters” or to develop metrics of how heavily loaded a network
or network segment is, compared with its rated maximum load. This offers a proxy for
“vulnerability”, if that definition of “vulnerability” is adopted, and is the same concept
as that mentioned by Günneç and Salman (2011), although primarily by quoting
Jenelius et al. (2006), who argue that “… vulnerability appears when the network is
under pressure with full capacity, and a small amount of further stress may cause a
major damage that may cascade through the system”.
Papers of particular note in this field include Shen et al. (2011), who present
one of the most comprehensive theoretical analyses of the “vulnerability” of power law
graphs: they do not attempt to use real-world examples, but their use of pairwise
connectivity does perhaps make the otherwise very abstract paper valuable to this
analysis. Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011, p. 4), commenting on urban water systems, note
that, to properly represent a water distribution network, it would be necessary to
include pipe loss factors, pump capacities etc., and, as the authors consider that this
is too hard, they propose a simplified approach, treating networks as undirected
graphs and using statistical properties of network topology and graph theory to identify
the structural properties of the networks. Yazdani et al. (2011) use a graph theory
approach to study the vulnerability of a specific water distribution system. Their paper
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includes (p. 1577) a table of the graph properties that are commonly used in this and
other works. As well as presenting results, this paper notes the limitations of the graph
theory approach, commenting (p. 1574) that
"A comprehensive assessment of WDN resilience would entail an analysis and
modeling of system performance or failure data … the data needed to support such
an analysis are typically non-existent ... proposed methodology may therefore be
regarded as a relatively quick-to-implement precursor to more detailed trade-off
analyses”.

Buldyrev et al. (2010) apply graphical representations to two interlinked networks (a
power grid and a SCADA system). These researchers start by stating the problem of
cascading failure across networks, and state (p. 1025) that
"We present exact analytical solutions for the critical fraction of nodes that, on
removal, will lead to a failure cascade and to a complete fragmentation of two
interdependent networks. Surprisingly, a broader degree distribution increases the
vulnerability of interdependent networks to random failure, which is opposite to how a
single network behaves”.

These authors use real-world data from a power network and an internet
network. Their approach (p. 1025) is
"To model interdependent networks, we consider for simplicity, and without loss of
generality, two networks, A and B, with the same number of nodes, N. The functioning
of node Ai (i1, 2, …, N), in network A, depends on the ability of node Bi, in network B,
to supply a critical resource, and vice versa”.

This is somewhat interesting, because the authors start by removing a set of
nodes from one network, then effectively use the 1:1 correspondence between the
nodes of one network and those of the other to derive a set of nodes to be removed
from the connected network. They state (p. 1028) that "After this work was completed,
we learned of the independent work of E. Leicht and R. de Souza, also addressing
the challenges of interacting networks”. Derrible and Kennedy (2010) consider
transport networks, and specifically an examination of actual rail networks, and state
(p. 3679) that "On a larger scale, by looking at 22 transit systems (bus and tramway)
in Poland, Sienkiewicz and Holyst [41] found that some systems appeared to show a
scale-free behavior, with scaling factors ranging from 2.4 to 4.1; most systems also
appeared to be small-worlds”. They note (p. 3683) that
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"As a result, we prefer to use another indicator, which is common in the graph theory
literature and was first introduced to transportation by Garrison and Marble [20]. It is
referred to as degree of connectivity and is extensively used in network research by
the transportation community. Mathematically, it is essentially identical to the
clustering coefficient defined above…”

Baldick et al. (2009, p. 4) consider electrical power systems. They state that
"The combinatorial growth in the number of ways cascading failures can occur make
them very difficult to analyze, and [37] develop a continuous-time Markov chain model
of a dependability system that explicitly tackles this problem”.

A graph theory approach to modelling a power grid system is proposed, and the
authors state (p. 5) that
"A cascading failure model based on small-world networks was proposed … and can
be used to identify the vulnerable lines. The model assumes that a node will fail if a
given fraction γ of its neighbours have failed … the process will become cascading
when these initial failures lead to subsequent failures due to exceeding of the fraction
γ”

The authors conclude (p. 7) that "Since power system cascading is diverse,
complicated, and computationally intractable, there is no single model, tool or
approach that can address all aspects of cascading or answer all the questions about
managing the risk of cascading failures”. Estrada (2007, p. 296) states that
"In a network representation of a food web, nodes represent species and links
represent who eats whom in the ecosystem … This kind of representation permits to
analyse the similarities and differences between complex systems of very different
nature … food webs have less-skewed uniform or exponential DDs (Dunne et al.,
2002a). However, they also display high fragility to intentional removal of the most
connected nodes.”

This paper proposes (p. 297) an interesting distinction between a network that can be
readily split and one that cannot. The concept of a good expansion network is
described as
"We start by defining informally the concept of network expansibility. A food web
having ‘‘good expansion’’ properties is the one that cannot be divided in at least two
isolated ‘‘large’’ parts by disconnecting a ‘‘small’’ number of nodes or links (Sarnak,
2004; Gkantsidis et al., 2006). These nodes or links, which make the function of
bridges between these parts, are known as bottlenecks. Consequently, a ‘‘Good
Expansion Network’’ (GEN) is a network without bottlenecks”.
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Wu et al. (2007, p. 2665) state their scope as "... the World Wide Web [2],
metabolic networks [3], electric power grids [4] and many others”. This paper quotes
(p. 2665) Albert et al. (2000) as the seminal work on network classification, and the
paper is built around the issue of whether the "attacker" has enough information to
"target" the most vulnerable nodes and hence the issue of whether, when
progressively removing nodes and observing network performance the least, most or
intermediate important nodes are removed first. Dekker and Colbert (2004) note, as
have other researchers that scale-free networks are resistant to random attacks, but
not to targeted attacks, and that some infrastructure networks, e.g. telecom networks,
are not "scale-free". Gheorghe and Vamanu (2004) state in the abstract of their paper
that:
"Quantitative Vulnerability Assessment (QVA) oriented standpoint. Complexity
induced vulnerability continues a line of work initiated under the joint Alliance for
Global Sustainability (AGS)-ETHZ project VAMCIS (Vulnerability Assessment and
Management of Critical Infrastructures)”.

This work is aimed at critical infrastructures, and these researchers equate
complex systems with graphical representations in which nodes (knots) represent
components or people etc. and links (edges) represent interactions. The researchers
describe (p. 78) "Connectivity as penetrability" and state (p. 79) "... higher connectivity
rhymes with a higher vulnerability”. The paper states (p. 79) that "... the higher the
vulnerability relevance of the knots involved in the exchange path of any knot of origin,
including the relevance of the knot of origin itself, the higher the vulnerability induced
in the overall system by the respective knot of origin. Assumption 3: the higher the
cumulated vulnerability relevance of the system’s knots, the higher the system
vulnerability itself”. The paper places a large reliance on DOMINO (decision support
system software). The conclusions are not supported by any data, and this paper
seems to primarily demonstrate the capabilities of the decision support software. No
specific infrastructure is examined, and no specific conclusions are proposed or
supported. Holme et al. (2002) present a purely theoretical approach, similar to many
others, considering graph theory properties and effects upon vulnerability. Edge and
node attacks are investigated, and the paper states (p. 056109-12) that
"None of the network models shows a behavior very similar to the real-world networks:
Even the clustered scale-free network model with both high clustering and the scale-
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free degree distribution…fails to describe successfully the scientific collaboration
network”.

Agarwal et al. (2001, p. 142) state that
"The objective of this paper is to present the basis of this new general theory of
vulnerability which is applicable to all systems that can be represented as a graph
e.g., traffic networks, pipe flows, electrical circuits etc.”

They develop (p. 147- 148) an approach that they term "clustering", which they
claim to be a process by which the structural vulnerability concepts can be embodied
into a graphical representation. Albert et al. (2000) have published a seminal work on
scale-free networks, concluding that "... we demonstrate that error tolerance is not
shared by all redundant systems: it is displayed only by a class of inhomogeneously
wired networks, called scale-free networks”. Tu (2000) has one single aim, i.e.
establishing that the internet is, in fact, a "scale-free" network. Misra et al. (2010, p.
560) state that
"When high dimensional systems perform critical tasks, the task is shared by and
dynamically allocated among the components. The ability to distribute function
dynamically enables robust and self-stabilizing function in a highly variable
environment, but breaks down when collective loads are excessive”.

These researchers’ conclusion (p. 560) is that
"We have developed a neuromorphic information processing pipeline that can
characterize the vulnerability of complex systems. The process consists of extracting
a dynamic measure of network activity and … succeeded in identifying extreme events
that are distinct from high demand but otherwise effective system activity”.

This conclusion uses the term vulnerability, but the approach and measure is more
closely related to other authors’ description of resilience.
The specific aspects of graph theory that affect its potential applicability to this
research can be enumerated as follows.
(a)

The “nature” of the edges is assumed to be identical – hence a graphical
representation of a transport system assumes that all edges are “roads” and
the representation of a water supply system assumes that all edges are pipes
carrying water. It is proposed that such systems be characterised as
“homogeneous”.

(b)

Many authors note that, for large networks, complete solutions are
computationally impractical in most cases. Some authors, particularly Gómez
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et al. (2011), not only acknowledge this issue but also propose approaches to
make the problems more computationally tractable. These particular authors
map a real network on to a “fictitious” network with hierarchical clusters – but
they retain the same simplistic definitions of the underlying network, which is
a road network, in which the probability of link failure is linearly proportional to
the length of the road.
(c)

“Nodes” or vertices are likewise assumed to have no function other than to
aggregate, accept, redistribute or dispense whatever flows along the edges.

(d)

The topology of the network is considered to be fixed; this presupposes that it
is not possible for an operator to re-route edges in response to a “harm”.

(e)

Whereas significant numbers of publications, such as Gómez et al. (2011),
use real-world network data as test data, many authors acknowledge that the
accuracy of the representation is problematic – specifically that there are
factors affecting actual network performance that are not captured by the
graph theory representation. Yazdani et al. (2011, p. 1581) state that
"However, it should be borne in mind that purely topological measurements
may only partially describe the network structure and fail to entirely
characterize its properties … oversimplification of water distribution systems
into abstract graph models is extremely useful but far from sufficient”.

(f)

Chopade and Bikdash (2011) consider the use of graph theory metrics for
SCADA systems. The paper does not actually produce an approach or a
metric that addresses interconnectedness ‒ it basically applies graph theory
to each of two networks individually, and generates graph theory results for
each. The conclusion states:
"In this paper we used graph-theoretic vulnerability analysis to study the
performance of networks … affected by the removal of vertices and edges …
analyzed the effects of vulnerability on the structure of the networks. The
major drawback with the generic graph analysis is that the performance
measures are not related to the practical decision-situation … careful to note
that the analysis of error and attack tolerance is perhaps too imprecise to
enable a realistic study”.

(g)

The definitions of nodes and edges are not necessarily simple: Guan et al.
(2011) note an approach for SCADA systems using a directed graphical
representation, where the nodes represent stages of a potential attack and the
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edges represent expected time-to-compromise for different attacker skill
levels. These authors also develop (using a set theory approach) a
“reachability set”. Mishkovski et al. (2011) make a very important distinction
within the application of graph theory to networks by distinguishing between
an approach that considers the capability of individual paths, and thus
distinguishes between a case where an edge failure causes flow to be
redistributed, and an approach where a failure actually causes a cascading
failure because of a sequential overload of paths.
2.6.6

Hierarchical systems
Several authors consider treating systems as fundamentally hierarchical (tree)

structures. In particular, Eusgeld et al. (2011) state that there is no universally
accepted definition of the term ‘‘system-of-systems’’ but consider that this phrase
should be applied to distributed and possibly independently operating systems that
evolve with time. These authors consider the topic of interdependencies between
critical infrastructures and reference the work of Rinaldi et al. (2001). These
researchers assert that the high level architecture (HLA) approach with an underlying
agent based modelling (ABM) approach is the best approach for modelling the
interactions between the SCADA system and the power generation system under
consideration. The model allows them to evaluate a small number of specific types of
“hazard”, and to detect some unrecognised vulnerabilities. This paper presents
preliminary conclusions: the researchers acknowledge that their model is still under
development, that their results are preliminary and that their model is highly targeted
at a specific case. The paper demonstrates that detailed modelling of a specific
system can uncover vulnerabilities, but the authors acknowledge that such a detailed
modelling approach cannot necessarily be extended to every case in which systems
interact.
2.6.7

Cellular automata and agent-based systems
Zio et al. (2007, p. 196) note that "The network security with respect to the

hazard is evaluated by combining the modeling and computational powers of Cellular
Automata (CA) [2] and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation [3]”. The authors identify (p. 197)
the basis of cellular automata (CA) computing as
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"CA are mathematical models of dynamic systems. The dynamics of CA unfolds at
discrete time steps on a discrete lattice of cells L, typically assumed homogeneous
(all cells bear the same properties) [2]”.

This appears to be useful for the specific cases investigated ‒ which are
limited to homogeneous networks, in which finite delays to "infection" are caused by
the network "edges". However, the usefulness is limited by the inherent "OR"
assumption, i.e. that a node passes "infection" to all connected nodes, as soon as it
is "infected" by any one of its connected nodes.
Oliva et al. (2010, p. 76) state that
"Infrastructures

such

as

energy

grids,

transportation

networks

and

telecommunications systems are critical to the welfare, economy and security of every
developed country …" The paper acknowledges the difficulty of adequate modelling.
The paper quotes Agent Based Modelling and Simulation (ABMS). In the discussion,
(p. 80), the authors state that "Although the IIM framework is compact, elegant and
capable of modeling cascading effects, the high level of abstraction does not support
accurate analyses of the real nature of dependencies”.

2.6.8

Other approaches and theories
A number of other theories and approaches are reported. The following

approaches have been applied to fields similar to that of this thesis, and so are
examined.
Normal accident theory: Perrow (1984) has proposed the phrase "normal
accidents", and has asserted that it is only necessary for a system to be complex,
tightly coupled and capable of generating a large harm in order for such a harm to
become inevitable. He proposes that individual errors and faults are inevitable and
that, sooner or later, a particular error will cascade within a tightly coupled system to
generate a catastrophe. Perrow (1984) basically asserts the initial premise for this
thesis but, where he simply asserts inevitability, this thesis characterises and
quantifies the exposure of a technological system and thereby illustrates how the
imputed vulnerability can be effectively reduced.
Chaos theory: “Chaos theory” considers systems in which minor variations to
input conditions may cause very large changes to outputs. Examples include weather
patterns and vertical pendulums. The theory is commonly associated with the
“butterfly wing” effect, an apocryphal scenario in which the beat of a butterfly’s wing
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triggers a cascade of effects leading to the downfall of a remote kingdom. The original
work in this field was by Lorenz (1963). Catastrophe theory has similarities to chaos
theory, dealing with the behaviour of systems that exhibit sudden changes in
behaviour, e.g. because of structural failure. As the current work concentrates on
characterising the relative vulnerability of technological systems to well-defined
changes of behaviour, these fields appear to have limited application to this work.
Complexity theory: Complexity theory has similarities to chaos theory, and
was historically derived from systems theory thinking, is primarily applied to
organisations and deals with systems of highly adaptive components. As such, it is of
limited application to the topic of this work. Exemplar publications include that by
Manfred (2010).
“Truck hit factor”: This measure, which has been given a number of names,
including “bus/truck factor” and “bus factor”, has been used in the software
development field to measure the number of software development team members
who could become unexpectedly unavailable, without jeopardising a project. Although
the context is a homogeneous system comprising only individual team members, the
metric assumes that any team member can take the role of any other team member
and so the factor is slightly different from the graph theory factor, which established
that a number of broken links were required to isolate system input from system
output.
Cognitive mapping: Murungweni et al. (2011) propose the use of “fuzzy
cognitive mapping” and apply it to the rural livelihoods and work in the Great Limpopo
Transfrontier Conservation area, which is in South Africa. Their objective is to assess
the vulnerability of the population to the various hazards faced. This is a qualitative
approach, in which stakeholders and focus groups define a set of state variables and
then the interactions, represented by directed and weighted arrows, between these
state variables. The effects of a small number of scenarios, e.g. drought, are also
represented by weighted directed arrows that are linked to relevant state variables.
The authors effectively consider that, if an arrow carries a heavy weighting (focus
group derived), then the target is highly vulnerable to the “source” of the arrow, which
they assume is the hazard. Akgun et al. (2010, p. 3561) state that “Vulnerability can
be defined as a ‘‘weakness in the system defended” in a most common and simplest
way”. This paper states (p. 3562) that:
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"Vulnerability assessment problem can be recognized as a group decision-making
(GDM) problem under multiple criteria. Therefore, there is a value in considering fuzzy
set theory and GDM methods for critical facility vulnerability assessment …”

This is an example of an accumulated scoring approach, in which a single
assessment is achieved by using a scoring system for disparate elements, and then
the “scores” (initial vulnerability values) are aggregated numerically. Newton et al.
(2006) use a Bayesian belief network to predict the impacts of commercialising nontimber forest products on livelihoods. Murungweni et al. (2011) state that
“… BBNs and FCMs have the ability to combine quantitative and quantitative
information and have some similarity in the way they use a transparent, graphical
representation of the functioning of the system, which can supplement existing, less
transparent frameworks that analyse vulnerability (e.g., Fraser 2007, Ericksen 2008)”.

2.7

A taxonomy of published techniques
Several orthogonal dimensions can be identified within these analysis

approaches, and will help the classification of the techniques described above. These
are proposed as follows.
Title

Classification feature

Time-frame

It is possible to consider techniques whose applicability is limited
to the short term, e.g. supply chain disruptions, to the medium
term, e.g. natural disasters, or to longer term issues, e.g. societal
breakdown.
Techniques can be classified according to whether they are
relevant to a localised geographical area (managing the effects of
natural disasters is a large field of study), or whether they have
wider geographical significance.
Techniques can be classified according to whether they deal with
a single, homogeneous “service” flowing in a network or diverse
“services” or “flows”, or whether the technique envisages the
creation of intermediate product streams. A system that considers
a single product or service can be characterised as
“homogeneous” and, in contrast, a technological system that
involves a range of goods and services can be characterised as
“heterogeneous” or “inhomogeneous”.
A technique can be characterised by the accuracy of the definition
of the technological configuration to which it is applied.

Geographical
constraint
Homogeneity
of technology
system

Accuracy of
definition
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Classification
of hazards
Result type

Input data

A technique can be classified by the approach used for the
identification and classification of harms and hazards, and
specifically by noting whether hazards are identified by
brainstorming approaches, or by some analytical approach.
A technique can be characterised according to whether it
develops quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative results –
and whether the results can be used to test whether a proposed
change offers any, or a defined level of, improvement in
vulnerability.
A technique can be characterised according to whether the
analysis is based on real data or on an expert opinion of
probabilities.

Table 3: Classification of published techniques

Table 4 lists the common techniques presented in the literature, and compares

Dynamic or static

Quantitative or characterised

Exposure quantification

Hazard characterisation

Hazard identification method

Harm identification method

Time-frame identified

System state defined

System configuration

System type

Name

them in terms of selected assumptions and scope characteristics.

Risk analysis

I

N

N

I

B

B

EC

N

C

S

Risk + Vulnerability

I

N

N

I

B

B

EC

N

C

S

System vulnerability

I

N

??

I

D

B

EC

N

C

S

Resilience

I

N

Y

D

D

B

D

N

Q

D

Accumulated scoring vulnerability

I

N

N

I

B

B

EC

N

C

S

Network model

H

Y

N

S

D

B

B

Y

Q

S

AB modelling

I

Y

Y

S

D

D

D

N

C

S

FMEA or FTA

I

Y

Y

I

D

D

B

N

C

S

PROPOSAL

I

Y

N

D

D

D

B

Y

Q

S
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Criteria

Values

System type

I for heterogeneous system, H for homogeneous system

System configuration

N for not explicitly defined, D for defined

System state defined

N for not defined, D for defined in detail, B for general system state (e.g.
bulk loading) defined

Time-frame identified

N for not defined, I for implicitly identified as “life of project”, D for defined,

Harm identification method

B for brainstormed value, D for derived value

Hazard identification method

B for brainstormed, D for derived from configuration

Hazard characterisation

B for Boolean, with assumption that it is above tolerable limit, D for defined

S for snapshot (i.e. instantaneous)

quantitatively, EC for expert classification, P for predefined, D for derived
Output type

Q for quantitative, C for categorised

Evaluation of system response

S for static, D for dynamic (time-domain response)

Table 4: Taxonomy of techniques related to risk and vulnerability
2.8

Conclusions from review of published material

2.8.1

Summary of published material
Several key points, relevant to the clarification of the field of research, can

then be distilled from the survey of publications.
(a)

The resilience-related techniques generate time-domain responses from a
specific system rather than considering what “breaks” the system.

(b)

The risk and accumulated scoring-related techniques do not explicitly
characterise the underlying technological system.

(c)

There is widespread recognition that complex and interconnected systems
tend to generate vulnerabilities.

(d)

The literature also clearly, and perhaps obviously, identifies that a hazard
exists only if it is linked to a “weakness”.

(e)

The graph theory approaches are relevant to homogeneous systems only.

(f)

The FMEA and similar approaches are relevant but need adaptation to
characterise the underlying system.

(g)

No quantitative measure of exposure (which is colloquially associated with
vulnerability) that can be applied to a heterogeneous system has been
identified.
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2.8.2

Analysis of gaps in the literature
Published studies have considered a number of systems, including water

distribution systems, power distribution systems, communications systems and a
range of supply chains. The effects of a failure upon an individual end-user are
considered to be significantly different from the effects of a failure upon a system
operator and there is a need for an examination that focuses on an individual enduser. Published studies that develop quantitative measures other than expertassigned scores have related to homogeneous systems, i.e. systems in which a single
type of goods or services is transported. The definition of scope established in the
introduction has been clarified to focus upon the end-user’s dependence on complex
heterogeneous technological systems. The literature includes many approaches to
the assessment of vulnerability. Most published assessments relate to systems, and
it can be noted that the focus on individual end-users allows a clearer definition of the
fail criteria for the technological system to be evaluated. Published studies have
revealed techniques that provide quantitative analyses of homogeneous systems but
not practical quantitative measures that can be applied to heterogeneous systems,
despite the observation that most technological systems supplying goods or services
to individuals are in fact heterogeneous. Analyses of heterogeneous systems have
generally not considered the specific configuration and the numbers of weaknesses
in a system, despite a widespread awareness that systems with more weaknesses
result in a user who is more vulnerable to that system. Many reviewed publications
have relied on expert opinions of the level of risk, yet have not addressed the case
where hazards are intelligently guided and whose occurrence is not random. Dynamic
studies of complex heterogeneous systems could be made for defined initial states, if
complete response functions for all components were available. Although certainly of
interest, published material has concluded that techniques to allow adequately
complete studies of this type are impractical because of the lack of availability of input
information and computational effort. Whereas high levels of vulnerability are
intuitively and generally attributed to long supply chains and complex systems with
"many things that can go wrong", there is a need for an approach that quantifies this
attribute.
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2.8.3

Summary; development of research question
In summary, an opportunity has been identified for the development of an

approach that will evaluate the vulnerability, incurred by a typical end-user, to a
heterogeneous technological system that supplies goods or services. The research
question originates from the observation that the identified group of end-users is
dependent for its continued mode of life upon the supply of goods and services that
are in turn dependent upon long chains of processes and intermediate products.
These long chains will probably expose the end-users to a deficit of security in the
continuation of their lifestyle. The configuration of these chains, and their length,
clearly contribute to the end-user's vulnerability, yet the effect of the length and the
configuration of these technological chains has not been adequately explored. The
research question proposes to explore this issue and to derive conclusions regarding
the exposure of present technological systems, and conclusions regarding means of
decreasing end-user vulnerability.
Chapters 1 and 2 have, by an iterative process, clarified the field of research
and reviewed the current state of knowledge in that field. These chapters have also
clarified a specific topic that is not adequately addressed in the literature, and have
demonstrated that a contribution to this topic would be of significant interest.
2.8.4

Research question
Deriving from this process, the research question is established as:
For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of vulnerability
can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used, and
what reductions can be obtained by changes to the technological approach or
configuration?
This research question can be considered in two parts, identified as RQ(a)

and RQ(b).
RQ(a): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of
vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are
currently used?
RQ(b): For goods or services delivered to end-users, what reductions of
vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach
or configuration?
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3.

METHODOLOGY

3.1

Introduction
This chapter develops a methodology for answering the research questions,

and for generating the contribution to the topic. The requirement for a quantitative
assessment of the vulnerability presented by a technological system makes it
essential to specify a method that has an established theoretical basis, to generate a
measure of vulnerability. The investigation of contributions of technological systems
to end-user vulnerability requires applied research in order to carry out an exploratory,
formulative and descriptive analysis of the topic. By applying a quantitative measure
of vulnerability, the research will gain familiarity with the extent of current
vulnerabilities and will develop new insights into approaches for reducing these
vulnerabilities.
3.2

Research phases
The methodology establishes five phases for the research. These are

described below.
Phase 1 develops and justifies a theoretical basis for the analysis of the
exposure of an arbitrary technological system; a method of application of the
theoretical basis is also generated. The development of this theoretical basis
is a contribution to the research field.
Phase 2 describes how the selected goods or services, which are to be the
subject of the initial analysis, are selected. Phase 2 also describes how data
required to analyse these technological systems is to be obtained, validated
and described.
Phase 3 describes the analysis (using the method established in phase 1) of
the data obtained as a result of phase 2. Numerically, this analysis
demonstrates the relative vulnerability of the end-user to the technological
systems used to supply each of the selected goods or services. The outcomes
of this phase provide the answer to Research Question (a) (RQ(a)). The
outcomes from this analysis form the basic data required as input to the next
phase of the research, and are likely to be as significant as the numerical
analysis of exposure.
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Phase 4 uses the outputs of phase 3 and the data generated within phase 2.
From these two inputs, this phase of the research generates a set of
hypothesises changes, each representing a specific change to the
technological system identified and described in phase 2 of the research.
These allow the hypothetical approaches to a reduction in end-user
vulnerability to be tested.
Phase 5 of the research again applies the methods generated in phase 1 to
the hypothesised modifications to original technological systems, developed
in phase 4 of the research. The outcomes of this analysis test the hypotheses
developed in phase 3 of the research, and allow answers to Research
Question (b) (RQ(b)) to be developed.
These research phases are illustrated in Figure 2.
3.3

Phase 1: development of theoretical basis
A metric is required to answer the research question, and a theoretical basis

for such a metric must be developed and justified. This section builds upon existing
techniques and theoretical bases, and on an analysis of issues not covered in the
literature, to develop a metric, and a theoretical basis for that metric, that can answer
the research question.
3.3.1

Theoretical basis
This section covers the definitions needed as the basis of any formulation of

a theoretical basis, and the criteria for a theoretical basis in terms of both defensible
theory and capability to answer the research question. In order to develop a
theoretical basis for "exposure", which measures the technological contribution to
vulnerability, several definitions are required, and are proposed in table 5.

76

Figure 2: Research phases.
3.3.2

Criteria for theory
The research field, as defined by the research question, specifies the

evaluation of the technological contribution to end-user vulnerability. The research
question implicitly includes several criteria for an acceptable theoretical basis.
(a)

As the "technological system" (as distinct from the final-goods-distribution
system) must create and supply goods to the end-user, a heterogeneous
system is described, i.e. a system having processing steps and intermediate
goods or service streams. A theoretical basis for assessing the contribution of
the technological system to end-user vulnerability must allow evaluation of the
contribution of heterogeneous systems.

(b)

The study must be indexed to the security of the end-user, as opposed to
either infrastructure or supply chain security per se.
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(c)

A nominated service level must be specified, to describe and quantify the
specified goods or services to be delivered to the end-user.

(d)

A quantifiable metric must be generated, and this metric must be
demonstrated to provide a measure of the contribution of the technological
system to the user’s "vulnerability".
Since the research questions seeks to “measure of vulnerability can be

attributed to the technological systems”, the quantifiable measure must be based
upon, i.e. derived from, the configuration and components of the technological system
alone, with no necessity for direct consideration of the probabilities of hazard
occurrence or the instantaneous states of the technological system, or the
correlations between hazard frequency and component state.

Term

Definition

End-user

The proposed approach is defined in terms of a single, representative
urban-dwelling end-user. It is proposed to simply note the number of
end-users likely to be represented for each example study.
For any case, it is necessary to define a service level for the goods or
services supplied to an end-user. This will allow a Boolean evaluation
of whether the service level is, or is not, available. Separate analyses
can be considered for differing service levels if required.
Defined as a heterogeneous system involving creation and
transmission of intermediate products and delivers goods or services
to the end-user.
A technological system has been defined to include processes and
intermediate streams that may include partially complete goods or
services, essential information etc. As a service level for the delivery of
the final goods or services is defined, the delivery of these can be
defined using a Boolean value (True/False). The level of intermediate
services can then also be defined, as Boolean variables, according to
its effect on the service-level delivery of the final goods or services.
Timeframes for consideration are:
• Operational time-frame, in which the technological system is
dependent only upon inputs in order to function.
• Maintenance time-frame, in which minor spare parts and additional
skills are required in order to return the system to operational mode.
• Replacement time-frame, in which major sections of the
technological system must be replaced.
These are proposed because they have well-defined differences in
technological requirement and hence significant differences in the
exposures calculated for each. Maintenance and replacement
scenarios include durations in which equipment can be acquired or
(re)created.

Service level to
end-user

Technological
system
Functioning of
technological
system
processes and
intermediate
streams
Time-frame for
consideration

Table 5 Proposed definitions of key terms
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3.3.3

Validation of theoretical basis
The theoretical basis proposed for the calculation of exposure is presented,

and, provided that the inputs are adequately defined as Boolean values, the proposed
theoretical basis allows calculation of exposure in terms of a Boolean algebra that is
provable in terms of formal logic. As proposed by Davis et al. (2007), the question of
whether the proposed approach will generate novel or more useful insights into a
phenomenon can be tested. Two complementary approaches are proposed. Firstly,
classical risk analysis can be applied to one of the examples selected for analysis as
part of this research; the comparison of outputs will illustrate whether additional
insights are generated by the proposed approach. Secondly, in the development of
the theoretical basis for the "exposure” concept, it was noted that homogeneous
systems can be considered as a subset of all possible heterogeneous technological
systems. It is therefore possible in principle to either take a homogeneous system that
has been analysed in a publication related to homogeneous systems, or to generate
an exemplar homogeneous system and analyse this using both the exposure
approach and one or more of the graph theory metrics that are commonly applied to
homogeneous systems. It would also be possible to use a process of formal logic to
show that the proposed exposure metric would generate outputs of equal significance
to the homogeneous system analysis approaches noted in the literature.
3.3.4

Implementation of analysis
The approach used to answer the research question represents each

technological system using a Boolean algebraic expression, and evaluates that
expression in a truth table, for combinations of inputs. Evaluation of that expression
requires that the inputs to each truth table line item be represented, and that the
Boolean expression generating the output from each table be calculated. Almost all
computer languages contain provision for Boolean operations and for the construction
of complex expressions by nesting these. It can be noted that software Expert system
shells are effectively no more than constructs of interlinked IF‒THEN‒ELSE rules
applied to named variables. As spreadsheets, and indeed almost all computer
languages, include the capability to represent Boolean expressions, the criterion for
the selection of an implementation approach gives prominence to the simplicity and
transparency of the representation of data and outputs. It is proposed to use a
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spreadsheet approach to the construction of truth tables for each example studied,
and it is noted that other approaches could generate identical outputs.
3.4

Phase 2: development of initial data sets
The research question relates to technological systems that deliver selected

goods and services to end-users. Phase 2 of the research has generate the data
relating to technological systems for delivering selected goods or services to endusers. The task has two distinct sub-tasks: making the selection of the goods or
services to be analysed, and acquiring and verifying the data for initial analysis.
3.4.1

Selection of examples for analysis
The research question indicates that the required data for analysis will relate

to selected goods or services without further definition, and to end-users ‒ also
without further definition. The analysis then requires the selection of goods or
services, and a definition of the end-user. Earlier sections of the thesis have included
background and scoping statements that provide context for this work, and hence can
guide the definitions and selections made within this task. Specifically, an earlier
section of the thesis has noted that urban-dwelling individuals requiring essential
goods and services are increasingly vulnerable to failures of complex, interlinked and
heterogeneous technological systems. Current risk analysis techniques do not
quantify the impact of existing configurations, or proposed reconfigurations, of a
technological system from an end-user perspective. There is a need for a means of
comparing the vulnerabilities imposed on such end-users by technological systems,
and of evaluating the changes proposed to reduce end-user vulnerability. As analysis
is to be applied to a selection of goods or services, example studies involving selected
goods or services are implied. Under the heading of "When to Use a Case Study
Approach", Baxter and Jack (2008) consider that a case study approach should be
used when the objective is to answer questions of how and why observed outcomes
occur and when it is important to consider the contextual conditions of the studied
case.
End-user. In selecting case studies, Eisenhardt (1989) notes that the
essential first step is defining the "population" from which the case studies will be
selected. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 536‒537) proceeds to note that for the "selection of
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cases... the concept of a population is crucial, because the population defines the set
of entities from which the research sample is to be drawn". For this study, the
"population” is the complete set of end-user needs. The research question neither
refines the population by stipulating typical nor refines any other particular descriptor
for the end-user; however, the introduction to this thesis references urban individuals
and cites apartment dwellers as an example. This effectively narrows the scope of the
"population". Although the research question does not include any finer definition,
considerations include the scope of persons who could possibly fit within the
definition, the homogeneity or otherwise of the group and various practical issues.
Practical considerations would suggest that data would be indexed against users in
significant Australian or New Zealand cities. This practical consideration would need
to be challenged if it were considered that such cities were sufficiently atypical, in
terms of the technological systems used to supply similar end-user needs, as to
negate their use as an indexation basis. Australian and New Zealand cities are
considered to be reasonably typical of cities of similar size in the developed world, in
terms of technological approaches to supplying end-user needs, and hence are used
as a basis for the indexation of data. It is therefore proposed to define the "end-user"
as an individual who fulfils the following criteria.
(a)

Lives in an apartment, and hence has limited practical capability for farming
or for large-area solar collectors.

(b)

Lives close to the centre of a city of more than about 200,000 individuals.

(c)

Lives in Australia or New Zealand.

(d)

Is employed, i.e. is assumed not to be severely financially constrained.

(e)

Commutes more than 10 km to work, which is considered to be beyond the
range of cycling or walking, for the majority of persons.
The selected group may be assumed to have built their lifestyle around a set

of assumptions regarding the availability of certain goods and services; other groups
have found alternative approaches to the disposal of sewage, the acquisition of fresh
foods etc. However, for the selected group, it is not practical to transition to such
alternative approaches in the time-frame that would be required, and hence the
continued supply of services in substantially the current manner can be claimed to be
“essential” to this common lifestyle.
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Selected goods or services. The research question identifies supplied
goods or services. A large range of goods and services exists. Several approaches
could be proposed for the selection. It would be possible to use a hierarchy of needs,
e.g. that proposed by Maslow (1943), and to make an arbitrary selection from each of
the tiers of needs identified. It would also be possible to use a hierarchy of needs, e.g.
that proposed by Maslow (1943), and to select, from one tier, all or most of the items
that apply to the defined end-user. For example, if criteria for physical survival were
selected, food, water and warmth needs would be identified. Yet another option would
be to identify needs that are typical of some broad categories of indicative
technological system that are involved in their production and delivery.
The analysis of the research opportunity has not specifically hypothesised that
the current technological systems used to supply needs that are more essential to the
target group were exposed to greater vulnerability than the current technological
systems used to supply less essential needs; the analysis also has not hypothesised
that the exposure of the technological systems and the resultant user vulnerability
were correlated with the level of need. For this reason, approaches (a) and (b) are not
proposed. The analysis of the research opportunity developed a hypothesis that some
types of goods or services were currently more vulnerable than others, and
additionally hypothesised that there were features of many current technological
systems that represented particularly high vulnerability. Provision for testing these
hypotheses suggests the need to identify broad categories of goods or services
having somewhat similar technological approaches within categories, but the greatest
breadth across categories. This reasoning suggests that a theoretical approach rather
than a random sampling approach should be adopted for the selection of the goods
or services to be studied. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537) explains that, in such an
approach, cases "... chosen to fill theoretical categories and provide examples of polar
types... random selection is neither necessary nor even preferable”.
Table 6 sets out several categories of goods or services from which case
studies could be selected. A larger “population” of candidate goods and services could
be developed, but the items listed in Table 6 are considered to be both significant and
representative of a range of technological sophistication levels and end-user needlevels. Each item is described, and a very coarse-grained categorisation is made of
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the level of need of the service, and the technological level of the current means of
providing the service.
I

Need
Water
Sewage

Need
level
High
High

Tech.
level
Low
Med

1
2
3

Power

High

High

4

Petrol

High

Med

5

Personal
travel Med
(few tens of km)
Long-distance
Low
transport
Simple message
Med

High

8

Personal or work
information

9

Description

High

Potable water supply
Sewage disposal for apartment
dweller
Assume mains voltage (i.e. within
acceptable voltage range)
Petrol delivered at local petrol
station
Implying petrol or diesel, and road
and car
Generally implying air travel

High

A message to another individual

Low

High

Targeted first-aid

High

High

1

Perishable food,
local supply

High

Med

1

Perishable food,
remote supply

High

High

1

Long-life
foodstuff, local
manufacture
Long-life
foodstuff, remote
manufacture

High

Med

High

High

Essential ongoing
Medicine

High

High

Capability to store and retrieve,
view, edit and share personal
information – family records,
important writings, music, business
and design information
Case where required response to a
medical situation is simple, but
diagnosis and communication of
correct action is essential. Choking,
childbirth, fish-hook removal
Implying
short-shelf-life
food
requiring limited cold chain needed
for distribution and chilling at enduser dwelling
Implying
short-shelf-life
food
requiring sophisticated cold chain
distribution system and postharvest treatment needed for
distribution and chilling at end-user
dwelling
No cold chain required. Limited
packaging required for transport.
Limited stocks normally held
Sophisticated
packaging
and
distribution chain required, possibly
with bulk and retail packaging
separated and storage of seasonal
produce. No cold chain required
Insulin? Clotting factor? Ventolin™,
anti-coagulant, anti-depressants

6
7

1

1
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1

Essential specific High
medicine

High

1

Basic medicine

High

High

1

Education for
children

High

Low

1

Basic detergent

Med

Med

1

Gas

Med

High

Vaccination for disease outbreak –
requires cold chain distribution of
vaccine
Antibiotic, pain relief, dental care,
blood transfusion
Subset of receiving and accessing
non-stored information or of
exchanging structured information
In the form of either soap or
equivalent (personal, clothes and
cooking utensil washing)
Capability to cook food

Table 6: Identification and selection of examples for study
In order to generate the most broadly applicable answers to the research
question, the examples selected should be representative of a range of products or
services and typical of some broad categories of technological system required.
These need to be representative and unbiased. The highlighted items from the above
table represent both systems that are primarily long-life infrastructural systems
(sewage), systems involving primarily the exchange of information, systems requiring
planned and ad-hoc specialised production and delivery systems, and systems
requiring essential commodities (e.g. fuel) and are therefore selected for study. As
there is a need for comparison between systems and as it is not practically possible
to select more than a moderate number for study, the above is considered to be a “fitfor-purpose” approach to the selection of examples for analysis.
3.4.2

Definition of examples
A methodology for defining the scope of the selected initial example studies,

and for obtaining the raw data for each, is required. This requires a decision on the
type of study to be undertaken.
Type of data required. Having selected examples of goods or services for
study, a methodology for acquiring the data for initial analysis is required. It would be
possible to identify a particular end-user, i.e. a specific individual, and a small number
of clearly identified goods or services acquired on specific dates. The technological
system that supplied those defined items could then be identified and would comprise
experimental data. This would fall within Andrade's (2009, p. 20) definition.
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"The case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident”.

Yin (1984) develops a similar definition, i.e. that case studies are rich, empirical
descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon. A diametrically opposite
approach would be to simply hypothesise example cases for the purpose of testing a
proposed analysis method. Approaches similar to this are taken by some authors, e.g.
Shen et al. (2011) in the investigation of theoretical aspects of networks. In
considering the approach to be used, it is useful to review the process leading to the
definition of the research topic. It was hypothesised that there were common factors
spanning technological systems, which contributed to the vulnerability of a wide
spectrum of end-users; this hypothesis needs to be tested. The research question
additionally proposes a requirement to explore, quantitatively, the effects of
hypothetical changes to technological systems. The "case study" approach, requiring
a detailed description of a very specific example, therefore seems likely to fail to draw
out the generality of conclusions indicated as required by the research question, and
"constructed" examples will not offer the level of credibility required in order to answer
the research question.
It is therefore proposed that, instead of analysing case studies, experimental
data from a range of primary and secondary sources will be used to develop typical
data that are demonstrably representative of the technological systems delivering the
selected goods or services. For example, rather than examining the specific steps
that conclude with a specific cabbage arriving on a particular individual's dinner plate,
the steps relevant to a small range of fresh green vegetables, to a person assumed
to live in a representative inner city area, will be examined and a dataset that is
representative of the technological system currently used to deliver perishable, locally
produced foodstuffs to an end-user in an apartment building will be assembled. This
approach effectively defines “simulation modelling”, generally following the
description used by Davis et al. (2007), who defined simulation as "… a method for
using computer software to model the operation of real-world processes, systems, or
events (Law & Kelton, 1991)”.
Format of data required. The data for evaluation will then consist of
descriptions of technological processes, intermediate streams and transport and
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communication paths, raw materials and finished goods or services of the complete
technological system required to deliver specified goods or services to end-users.
These descriptions must be such that input parameters to the quantitative analysis
method can be generated from the descriptions.
Methodology for acquisition of data. A definition of a representative "enduser" has previously been developed, and a small number of goods or services have
been selected for evaluation. A description of the technological system, demonstrated
to be representative of real-world cases, is required for each example studied. This
section considers methodological options for acquiring the required data for each
goods or service example to be analysed. The methodological options for acquiring
the required data, for each example of goods or services to be analysed, include a
survey approach, a multi-case study approach and a hybrid of these approaches. It is
quite possible to use either informal case study data or indeed surveyed data as a
means of ensuring that a simulation is an adequate representation of the "real world".
Each of the candidate methodologies for data acquisition has specific characteristics;
the positive and negative contributions towards answering the research question must
be considered in selecting the methodology to be applied.
A hybrid approach is proposed, in which a "construct" dataset is developed for
each selected goods or service example using background knowledge and publicly
available information, and specific items of each such dataset are tested by limited
survey of actual examples of the technological systems used for the particular goods
or services. This approach is practical, and since the data is representative of real
systems, its analysis can reasonably be claimed to generate useful and demonstrably
valid answers to the research question. The proposed approach can be illustrated
with an example: if "petrol supply at a local station" is the example of goods or
services, background knowledge would be quite sufficient to establish that bulk
supplies arrive via diesel-fuelled tanker and that electric pumps are used to meter and
dispense the petrol. A relatively simple survey of retailers would confirm the
approximate number and location of bulk supplies and the number of refineries. The
use of selected sources of information to confirm specific aspects of example datasets
is well known in case study literature; for example, Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 554)
state
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“A hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, a strategy
which also enhances data credibility … Potential data sources may include, but are
not limited to: documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artefacts, direct
observations, and participant-observation... In case study, data from these multiple
sources are then converged in the analysis process rather than handled individually”.

In summary, datasets for the technological systems representative of those
used for the delivery of each of the selected goods or services, to a representative
end-user, will be developed from background knowledge plus publicly available
information, and selected aspects will be clarified and validated by enquiry and by
survey of actual systems. In validation of simulation data under the heading of
"Strategies for Achieving Trustworthiness in Case Study Research", Baxter and Jack
(2008) consider the importance for qualitative research of providing enough detail to
allow the reader to assess the trustworthiness of the data and hence the credibility of
the analysis. They note that such credibility will require careful formulation of the
question, appropriate selection of case studies and sampling methods, plus
systematic and detailed handling of information.
Adopting these strategies, this research will ensure that enough detail is
provided to allow readers to assess the validity of the work, ensure that the research
question is clearly written and use sampling strategies that will ensure that the
simulation case studies are indeed representative of actual data and that the basis for
this assertion is documented.
3.5

Phase 3: analysis of examples

3.5.1

Analysis outputs
The analysis of the initial examples will generate measures of the absolute

and relative "exposure" of the technological systems that are studied. The theoretical
basis of the proposed metric is developed within Chapter 4, where the validity of the
Boolean algebraic representation of the technological system is argued, and where
the exposure metric is justified as a valid measure of the contribution to the end-user's
vulnerability. The exposure metric is established as the primary, but not the only,
analysis approach for individual example studies. Beyond the metric of exposure, the
examples will be treated in a similar way to case studies, and the processes of theory
building from case studies, as described by Alaranta (2006), will be used. The process
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of defining the components and boundaries of each exemplar technological system,
and identifying each point of exposure, whether to single or multiple failures, is also
an output of the investigation and allows an analysis of the specific contributors of
various subsystems to the exposure metric.
This quantitative plus qualitative approach will analyse the hypothesis that
some common technological systems are more exposed than others – and provide
insights into the specific subsystems whose exposure values contribute most to the
vulnerability of the end-user. In addition to the analytical method developed in Chapter
4 of this thesis, classical risk analysis of one of the examples will be carried out; this
will demonstrate whether additional insights are generated by the evaluation of
exposure for that example.
3.5.2

Interpretation of analyses
The dataset used as the basis for analysis, plus the information resulting from

the analysis of the dataset, effectively form a "case study”, in the terms used by (e.g.)
Eisenhardt (1989) and also Yin (1984), who describe case studies as detailed
descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon.
In case study literature, the process of deriving theory and/or hypotheses from
case studies is described by authors such as Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), who
note the research strategy of building theoretical constructs or propositions from
empirical evidence described in case studies. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) also
note that the process of building theories from case studies is a process that is poorly
codified. An exposure metric, as developed in this thesis, is a single compound
integer; it is useful for ranking the relative vulnerability of technological systems and
for quantitatively assessing alternative proposals for changes to a particular
technological system. The research question, "For goods or services delivered to endusers, what measure of vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems
that are currently used, and what reductions can be obtained by changes to the
technological approach or configuration?", implies a process of review and a process
for the development and testing of theories and/or hypotheses. The analysis of the
initial examples will allow the identification of the specific processes and streams
(components of the technological systems) that contribute to the exposure of each
studied system, and will allow descriptors of these to be categorised, with a view to
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developing propositions that show generalisable principles that, in ranges of
technological systems, cause increases in exposure, and hence in vulnerability of the
end-user who depends upon the system. These identifications will also provide the
foundation for the formulation of hypotheses (hypothetical theories) for a reduction in
vulnerability.
3.6

Phase 4: hypothesising and testing changes to examples

3.6.1

Generating hypothetical changes
As the generation of alternatives is dependent on the outcomes of the initial

analysis, this is the aspect that can be least well defined in advance of the initial
analysis work. This exploratory research process of examining the results of the initial
dataset analyses, proposing technological alternatives and examining the effects of
proposed changes is considered to be one of the most potentially valuable aspects of
the research. Davis et al. (2007) note that
“Although scholars writing about theory development (e.g., Dubin, 1976; Pfeffer, 1982;
Priem & Butler, 2001; Sutton & Staw, 1995; Whetten, 1989) may have different
emphases, most agree that theory has four elements: constructs, propositions that
link those constructs together, logical arguments that explain the underlying
theoretical rationale for the propositions, and assumptions that define the scope or
boundary conditions of the theory. Consistent with these views, we define theory as
consisting of constructs linked together by propositions that have an underlying,
coherent logic and related assumptions”.

The research question proposes examining the effect of changes to the initial
datasets (current representative technological systems). The basis for these changes
will be developed as an outcome of the analysis of the initial datasets, i.e. if a particular
item is found to contribute significantly to vulnerability in more than one of the initial
datasets, then it would seem to be reasonable to define the characteristics of the item,
seeking common factors. The identification of common contributors to user
vulnerability will also allow the generalisation of the approaches to a reduction in user
vulnerability.
This is considered to be a valid approach for answering RQ(b). Eisenhardt
(1989) provides a tabular breakdown of the steps required to generate theories and/or
hypotheses from case studies; in part, this process includes (Table 1) the "Interactive
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tabulation of evidence for each construct" and “search evidence for "why" behind
relationships…” Eisenhardt (1989, p. 539) also notes that this analysis of "within case"
data is the "least codified part of the process". The inputs to the theory and hypothesis
development task are the outputs of the analysis task. It must be noted that the
analysis task is a simulation, rather than a case study, under the definitions used by
Yin (1984) or Andrade (2009).
Having observed common characteristics of the processes and streams,
which would be considered to be "constructs" in the term used by Davis et al. (2007)
that contribute to the vulnerability of the end-user across multiple examples,
propositions for the underlying causes can be assembled and categorised. From
these propositions, hypothetical changes can be identified for testing.
3.6.2

Analysis of effect of hypothesised changes
RQ(b) is a "hypothesis-testing research" type of question, requiring

approaches appropriate for this type of question. Within this task, technological
changes that hypothetically reduce end-user vulnerability associated with the delivery
of a particular type of goods or service that were developed in phase 4 will be tested.
The test approach will be identical to that used in phase 3 of the research. Effectively,
this task will be close in nature to an "instrumental" type of case study, as defined by
Baxter and Jack (2008), i.e. accomplishes more than just understanding a situation,
and additionally helps to refine theory and assists in our understanding of other
matters. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 546) states in her conclusion that "... one strength of
theory building from cases is its likelihood of generating novel theory", which is
considered as justification for the approach. Hypotheses will have been formed by
detailed observation of the specific processes, streams and subsystems that
contribute to the exposure value, by deducing common characterisations of these,
and

then

formulating

exposure-reducing

hypotheses

based

on

those

characterisations. The hypotheses will be tested firstly by simply observing decreases
in exposure values for the delivery of the same service and service level, to the enduser, and by critically assessing whether the characterisations of exposure causes
are either valid or optimal.
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3.7

Phase 5: development of conclusions

3.7.1

Answering the research question
RQ(a) asks “For goods or services delivered to end-users, what measure of

vulnerability can be attributed to the technological systems that are currently used?”
RQ(b) asks "For goods or services delivered to end-users, what reductions of
vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach or
configuration?" The "what reductions" phrase in RQ(b) indicates a need for a
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the effect of each hypothesised change.
Having tested the propositions (that are embodied in hypothetical changes),
Chapter 8 not only will report the outcomes in terms of contributions to the vulnerability
of the end-user, and thus supply direct answers RQ(b), but also will test the
categorisations used to develop hypotheses and will synthesise the tested
propositions into a small set of principles that could be described as "coherent logic",
in the terms used by Davis et al. (2007). These, demonstrably generalisable principles
will supply the most important contribution of the study.
The description and the definition of technological system “exposure” are
considered to represent a contribution to the body of knowledge. The contribution can
be described as follows:
(a)

They expand both the concept of risk analysis, which is generally applied to a
whole system without detailed indexation to system configuration, to take
account of the configuration of the technological system in question. By
insisting on a tighter definition of the system and the time-frame in question,
more rigorous outcomes can be expected from the application of the risk
analysis approach.

(b)

They specifically identify the importance of identifying loci of weakness in a
technological system, without consideration of the probability of hazard.

(c)

They identify and describe the concept that, for a technological system
supplying goods or services to an end-user, a (mis)guided hazard has a
qualitatively different effect from a probabilistic hazard.

(d)

They allow the consideration of heterogeneous systems, which is not possible
using the graph theory analyses applied to homogeneous systems.
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(e)

They allow demonstration, by reference to measurement theory, that they are
a valid measure of the contribution of the defined technological system to an
end-user's vulnerability.

(f)

They allow the hypothesising of principles based on an analysis of initial
examples.

(g)

They allow testing of these principles by analysing hypothetical changes to
initial examples, showing that the principles are generalisable.
Chapter 1 has described the significance of the field of research. Answers and

conclusions generated in this field can therefore be assumed not only to represent a
significant contribution to the field of study but also to offer valuable application to
society.
3.7.2

Development of general conclusions
The results from the analysis of hypothesised changes to the examples will

themselves be reviewed. From the conclusions related to the example studies, more
general conclusions regarding the value of the approach, and the applicability of the
generalised conclusions, as well as the conclusions related to the specific examples
will be presented.
3.8

Conclusion of methodology description
The methodology includes the development of a metric to measure end-user

vulnerability. The methodology has proposed and justified the use of exemplar
studies, analysed quantitatively, as a means of answering the research question.
From initial analyses, hypothesised changes and re-analysis, the methodology has
proposed the development of generalisable conclusions.
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4.

DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR MEASURING
VULNERABILITY

4.1

Introduction
Previous chapters have established both a gap in the awareness of the

contribution of technological systems to end-user vulnerability and a gap in the
theoretical basis for measuring this contribution. The first phase of the research,
defined in Section 3.3, requires the development of and justifies a theoretical basis
for the analysis of the exposure of an arbitrary technological system and a method of
application of the theoretical basis.
This chapter commences by establishing the context of the measurement and
the theoretical approach. A theoretical basis for representing an arbitrary
technological system, and for demonstrating that the representation is a valid
mapping from the real system, is developed and refined. Starting with the
representation of an arbitrary technological system, a proposal is made for generating
a measure of the contribution to vulnerability, which is the phenomenon of interest.
That attribute is then shown to be a valid measure of the phenomenon of interest,
described as the contribution of a technological system to end-user vulnerability. The
accuracy, precision and scaling of the proposed measure are examined.
4.2

Context for a theoretical basis
The research question therefore requires the implementation and operation of

an approach that meets the requirements for a contribution to the body of knowledge
in the form of a valid measurement, as described by Hand (2004) and by Suppes
(2009). In order to meet these requirements, it is necessary to represent a complex
technological system, strictly within the identified context, which might involve a large
number of operations and intermediate steps and partial design redundancies and
possibly also single points-of-failure. The representation must at least be
homomorphic in terms of the operations and streams, and preferably should be
isomorphic in order to give assurance that the representation does not omit significant
features of the real system. It is further necessary to identify, from that representation,
an attribute that can be demonstrated to be a valid measure of the phenomenon of
interest and to confirm that the metric is invariant with respect to irrelevant factors,
that it incorporates all relevant factors and thus is complete, that there are no
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correlated variables and that it has definable levels of both precision, such that
independent researchers can obtain outputs that are numerically similar, and
acceptable accuracy. It is also necessary to evaluate the scale factors of the metric,
i.e. the rate of change and scope of values of the metric, and to evaluate how the
values derived for the metric will correlate with the conclusions to be reached.
4.2.1

End-user services
The research question focuses on the delivery of goods or services to the end-

user, and hence a proposed metric must relate to this. Adequate definitions of a
service level and of the specific goods or services allow a Boolean variable to define
this delivery or non-delivery. The descriptions of goods or services and a service level
therefore allow a clear definition of “delivery” for a particular case, but do not preclude
a separate examination of technological vulnerability associated with various different
service levels.
4.2.2

End-user focus
The contribution of the technological system to the end-user's vulnerability, in

regard to selected goods or services, is the context of the research. The emphasis is
on the contribution of the technological system rather than the significance of the
particular goods or services under consideration. However, the example studies will
be selected with a view to examining goods or services that have a range of effects
upon, and hence significance to, end-users.
4.2.3

Heterogeneous system description and representation
The contribution of the technological system to vulnerability cannot be

constrained to consideration of that portion of the technological system that is
responsible for the final distribution of completed goods or services. It must be
assumed that the “contribution” arises from the whole technological system, which
includes the incremental addition of value to the goods or services, which is
distinguished from the simple distribution of goods that is implicit in the analysis of
supply chains and in the analyses applied to computer communication systems and
power or water distribution systems. The analysis of the contribution of the
technological system to vulnerability therefore requires the characterisation of a
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technological system that is heterogeneous and must therefore consider processes,
intermediate streams and sources of inputs.
Researchers such as Pacheco et al. (2016) use the term heterogeneous, but
without any definition. These researchers note (p1) that "...Protecting and securing
the resources and services of smart cities become critically important due to the
disruptive or even potentially life-threatening nature of a failure or attack on smart
cities’ infrastructures...." and propose an approach to protection based upon Moving
Target Defense (MTD) techniques for communications and data infrastructures; they
therefore propose a much narrower interpretation of “heterogeneous” than is used in
this work.
4.2.4

Static and dynamic contributions
Published definitions of “vulnerability” have been extensively examined in

Chapter 2 of this work. Significant divergence and lack of clarity among published
definitions have been noted. The proposed approach to improving the precision of
these varied definitions is to use the phrase "dynamic vulnerability" to describe the
dynamic response of a functioning system to a specified perturbation. Dynamic
vulnerability measures, which are not analysed in this thesis, would take account of
the instantaneous state of all system components and the magnitude of nominated
perturbation(s), and would assume that the system will not actually fail. Metrics of
dynamic vulnerability would measure the response of a system, starting at a defined
status, to a defined perturbation. Dynamic vulnerability is then the inverse of
resilience, as defined in this section.
Once a defined level of service from a technological system is defined, a
recursive application of that service level output will also define the nominal state of
all streams and processes "upstream" of the final delivery of goods or services. This
set of states, which represent nominal operating conditions for the defined service
level, also allows a clear definition of a maximum tolerable disturbance for each
stream and process variable, as the perturbation from the nominal state that will cause
failure to achieve the service level output. The definition distinguishes the dynamic
vulnerability situation from a static vulnerability measure.
Having assigned the term “dynamic vulnerability” to describe dynamic and
continuous responses and having defined the scope of that phrase, "vulnerability" is
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will be used to describe the contribution of vulnerability that is made to the user by the
technological system components and configuration alone. The work of Chapter 4 has
been to show that the proposed "exposure" metric is a valid measure of this
vulnerability. The research questions upon which this thesis is based relate to static
vulnerability. It is proposed that static vulnerability should be considered as a precise
antonym of robustness, noting that robustness is commonly associated with the
design and configuration of a technological system, rather than the margin between
design and overload performance.
4.3

Exposure as a theoretical measure of vulnerability
The end-user focus and the definition of service level generate a very clear

target for the consideration of vulnerability. The variations of the definition of
vulnerability have been stated previously, and commonly include the concept of
susceptible to attack, which requires a clear definition of the term "attack" and a
definition of "susceptible". The research question seeks to quantify the contribution
made to vulnerability by a technological system. The process of formulating this
question specifically excludes consideration of the external events that could
contribute to failure and also excludes consideration of the probability of any of those
events occurring. This approach pre-supposes that, if a weakness existed, it could
cause failure either because of random events over a long time-frame or because of
malicious activity within a short time-frame.
As the probability of external hazards does not affect the specific contribution to enduser vulnerability of the technological system, any aspect of the technological system
that is capable of causing failure makes the same contribution to vulnerability as any
other aspect of the technological system that is capable of causing failure. Assuming
either long time-frames or the presence of malicious activity, the contribution to
vulnerability of the technological system can be associated with the number of modes
of failure that are possible, and can be associated with the configuration of the
technological system.
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4.4

Possible contributions to a measure from published techniques

4.4.1

Specific contributory aspects and gaps
Risk analysis approaches do not prescribe a description of the target

technological system at all, and hence do not necessarily derive any measure that
relates specifically to the technological system. The limited applicability of
homogeneous systems has been described previously. Both resilience analysis and
FMEA offer foundational concepts that can contribute to a metric that meets the
requirements of this research, because both require a clear definition of the target
technological system. An FMEA analysis commences by establishing a very clear
definition of a technological system, which is commonly an interconnected system of
valves, pipework, pumps and control systems, and then examines the effect of the
failure of each component within that system. FMEA commonly assumes a Boolean
(fail or operate) status of each input although, in some cases, fail-open, fail-closed
and fail-fixed modes may be considered. The analysis normally examines the effect
on the system output. FMEA analysis commonly results in a tabular representation of
the effect of each selected component failure. FMEA is commonly carried out to
establish whether a defined level of design redundancy (N‒1 etc.) has been achieved.
For example, if an N‒1 design redundancy (system failure cannot be caused by the
failure of any one component) is specified, FMEA would examine the effect of each
individual component failure upon system output. If an N‒2 design redundancy was
specified, i.e. system failure cannot be caused by the failure of any two components,
then FMEA would examine the effect of each possible combination of two component
failures upon system output.
The research question requires assessment of the complete contribution of
the technological system to end-user vulnerability. The FMEA analysis approach,
which examines fail or no-fail conditions of each component without design review to
achieve a specified design redundancy, can generate a tabulated representation of
the single input fail criteria that cause a failure to meet the service delivery criteria.
Therefore, if each possible failure mechanism could be evaluated as either
operational or non-operational, and the delivery or non-delivery to the end-user is the
final output, then both the resilience analysis and the FMEA analysis would yield
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similar outputs that could be represented in a tabular format showing single failure
causes.
4.4.2

Capabilities to be added to published approaches
Resilience analysis generates output responses to single inputs, and so does

not completely characterise a system whose failure may arise from combinations of
failures. Similarly, FMEA provides a simple tabular representation of the effects of
each component’s failure and is generally used only to demonstrate that a design
redundancy requirement of a tightly defined system is met. The development of an
adequate theoretical basis requires that all of the potential failure modes of a
technological system are defined and characterised, as well as being shown to
provide a valid measure of the attribute of interest. This is the capability to be
contributed by the enumeration of a technological system’s exposure as a measure
of its contribution to the end user’s vulnerability
4.5

Development of proposed metric
The aspects of published techniques that can be built upon to generate a

theoretical basis that meets the requirements of the research question have been
identified. The limitations of published techniques have been identified, and the
capabilities that must be added have also been identified. The criteria to be met by a
theoretical basis, in order to address the research question, have been established.
4.5.1

Measurement theory – the criteria for a metric
"Measurement" is itself a concept requiring careful application to any new

analysis approach, in order to ensure the relevance of the proposed approach.
Suppes (2009, p. 825) states that
"A conceptual analysis of measurement can properly begin by formulating the two
fundamental problems of any measurement procedure. The first problem is that of
representation … we must show is that the structure of a set of phenomena under
certain empirical operations and relations is the same as the structure of some set of
numbers under corresponding arithmetical operations and relations. Solution of the
representation problem for a theory of measurement does not completely lay bare the
structure of the theory, for there is often a formal difference between the kind of
assignment of numbers arising from different procedures of measurement. This is the
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second fundamental problem, determining the scale type … based on the proof of an
invariance theorem for the representation”.

Similarly, Hand (2004, p. 3) offers an initial definition ‒ "…quantification: the
assignment of numbers to represent the magnitude of attributes of a system we are
studying or which we wish to describe.” This definition is operationalised initially by
noting the previously established context for the measurement and a "phenomenon
of interest", by representing the heterogeneous system in some way, and establishing
a mapping from the real system to a system that corresponds to, and behaves in the
same way as the real system, within which a measure can be developed. Finally, the
definitions are operationalised by defining an attribute to represent the phenomenon
of interest, and confirming the validity of the measure.
4.5.2

Representation of a heterogeneous system
Heterogeneous technological systems can be described as progressively

adding value to raw inputs, and ultimately generating a specified output. These
systems could also be described in terms of applying processes to input and
intermediate streams, generating further intermediate streams until the final output is
created. It should be noted that a homogeneous system is a specific case of a
heterogeneous system, in which the process types are limited to aggregation and
distribution, with no transformations. The definition of a service level of output allows
representation of the output using a Boolean variable. Consider the final delivery of
the goods or services; this can be assumed to be feasible if a set of conditions is
fulfilled, e.g. a road exists, an operational truck is available and fuel and a driver are
available. This could be represented as a Boolean AND function with four inputs. If
each of those inputs is considered in turn, it is proposed that their availability can also
be represented as a Boolean variable, which is the output of a Boolean function of
several inputs. Extending this principle allows a complete technological system to be
represented as a complex Boolean algebraic expression, which considers the specific
processes, the intermediate streams and the input streams, and results in a Boolean
representation of the service level delivery conditions for defined goods or services to
an end-user. Figure 3, using standard symbols for AND and OR gates, illustrates a
simple example of this approach.
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Figure 3 A representative complex technological system.

Figure 4 provides a more realistic example of a heterogeneous technological
system, including cases in which some streams have alternative sources, and
including processes that have some common requirements and some unique
requirements. Real technological systems may also include operations that are
mutually exclusive, indicating a need for a functionality representing the case where
IF (a) then NOT (b). Such a “NOT” construct can be used in conjunction with the
definition of stream availability level, e.g. to describe a situation in which the sufficient
level of stream capacity to ensure the functioning of (a) will preclude the sufficient
level of stream capacity to ensure the functioning of (b).
A computationally complete Boolean algebra requires only the "AND", "OR"
and "NOT" constructs, and these have been shown to be sufficient to represent an
arbitrary heterogeneous technological system for delivering goods or services to an
end-user. The final service delivery can be represented by a Boolean variable and,
by applying the definition recursively, intermediate streams can be considered to have
Boolean values according to whether they do, or do not, cause failure of the final
service level delivery. This allows the representation of streams and process
availabilities as Boolean variables. The “NOT” function can be used, although its value
in the field of this thesis is problematic, but, as there is no function that allows
“distribution”, a stream availability cannot be simply assigned to the input of more than
one gate. The system needs to be re-drawn as demonstrated in Figure 4. This redrawing illustrates the correct treatment of the case where an input stream affects
more than one process.
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Figure 4 Rationalised representation of representative complex system.

4.5.3

Interpretation of data: defining and measuring the attribute
A truth table, as illustrated in Figure 5, based on Boolean algebra, and

including all valid inputs, can be used to represent the possible outputs of the
technological system for each possible combination of input availability or nonavailability.

Figure 5 Representation of system inputs and outputs
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Considering a system, of which representative parts are illustrated in Figure 5
above, it can be seen that there are a number of points for which a single failure will
cause the system output to fail. These are added to generate the E1 value,
representing the highest level of vulnerability. There are also cases where a
combination of two or more failures will need to occur simultaneously in order to cause
the system output to fail. These generally arise from duplicated systems, are
represented using “OR” gates and are added to give the E2 value. Continuing this
approach, it is possible to construct a composite metric of the form {E1, E2, E3... En},
where E1 is the number of single points of failure and E2 is the number of cases where
two independent failures must occur in order for the system to fail. The E2 value must
exclude cases where either one of the inputs would alone have caused output failure
– otherwise the values would be over-represented. Similarly, the E3 value must
exclude cases where a combination of two of the failing inputs would have caused
output failure. This representation and concept expands upon the “N‒1”, N‒2” design
redundancy concept, arguably adds rigour to that definition and is proposed to provide
a measure of the relevant attribute.
It has previously been argued that probabilities of a particular process or
stream failure, i.e. the probability that a hazard aligned to that process or stream is of
sufficient magnitude to cause the operation of the process or stream to fall below a
level that would cause failure of the technological system output, should be excluded
from consideration for two reasons: firstly, because these will tend towards a
probability of 1.0 over a sufficiently long time-frame or under the assumption of
directed attack; secondly, because they are characteristic of external hazards rather
than the intrinsic components and the configuration of the technological system that
are the topic of the research question. It has also been established that (a) arbitrary
heterogeneous technological systems supplying to a single point with a defined
service level can be represented as a Boolean algebraic expression, and (b) the
response of the system to permutations and combinations of failures can be
represented in the form {E1, E2, … En}. It is therefore argued that the number of
vulnerability points, i.e. possible points of failure, of the technological system is a valid
mapping of the “vulnerability that can be attributed to the technological system” on to
an attribute. Within AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, as the definition assigned to the term
“exposure” is closely related to the concepts described above, for the purpose of this
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work, the quantitative evaluation {E1, E2, … En} will be referred to as the “exposure” of
the technological system.
4.5.4

Clarifying the definition of the attribute
Granularity. Generating an accurate exposure value requires a careful

consideration of the assessment process and, specifically, the granularity of the
representation. To illustrate using an example, if every transistor in a memory chip
were considered to be a potential cause of failure, the “exposure” value calculated for
the computer would be exceedingly high. In contrast, if the computer were considered
to be a complete, replaceable unit, then it would be assigned an exposure value of 1.
A pragmatic definition will address this issue: if some subsystem is potentially
replaceable as a unit, and can be attacked separately from other subsystems, then it
should be considered to be a potential source of failure. This definition is proposed to
allow an adequate level of precision – i.e. reproducibility by different practitioners.
System boundaries. One system boundary must be at the end user:
definition of the other system boundaries is essential for an analysis and will be set
pragmatically at the points where a sufficiently large number of sources of the input
stream are available, and hence can be considered to be unconditionally available.
Contributory systems. It can be expected that there will be cases where a
stream that is an input to one technological system is itself the product of another
technological system, i.e. a contributing system. The technological system that
generates the input will itself have some degree of “exposure”, and it is important to
have a valid basis for calculating the contribution that is made to the exposure of the
end-user. This issue is illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 Contributory system
A more generalised approach is required. The problem can, in fact, be
generalised by considering that each input to a gate (Boolean AND or OR operation)
has an exposure vector, and developing the principles by which the gate output can
be calculated from these inputs. This is illustrated in Figure 7.

Figure 7 Generalised approach – contributory system
For the AND gate, the contributory exposure vectors are simply added
component-wise; hence the output metric is
{ (A1+B1+C1), (A2+B2+C2), (A3+B3+C3) … (An+Bn+Cn)}.
For the OR gate, the issue is more complex. For the case where there are
three inputs to the OR gate, the calculation is as shown in Equation 8.

Equation 8
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It should be noted that, when calculating the E3 value, one fail from each input
MUST occur for the output to fail; however, each remaining combination of fails
contributes to the E3 value. The E4 and subsequent values are calculated in exactly
the same way as the E3 value. It can be noted that, because the contributory system
has effectively added streams and processes, the length of the output exposure vector
is increased when the contributory system is considered. In principle, an exposure
vector of very great length could be postulated.
The fact that contributory E1 values are added to the total exposure of a parent
system is significant: a single point of failure is not lost when the contributory system
is added to the parent system. As a practical example, if the “O” ring seal failure had
been identified as a contributor to the E1 exposure of the Thiokol Solid Booster Rocket,
then the elimination of all E1 values for the parent system, which was the Challenger
space shuttle, could not have been achieved unless the “O” ring weakness was
addressed. The use of an exposure metric potentially addresses the colloquial saying
“it’s always the smallest things that get you”.
Pragmatic limits on depth of analysis. Some pragmatic observations can
be made. As, for example, E3 combinations cannot by definition include any E2 or E1
combinations, and E4 combinations cannot include any E3, E2 or E1 combinations,
there will be a tendency for the values of these quantities to decrease. Upper bounds
can be set: for a system with N inputs and, if E1 = n, then E2 ≤ (2(N ‒ E1)) etc. and it can
be observed that, if a system with N inputs has an En value of 1, then this system can
be only a single “OR” with N inputs and all higher E values (E1…E(n ‒ 1)) must be zero.
The proposed approach is therefore to nominate a level to which exposure values will
be evaluated. If, for example, this level is set at 3, then the representation would be
considered to be complete when it could be shown that no contributory systems added
to the E3 values of the system as represented.
4.5.5

Interpretation of “exposure” values
A significant purpose of this investigation is to allow the evaluation of proposed

changes and the comparison of technological systems. The effectiveness of proposed
changes can be assessed by considering the composite metric. For example, it might
be considered to be valuable if the E1 value were reduced by a given percentage.
Comparison of technological systems is difficult unless the defined attribute can be
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validly assigned a single value that can be proven to be mapped from the actual
“exposure”. A rational means for converting an exposure represented in the form {E1,
E2, E3... En} into a single attribute value is useful though not essential. The mapping
from the exposure expressed as {E1, E2, E3... En} on to a single attribute value can be
made by considering that there is likely to be an average cost of protecting each point
of exposure and hence that simply adding the unique E1, E2, E3 values provides a
single value for the attribute, which offers a valid means of comparing technological
systems. It is also noted that a qualitative interpretation of the distribution of E1, E2
etc. values will provide additional insight and would also allow the assessment of
progress towards, for example, a target of E1 = 0. This conclusion assumes that the
E1 and E2 etc. combinations are exclusive, as previously defined.
4.6

Evaluation of proposed approach and metric
Recognition of the concept that long supply lines and systems with large

numbers of potentially fatal flaws and with no alternative sources are "exposed" can
be found in documents as historical as "Sun Tsu, The Art of War" (Griffith 1963), in
the concern expressed by Senator John Glenn regarding the Mercury spaceflights
(Glenn, 1997) and in very many other publications. Although the term published
definitions of “vulnerability” and the phrase “contribution to vulnerability” may not be
precisely defined, these observations indicate that the “exposure” attribute is a valid
representation of the phenomenon of interest. In addition to providing a valid
representation, it must be demonstrated that the proposed assessment of "exposure"
represents a reproducible and accurate measure that actually represents the
contribution of the technological system to vulnerability.
4.6.1

Representation
Suppes (2009, p. 825) notes that
"A conceptual analysis of measurement can properly begin by formulating the two
fundamental problems of any measurement procedure. The first problem is that of
representation, justifying the assignment of numbers to objects or phenomena. What
we must show is that the structure of a set of phenomena under certain empirical
operations and relations is the same as the structure of some set of numbers under
corresponding arithmetical operations and relations”.

106

Similarly, Hand (2004, p. 3) proposes an initial definition as "quantification: the
assignment of numbers to represent the magnitude of attributes of a system we are
studying or which we wish to describe". Hand (2004, p. 132f) presents detailed
descriptions of the “validity” of a representation, and describes several distinct types
of validity, which are effectively descriptions of alternative approaches to establishing
validity.
In the context of this work, an evaluation is needed of whether the proposed
theoretical basis (the numerical evaluation of “exposure”) actually represents the
performance indicator described in the research question, by considering the validity
criteria proposed in works such as Hand (2004). Hand's concepts of "criterion validity"
and "content validity" seem to be of lesser relevance, because they are related to
other comparative measures, whereas the proposed measure has been developed in
response to an identified "gap" and therefore does not align clearly with other
measures. Hand's (2004, p. 133) description of "construct validity", in contrast, is
described as "... involves the internal structure of the measure and also its expected
relationship with other, external measures. Construct validity thus refers to the theoretical
construction of the test: it very clearly mixes the measurement procedure with the concept
definition”.

The term vulnerability generally has two elements: firstly, the knowledge that
possible failure modes exist; secondly, the knowledge of practical inability to
adequately prevent those modes. The lack of ability to prevent failure modes is likely
to include practical issues of physical access to particular loci of potential failure, but
is also likely to include an awareness that the multiplicity of such loci and the lack of
adequate alternatives present a major practical problem. It is proposed that these
somewhat intuitive concepts are actually described in quite rigorous logical terms by
the Boolean representation of the technological system involved and, because the
exposure metric {E1, E2, E3 … En} is constructed directly from the representation of
the technological system, this has a construct validity in the terms proposed by Hand
(2004).
The extent to which the proposed theoretical basis represents the issues in
the research question is effectively an examination of the scope and validity of the
framework of assumptions and boundaries within which the representation is claimed.
In the examination of risk issues, the rationale for assuming all hazards to have a
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probability expressed as p = 1.0 was established. The definition of service level does,
certainly, allow a Boolean evaluation of the provision of a stated service. It might be
argued that an infinite number of service levels is theoretically needed to characterise
the supply of goods or services, but this is unlikely to be a practical issue: a water
supply that is adequate for two criteria, e.g. “drinking only” and a “normal bathroom
and clothes or dish washing and food preparation”, is likely to achieve the goals of the
measurement, i.e. informing decision and allowing comparison of alternative
technological systems. The exposure metric does depend critically on the system
boundaries selected. These boundaries effectively represent inputs that are
considered to have an exposure of {1,0,0} and, for a valid calculation, the system
boundaries need to be defined precisely.
4.6.2

Completeness and uniqueness
As the Boolean algebraic representation of the real system will generate the

same results, in terms of Boolean delivery or non-delivery of service levels, as the
real system under the same combinations of input failures, the Boolean
representation can be said to be homomorphic. The real system and the Boolean
algebraic representation can be said to be homomorphic in terms of the processes
and streams. Assuming adequate descriptions of the processes and streams and
relationships, it is actually possible to re-draw an actual system from the Boolean
algebraic representation. This proves that the representation is not only homomorphic
but also isomorphic, allowing an inverse mapping.
4.6.3

Adequacy
It must be established that it is possible to represent all practical technological

systems unambiguously by Boolean algebraic expressions. Several authors have
drawn attention to the complex interactions and possibly feedback loops between
subsystems. It is important to establish with confidence that an arbitrary technological
system can be represented unambiguously with a Boolean expression. A particular
consideration is whether technological systems in fact include feedback loops, and if
so whether the proposed approach can represent these.
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Figure 8 Feedback loop representation
Figure 8 demonstrates a progressive re-drawing of a system initially
considered to include a “feedback loop”. For a system, e.g. an electronic system,
where initial conditions are not pre-determined, the output of this system as shown in
the first representation, is indeterminate when S05, S06 and S10 are true. As the
evaluation of exposure considers the number of points that will cause the failure of an
operational system, initial conditions are always determined. The system can then be
simplified as shown in subsequent parts of Figure 8. For systems with input conditions
that are not indeterminate, representations of configurations involving feedback can
be decomposed to simple Boolean representations and therefore the exposure values
can be determined.
Haimes and Jiang (2001) consider fractional values of interaction between
infrastructural systems, using these fractional values to assess the decrease in
functionality of one system resulting from the decreased functionality of another.
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These concepts have at least superficial similarity to the colloquial concepts of intersystem feedback. Although valuable, Haimes and Jiang’s approach to a description
of interdependence does not quantify exposure as a metric of vulnerability and relies
on problematic processes for calculating the levels of interaction.
Feedback must be considered in its broader context. Diamond (2005) and
others have noted that, within a geographically and economically constrained
civilisation, a full positive feedback of failures, caused by a single essential resource
failure, can cause societal collapse. Geographical regions, e.g. those affected by
natural catastrophe, are now not tightly constrained in terms of trade, geography or
information; therefore, disaster relief is possible. However, our highly inter-connected
world is certainly still exposed to global environmental failures such as major climate
change, and Diamond's scenarios emphasise the exposure concept because there
are effectively exposure values associated with all major environmental resources,
including fresh water, clean air and a viable temperature range. These are not
discounted, but the topic of this thesis is technological contributions and it is the
technological contributions to which attention is drawn.
4.6.4

Precision
Precision is achieved when different practitioners apply the same concepts

and techniques to a problem, and all generate metrics that are close in value to those
generated by others. The Bureau Internationale des Poids et Mesures (2008)
provides a well-accepted distinction between the term "precision" and the term
"accuracy”. It defines (p22) precision as "closeness of agreement between indications
or measured quantity values obtained by replicate measurements on the same or
similar objects under specified conditions". This is similar to the concept of
reproducibility. Achieving an adequate level of precision is closely linked to the
definition of system granularity, and indeed to the definitions of what constitutes a
“process” and an “intermediate stream”. Consider an example: at a macro level, a cell
phone needs power only. A main processor unit may contain more than a billion
transistors and, if any should fail, the unit will not operate, and a decision is therefore
required on whether to assign an exposure value of 1 billion or an exposure value of
1. Two somewhat pragmatic tests can be applied. If a subsystem can be replaced as
a unit, then it should be considered to be a “process” and, if it is practically feasible
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for an attack to be directed at a subsystem without affecting its neighbours, then it
should be considered to be a “process”. There is no real mechanism for an attacker
to target a single transistor of a chipset; neither is it possible to replace even a
processor alone – which would suggest the personal computer (PC) motherboard as
the appropriate level of granularity for a “process”. It would be possible in future to
build up a library of exposure vectors for larger components, e.g. the PC, to be
incorporated into analyses using the principles developed for contributory systems.
4.6.5

Accuracy
When considering representation, evidence has been presented that the

metric does relate to the attribute of interest – the question of accuracy remains, i.e.
whether the measure offers a moderately linear representation of the quantity of
interest. The Bureau Internationale des Poids et Mesures (2008) provides a wellaccepted distinction between the term "precision" and the term "accuracy”. It defines
(p21) accuracy as "closeness of agreement between a measured quantity value and
a true quantity value of a measurand ". Real examples of the importance of this issue
can readily be envisaged. If alternative changes to the technological system have, for
example, a cost ratio of 2:1, and the alternatives have exposure values that also have
a 2:1 ratio, then the quality of the decision will depend critically upon the accuracy of
the exposure measure. The adequacy of the accuracy of the proposed measure is
justified by a simplifying assumption. To adequately mitigate each exposure value will
require some effort and expenditure and, whereas costs might vary significantly
between cases, it is reasonable to assume that, when a large number of exposure
“points” (single or combination failure points) is under consideration, the expenditure
for mitigation will bear at least a moderately linear relationship to the number of such
points. This principle will apply whether the designer’s target is to bring E1 to 0 or E1
and E2 to zero.
4.7

A consistent set of definitions and metrics
An internally consistent and defensible set of definitions is needed to avoid

confusion in the remainder of the thesis. Figure 9, below, illustrates many of the
concepts. The following definitions are proposed, and correlations with published
definitions are noted.
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Figure 9 Illustration of selected terms

(a)

Risk
Definition. The probability that a given hazard will occur (at a level above the

maximum tolerable level) during a nominated time-frame.
Explanation. Risk must be applied to a hazard that, in turn, is always related
to a specific weakness: a hazard is irrelevant unless it is associated with a weakness.
It has already been argued that, when either long time-frames or (mis)guided
hazards are considered, the risk probability approaches 1.0. If a specific risk has a
known probability function, i.e. it will exceed a nominated value for a known
percentage of time, it would be possible to calculate a Bayesian probability that there
will be an instant when the loading of a particular weakness plus the hazard value will
exceed the maximum tolerable value of that weakness. Although this is
computationally possible, both the "guided hazard" and the long time-frame
arguments deprecate the value of this approach. The practicality of the approach is
also hindered by noting that every weakness may have an unlimited number of
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hazards linked to it, and that every potential hazard for every weakness must therefore
be considered to be a component of a Bayesian probability calculation.
Alignment. This definition aligns with many published definitions, but differs
from many non-academic definitions, e.g. the insurance industry's usage that
considers an "insured risk" to be the asset that might suffer damage. This aligns with
common definitions: risk is quoted as "high", when a hazard is likely to occur, through
to "low", when it is assessed that a hazard is unlikely to occur.
(b)

Hazard
Definition. Something that causes a perturbation in the performance or

availability of a process or stream that is part of the technological system – e.g. a
severe weather effect, e.g. “more than xx mm rain” is a hazard.
Alignment. Consistent with AS/NZS ISO GUIDE 73:2009, which defines
Hazard (3.5.1.4) as a "source of potential harm".
(c)

Service_level
Definition. Rate of delivery of specified goods or services, to a single point.
Explanation. Definition of a service level allows a Boolean representation of

“harm”, i.e. the non-supply of goods or services.
(d)

Harm
Definition. The failure to deliver some specified level of service or goods.
Explanation. This definition applies equally to the output of a technological

system and to the end-user failure-to-receive.
Alignment. This definition does not consider the consequence of failure-todeliver, e.g. if a technological system delivers toothpaste, then this definition of "harm"
refers to the failure to deliver toothpaste, rather than caries or halitosis.
(e)

Technological system
Definition. Scope is defined by that needed to produce the service level of

specified goods and where failure will cause specified harm, i.e. a failure to supply.
(f)

Weakness
Definition. When applied to a technological system, “weakness” is proposed

to be defined as a stream, process or other facility whose function is a part of the
technological system in question, and whose absence or inoperability contributes to
the possibility of harm.
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Explanation. Weakness is directly associated with the potential for harm, i.e.
the potential that, if the locus of weakness fails, then "harm" (a failure to deliver
service) may result. The uncertainty in the "may" is due to two factors: if the attack on
the weakness is below the maximum tolerable limit, or the configuration of the system
provides redundancy for the function of the weak point.
(g)

Exposure
Definition. A metric derived from the number and the configuration of the

weaknesses of a technological system.
Explanation. Exposure is qualitatively related to the difficulty or cost of
preventing harm. A high level of exposure means that protection is difficult and
expensive as many weaknesses must be protected.
Alignment. This definition clarifies the ISO definition.
(h)

Vulnerability
Definition. A summation, for each combination of weaknesses that can cause

the defined harm, of the risks that hazards associated with those weaknesses will
cause the harm. If the risk for every hazard is considered to be p = 1.0, vulnerability
is synonymous with exposure.
Explanation. The entity that is proposed to be "vulnerable" must be identified
and could be a person, or a technological system, associated with a specified harm.
The definition considers both exposure and total hazard probabilities, indexed to a
specific HARM. The concept of how close an operational system is to failure is
captured by the concepts of resilience and maximum tolerable disturbance, and
should not be associated with the term vulnerability.
Alignment. Aligns moderately with the definition stated by Akgun et al. (2010,
p. 3561), who propose that "... [v]ulnerability can be defined as a ‘‘weakness in the
system defended".
(i)

Robustness
Definition. Opposite of exposure.
Explanation. Robustness can therefore also be mapped directly to the

exposure metric. A system whose E1 and E2 exposure values are zero could be
asserted to be robust, because these values show that there are no single or dual
process or stream failures that will cause the system to fail. In contrast, a system
whose E1 exposure value is high could be asserted to lack robustness, i.e. be
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vulnerable, because a failure of any of the contributors to the E1 value will cause
failure. The proposed definition is NOT the opposite of vulnerability, because risk is
not involved. The proposed definition relates only to the system configuration and
components.
Alignment. Published definitions are similar but opposite to the definitions of
resilience.
(j)

System state
Definition. The instantaneous load level of each process and stream of a

technological system.
(k)

Resilience
Definition. Dynamic output response of a system, to a perturbation whose

level is below the maximum tolerable disturbance for the weakness with which the
perturbation is aligned. This is the “dynamic vulnerability” of the system.
Explanation. A system is only "resilient" as long as the output function is
continuous with respect to input perturbations, i.e. "harm" (system failure to meet the
service level) has not occurred. Any measure of resilience must specify the initial
system state, the perturbation level and the perturbation target, i.e. the weakness. It
is argued that, whereas the resilience metric is applicable to systems that have not
failed, the exposure metric measures possible modes of failure. This division of
applicability scopes is valid for common cases such as the supply of 230 VAC
electrical power, which is generally either available or not available, and a system that
is dependent on an electric motor that either operates or does not, according to the
availability of the power supply.
Alignment. Published definitions of resilience, as noted in Chapter 2 of this
thesis, commonly consider system performance responses to perturbations of inputs,
and specifically the time taken to return to some defined state or an integration of the
deviation of system response against time. These definitions implicitly assume a
response function without discontinuities, i.e. that the system does not actually fail, a
knowledge of the instantaneous state of the system and a means of calculating a
dynamic response to a specified perturbation.
(l)

Maximum tolerable disturbance
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Definition. The level of perturbation for each stream or process, over and
above the system state loading that is normal, for the system service delivery level to
the design number of users that will cause stream or process failure.
Alignment. Simply refines the descriptions used by Starossek and Haberland
(2010) and Gómez et al. (2011) by establishing the clear boundary between an
operational system responding to a perturbation and a system that causes harm, i.e.
fails.
(m)

Resilience limit
Explanation. Hollnagel et al. (2006) consider how close a system’s normal

usage is to the failure level; this term is proposed to capture this concept. A simple
measure might be the ratio of maximum tolerable disturbance to normal state.
4.8

Conclusions

4.8.1

A valid theoretical basis
This chapter has developed the theoretical basis of the analysis, by starting

with a review of the context for an acceptable theoretical basis for a solution to the
research question, and then demonstrating how valid constraints on two existing
techniques lead to the same conceptual framework for a solution. It has then been
demonstrated that an arbitrary heterogeneous system can be mapped on to a
Boolean expression and that the evaluation of the Boolean expression for all
combinations of process or stream failure generates a metric that is a valid
representation of the number of weaknesses (or the number of points requiring
protection effort) of a technological system. Finally, it has been demonstrated that this
attribute’s metric is a valid representation of the phenomenon of interest (the system
property described in the research question), the metric is invariant with respect to
factors specifically outside the defined context, the metric does adequately consider
all factors that are valid within the defined context and the accuracy and the precision
of the proposed measure are fit for purpose.
4.8.2

A theory of exposure
This thesis is concerned with the contribution of technological systems to end

user’s vulnerability, and a theoretical basis for measuring this by an evaluation of
systems’ exposure. Crittenden and Peterson (2011) what a theory is, and note many
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definitions of theory, including "A supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain
something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be
explained" and "A scientific theory is an explanation or model used to account for
observations". Wacker (1998) proposes that conceptual definitions, domain
limitations, relationship building and predictions are the essential elements of a valid
“theory”. This thesis provides a system of ideas intended to explain something and
additionally provides conceptual definitions, a domain limitation (introduction),
relationship building as a result of validating the metric and a predictive capability
because the proposed metric can be used to evaluate potential changes. On this
basis, a "theory of exposure" could be considered to meet the definitions of a valid
theory, when formulated as “An end-user’s vulnerability to a technological system
supplying specific goods/services is measured by the number and the nature of
points-of-failure which are expressed as the “exposure” of that technological system”.
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5.

DEFINITION OF EXEMPLAR STUDIES

5.1

Introduction
This chapter defines the initial exemplar technological systems to be studied.

The technological descriptions assume that the individual user lives in a city with a
population of about 200,000‒500,000. This size is selected because it encompasses
a significant number of cities, particularly within Australia and New Zealand. While
this population range is noted, it is not intended to be a rigorous definition, but rather
a range that allows representative exemplar studies to be described. Mega cities
(perhaps of many millions) might, for example, have dedicated power stations that are
not envisaged within the exemplar studies, and villages of tiny population might (for
example) lack an internet Point of Presence. An operational time-frame is assumed,
i.e. it is assumed that no maintenance or replacement of equipment is needed but
operational supplies are required. Section 3.3 of this thesis notes that “maintenance”
and “replacement” time-frames are longer and hence in practice allow specialised
equipment to be acquired or (re)created. The end-user is not a named individual, but
must be demonstrated to be representative. It seems to be reasonable to consider
that a "representative person" will be neither blind nor deaf, and will be capable of
operating household or personal equipment. On the basis of smartphone and laptop
ownership statistics, the physical and intellectual ability to operate a smartphone can
reasonably be assumed. It also seems to be reasonable to assume that a
"representative person" will have the financial means to live in an apartment, with
power, water and communications facilities connected, and will have the financial
capacity, independent of technological capacity, to purchase common goods or
services. The examples are chosen to demonstrate goods or services whose absence
would effectively force significant lifestyle change upon the representative persons.
5.2

Description and verification of examples

5.2.1

Format of example descriptions
A consistent format, as described in Table 7, is used across all examples,

using the following headings.
•

Title, and version control information.

•

Initial description, and key features.
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•

Confirmation of analysis time-frame.

•

Justification for inclusion of the example – in terms of significant effect upon
the end-user if the goods or services are not available.

•

Clarification of the end-user service level and goods or services description.

•

Text description of the example. Clarification of boundaries, i.e. inclusions and
exclusions, and justification in terms of selected level.

•

Confirmation that the example description is representative of real
implementations of the service: this is likely to involve include research of
actual systems implemented in a small number of cities and/or referenced
within public sources.

•

Representation of process, stream and configuration descriptions in terms to
be used in the analysis, including discussion of granularity.
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Initial
description
Time-frame
Justification

1 Sewage

2 Work information

3 Local fuel supply

4 Targeted first-aid

5 Perishable food

6 Medicine

The sanitary removal of
human waste, on an “asrequired basis”, and
resulting in the discharge
of environmentally
acceptable waste.

The capability to store and
retrieve, view, edit and
share work information.

The service, in this case, is
the supply of petrol at a
local petrol station.

The service, in this case, is the
correct application of a first-aid
measure.

The supply of an essential
medicine that enables an
apartment dweller to
continue to function at a
normal level.

An “operational” timeframe has been selected
for study, i.e. it is
assumed that no
maintenance or
replacement of
equipment is needed.
Public transport services
(trains, buses) in New
Zealand are generally
considered to require onboard toilet facilities if the
journey is longer than 2
hours; although this is
clearly only a guideline, it
does demonstrate that
the facilities are
considered to be essential
for even relatively short
occupancy intervals.

An “operational” timeframe has been selected
for study, and so no
maintenance or
replacement issues are
considered.

An “operational” timeframe has been selected
for study; hence
maintenance and
replacement of
components are not
envisaged.
For the size of city
considered, public
transport (coverage and
frequency) commonly
makes such activities as
grocery shopping and
commuting to work only
marginally practical for
many, and the distances
are arguably too long for
many to reasonably walk.

Only an “operational” time-frame
has been selected for study:

The supply of a perishable
food. Fresh whole milk is
selected because it is a
staple food and requires a
technological system that is
similar to that required by
other fresh food.
An operational time-frame
has been selected for study.

Life-threatening medical
emergencies can certainly occur
for the apartment dweller; for
many, the time until death is
shorter than the time for a
paramedic to arrive. Life or death
will depend upon the ability of a
co-dweller to diagnose the
problem, and apply the correct
measure.

It is common for apartment
dwellers to purchase, store
and use fresh food ‒ and
deprivation of this capability
would constitute a
“significant change to
lifestyle”. This justifies the
consideration of a fresh food
example. Fresh milk is a very
common food.

There are a number of
medical conditions that, with
treatment, allow a person to
live a reasonably normal life
‒ but would severely reduce
their capabilities without
treatment. Asthma affects a
significant portion of the
western world’s population.
The "Ventolin™"
bronchodilator is generally
effective in controlling
bronchospasm.

The storage and
transmission of
information is
foundational. A consulting
engineer without access to
functional email, or file
server facilities, is likely to
be unable to carry out
expected tasks. Similarly,
the apartment dweller is
unlikely to have the
storage space to hold
significant tomes of family
history or reference
material.

An operational time-frame
has been selected for study;
hence no significant
maintenance or replacement
of equipment or processes
will be required.
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Service level
Description and
definition of boundaries
Representative
example?

The sanitary removal of
human waste, as
required, via the lavatory
and resulting in the
discharge of
environmentally
acceptable water to
waterways, sea or landfill.

The definition of service
delivery implies that the
complex information is
able to be read, seen and
updated by more than one
party, before being read
by the intended
“recipient”.

Water-flushed lavatory,
flushing water, gravity-fed
systems, pumping
stations, coarse screen
sedimentation, tricklefilter aerobic digester
clarifier, oxygenation
ponds, dewatered biosolids, transport to
landfill.

Laptop hardware and
software, packet
exchanges with router, ISP
exchange packets with
local router if local table
(updated by BGP and
similar protocols, allows it
to use T3 and/or T1 links
to high speed routers and
local ISP has links to DNS
servers, exchange packets
if T1 links to undersea
cables).
Statistics show that a large
proportion of the
population have either
laptops or "smart phones"
and rely on these for work
as well as essential
personal information.

A survey of sewage
systems used by cities
within this size range
reveals a level of
uniformity.

The service is achieved
when pre- or postpurchased petrol, whose
quality is within the fuel
specification limits, is
supplied at a normal flowrate, to a vehicle parked in
the forecourt of the petrol
station.
Petrol pumps, purchase
transaction and
transaction completion,
local control and data
collection system,
operator, external
communications system,
fuel metering.

The delivery of the description of
the manoeuvre, to the first-aider,
in a form that can be
appreciated, and within minutes.

The availability, to a
consumer, on demand, of
whole milk with acceptable
bacteriological, nutritional
and taste properties (and
Codex standard protein, fat
etc. levels).

Service level criteria are
defined in terms of delivery
of the medication (of
adequate purity and known
strength to the end-user, in a
form that the end-user can
use).

Differential diagnosis between
choking and heart-attack, access
a source of information, identify
the condition and receive
detailed instruction on the
treatment.

Working refrigerator,
transport from the retail
outlet, retail outlet,
communications and
stocktaking system and
financial transaction
capability. Transport to the
retail outlet, bulk transport
of consumer packages,
processing and packaging
system, pasteurisation
equipment.

Raw feedstock materials,
synthesis of active
compound, packaging,
ordering and payment
system, distribution chain,
manufacture of (empty)
metered-dose inhaler units,
filling, shipping and
distribution chain,
pharmaceutical dispensing
and financial transactions.

For the type of petrol
station described, the
processes and equipment
are observably very similar
across a wide range of
locations internationally.

Much “first-aid” literature
strongly suggests that the field is
considered to be significant.

The processes generating
pasteurised and chilled milk
are defined by regulatory
bodies such as the IDF and
Codex formulations.

Medical statistics identify
asthma as a common
condition. Ventolin™ is
commonly prescribed for the
relief of even severe asthma.

Table 7: Overview of examples for study
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5.2.2

Granularity of example descriptions
Analysis requires the definition of streams, which may be streams of liquid,

transported streams of items, streams of electrical power, streams of information or
other intermediate or final products, and also definitions of “processes”, which
transform streams. Practical definition requires a consideration of the granularity of
the representation; for example, it would be possible to define a “power station” as a
process that takes fuel and produces electricity, but it would also be possible to
consider a power station boiler that takes fuel and produces steam, a power station
steam turbine that takes steam and produces shaft power and a power station
generator that takes shaft power and produces electricity. It would also be possible to
consider finer levels of granularity; for example, it would be possible to describe the
components of the steam turbine, e.g. main valves and their actuators, drain systems
and lubrication systems.
The “exposure” metric generated by the analysis will depend on the degree of
granularity described, and therefore a valid level of granularity. Considerations of
granularity must be defined rigorously; the definition is proposed to include the
following.
(a)

A process should not be subdivided beyond the point where an attack would
inevitably affect an adjacent sub-process. If any attack would inevitably affect
an adjacent sub-process, it is not valid to consider the exposure of the two
sub-processes separately. Two examples will illustrate this principle. A
computer CPU chip may contain a billion transistors; however, as these are
not practically accessible individually, they should be considered as a single
point of failure (actually, this numeration will extend to the motherboard
including all SMDs, but excluding RAM contents, because these can be
accessed separately and represent an additional source of failure). In contrast,
consider a long above-ground pipeline comprising many flanged pipe spools
(possibly identified on an engineering bill of materials (BoM) as spool
123AA_001, spool 123AA_002 … spool_123AA_020). As such spools can
potentially be attacked individually, a higher E1 value could be assigned. For
an underground pipe, it might be more likely that a pipe might be replaced on
a city-block-by-city-block basis, allowing this to be used as the unit length. For
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an undersea fibre-optic cable carrying internet data, the cable can be “hooked”
and brought to the surface for repair, although this is a major operation. For
the undersea cable, the number of repeaters can also be assessed, and an E2
value based on the assumption that two adjacent repeaters need to fail, in
order to make the complete cable inoperable, can be built.
(b)

A process should not be subdivided beyond the point where a component or
process would normally be replaced as a unit. For example, a computer printer
has paper transport, electronics and similar subsystems, but it would normally
be considered to be a disposable unit for which significant repair costs would
exceed the new purchase cost. The proposed analysis is of the number of
weaknesses, not of the number of possible attacks; although it is possible that
some printer subsystems could be attacked without necessarily affecting the
others, a significant failure would be considered simply as “printer failure”, and
would result in the installation of a new printer.

(c)

As the granularity should be consistent within each example, if an internet
router within an apartment is considered, so should a router operated by the
ISP through which the household’s internet connection is made.

(d)

The level of granularity should be consistent across examples. This issue is
assisted by the use of standardised contributory subsystems, applied to more
than one example study.

(e)

The granularity should allow meaningful assessments across all possible timeframes – hence, items that can be individually replaced should be identified
so that a “replacement” time-frame can be assessed.

5.2.3

Selection of analysis depth
Within Chapter 4, it was proposed that the treatment of contributory systems

should be addressed by setting a level to which the exposure values should be
calculated, e.g. whether analysis should stop at E2, E3 or further. Rarely, engineering
systems will include main, backup and emergency systems (N‒3 design redundancy):
examples include the provisions for lowering landing gear on fighter aircraft or
lubrication oil systems on the main turbo-generators of a power station; however, even
in cases where system level N‒2 design redundancy has been specified, this is
commonly not achieved because some common systems are impractically expensive
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to duplicate. For this thesis, it is not proposed to consider exposure modes and values
below E3. This level is considered to be more stringent than good engineering practice
for most fields.
5.3

Contribution of common subsystems
The example studies are representative of many particular examples used for

the delivery of the nominated goods or services. The analyses of the common
contributory subsystems are similarly representative of many actual examples, and
are defined so as to align in scope with the example studies. Several of the example
systems include elements of communications, a need for financial transactions and/or
a need for various commercial road transport. Where these subsystems are
essentially identical across the examples, it is reasonable to treat them separately,
and to improve the consistency of the examples by referencing the same common
subsystem analysis. It is therefore important to ensure that the same subsystem
scope is included in each relevant example, and that the individual example analyses
include all exposures that are not in the common subsystem’s scope.
5.3.1

Internet communications system
Initial description. Whether a “smart phone” or a laptop or tablet is used, a

user application such as browser software or an email client serves as a user
input/output device and, with the operating system and software drivers, converts data
to and from packets that are exchanges with a domestic router. From the point where
packets of data leave the household router, an “internet communication system”
conveys these packets to the input of another household router. There is significant
variation in the input/output systems; however, for very many examples, the system
between the exit from the user’s router and the entry to the remote user’s router is
essentially identical. This internet communication system includes the telephony
copper wire from the household router to the suburb’s digital subscriber line access
multiplexer (DSLAM) cable termination point, the fibre-optic cable from the suburban
DSLAM to the ISPs and Point-Of-Presence at the city’s “peering point”, i.e. the point
where the city-wide internet connections are multiplexed on to a national peering
network of fibre-optic links. From one of a small subset of these peering points,
packets are routed to the connection point to a separate provider’s undersea fibre-
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optic cable system. The routing in each case is directed by a border gateway protocol
(BGP) that ensures that all routers can recognise the destination of packets and send
these to the next appropriate router. Undersea fibre-optic cables use a very heavily
protected set of optical fibres, with repeaters about every 400 km, to transmit packets
to a remote termination point. The process is then reversed, leading ultimately to the
presentation of packets to the input of a household router at the designated
destination.
Justification for presentation of example. From the point where packets
leave the domestic router, an almost identical system provides a foundational service
for many others, and for several examples studied in this work.
Service and service level. The exchange of packets of information between
the household router and the systems outside the household is proposed as the
service level.
Example description and definition of boundaries. As the TCP/IP software
within users’ systems is capable of error detection and for requesting the resend of
packets, there is no need to specify “error-free reception of a file” as the service level.
Furthermore, as household systems (smart phone, browser application etc.) vary
considerably, these are not defined as within the common internet subsystem. The
systems outside the household, from the telephone line leaving the router onwards,
are defined as within the boundaries of the internet contributory system. For the
exemplar system, the local household router exchanges packets via the simple
telephone system's copper wires to the roadside DSLAM system that commonly
serves a city suburb. The roadside DSLAM facility multiplexes the packets exchanged
with the complete suburb's internet connections, and exchanges these with the ISP's
point-of-presence, which is commonly located in a telephone exchange building
serving a city. The ISP's point-of-presence is also a "peering point", connecting to
other national "peering points". The ISP's point-of-presence exchanges packets with
other national peering points, allowing full internet connections. For offshore
connections, ISPs purchase bandwidth from organisations that provide and service
undersea cables, and packets are forwarded from peering points, via undersea cable,
to offshore equivalents of peering points. At the distant end, a mirror image process
leads to the exchange of packets to the distant router's termination point.
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Confirmation that example description is representative. Discussion with
local ISPs has indicated that the system as described is representative; however, it is
noted that many variations are possible, including the increasing availability of fibre to
the home.
Definition of processes, streams and configurations. Packets are
exchanged with the local DSLAM system IF local copper-pair cables are intact. The
DSLAM multiplexes these packets to its fibre-optic cable IF it has power, AND the
termination system is operational AND the multiplexer is operational. Packets are
exchanged between the DSLAM and the ISP point-of-presence IF the fibre-optic
system from the DSLAM to the city telephone exchange is intact. Packets are
exchanged within the national peering points IF the national fibre-optic cables are
intact, AND the ISP's routers AND router tables AND power supplies are operational.
Packets are exchanged with the undersea cable service provider IF the fibre-optic
cable to the undersea cable termination point is operational. Packets are exchanged
from end to end of the undersea fibre-optic cable IF the cable is intact AND power for
repeaters is available.
5.3.2

Financial transaction
Initial description. Many, although not all, of the exemplar systems include a

requirement for a financial transaction with the end-user. As this is common, and as
the EFTPOS system for such transactions is very common, this is selected as a
common subsystem. The “financial subsystem” will be referenced as such within each
example, but will itself include the “internet system” as a contributory system. The
scope that is uniquely within the “financial system” therefore excludes the scope
defined for the internet communications common subsystem.
Justification for presentation of example. As the use of debit cards for
even very minor transactions is common, it is useful to consider the exposure of the
simple financial transaction system.
Service and service level. The service level will be deemed to be the display
of a “transaction-accepted” message at the merchant’s EFTPOS terminal. This
message will normally be sufficient assurance for the merchant to release the
purchased goods or services and to complete the transaction with the consumer.
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Example description and definition of boundaries. The financial
transaction system uses the internet communications system several times; however,
as the communications system is considered to be elsewhere, the subsystems
required are as follows. The “acquirer bank” system that the EFTPOS terminal
connects to, and which manages further transactions, is required. The merchant
needs a service agreement with the acquirer bank and hence the acceptance of the
acquirer bank’s terms and conditions. In order to use the EFTPOS system, the enduser also requires an account and hence acceptance of the user bank’s terms and
conditions. Having received a request from an EFTPOS terminal, the acquirer bank
requests information on credit availability from the user bank and makes the financial
transfer to its account. The acquirer bank then makes the transfer of credit, possibly
overnight in a batch mode, to the merchant’s bank.
Confirmation that example description is representative. The EFTPOS
payment system is now almost ubiquitous in New Zealand; amounts of less than $10
are commonly transacted.
Definition of processes, streams and configurations. Noting that the
communications systems are addressed elsewhere, the processes and hardware
required for financial transactions are the EFTPOS terminal, which fulfils a similar
function to a domestic router, and the computers, applications and storage systems
at the acquirer bank, the user’s bank and the merchant’s bank. The accept message
to the EFTPOS terminal will originate from the acquirer bank. The acquirer bank will
issue the accept message once the user's bank has accepted the transfer of funds to
the acquirer bank and it has queued the transfer of funds to the merchant’s bank. The
user’s bank will confirm the transfer of funds to the acquirer bank once it has
confirmed that the EFTPOS transfer request refers to an account whose user has
accepted the bank conditions, i.e. is valid, and has sufficient credit. The acquirer bank
will confirm the queuing of the transfer of funds to the merchant’s bank once it has a
confirmation from the merchant’s bank that the merchant has accepted the bank terms
and has a valid account.
5.3.3

Road transport system
Some example cases, including those concerned with the transport of raw

milk, sewage treatment bio-solids and medical items, require the transport of goods
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by road. Although all these cases do require a road system and fuel, there are few
other similarities, because, in some cases, vehicles such as milk tankers are required
whereas, in other cases, general-purpose vehicles such as passenger cars or light
trucks are adequate. As an identically scoped road transport system cannot readily
be applied across multiple examples, road transport is treated separately within each
example. Chapter 7 of this thesis identifies several general approaches to decreasing
exposure, one of which is the use of re-purposable components. The adoption of
standardised shipping containers is an excellent example of that principle.
5.3.4

Other systems
Electrical power is used by many examples, but the circumstances of the

power delivery vary (three-phase high-voltage supplies to factories, single-phase lowvoltage supplies to houses and supplies to different countries are some examples).
For these reasons, electrical power will not be treated as a common subsystem, and
electrical power supplies will be treated separately for each example. Urban-supply
potable water is used in several examples, and the means of supplying it is identical
in each case but, as the means of supplying it is somewhat trivial, an exposure of E1
= 1 is simply added to each relevant example.
5.4

Detailed description of examples

5.4.1

Example study #1: sewage system
Initial description. The service, in this case, is described briefly as the

sanitary removal of human waste, on an “as-required basis”, via the lavatory installed
in a multi-storied apartment and resulting in the discharge of environmentally
acceptable water to waterways or sea, and the dumping of solid waste of
environmentally acceptable specifications to landfill. This example therefore includes
the plumbing within the apartment, the pumps and pipework for aggregating and
moving the sewage and the sewage treatment plant.
Time-frame for analysis. An “operational” time-frame is assumed, i.e. it is
assumed that no maintenance or replacement of equipment is needed but that
operational supplies are required. Practical issues for this example will include the
assumption that landfill capacity is available for dewatered sludge and that any
flocculent chemicals are available.
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Justification for presentation of example. Public transport services (trains
and buses) in New Zealand are generally considered to require onboard toilet facilities
if the journey is longer than 2 hours. Although this is clearly only a guideline, it does
demonstrate that the facilities are considered to be essential for even relatively short
occupancy intervals. Historically, the provision of sanitary means of sewage disposal
has been considered to be a primary contributor to population health, and to be
essential if major disease outbreaks (either as a result of direct contamination,
facilitation of breeding of flies, rats or other disease vectors, or indirectly by
contamination of drinking water supplies) are to be avoided in any population
concentration. Natural disasters and major equipment malfunctions have occasionally
caused treatment facilities to be unworkable. The resultant discharge of raw sewage
into municipal waterways constitutes a significant hazard, requires significant
remediation and is certainly not acceptable over even a medium term. For the
apartment dweller, the lack of a workable method of the sanitary disposal of sewage
will effectively reduce the apartment to the status of emergency accommodation, and
the lack of this service will certainly involve significant and unwanted changes to the
lifestyle of the apartment dweller. Without a functional sewage disposal system at the
end-user level, apartment dwellers would be obliged to make very significant changes
to their lives – perhaps by using portable sewage collection systems at street level,
as was done in Christchurch following the 2011 earthquakes.
Service and service level. The service, in this case, is the sanitary removal
of human waste, as required, via the lavatory installed in a multi-storied apartment
and resulting in the discharge of environmentally acceptable water to waterways or
sea, and the final disposal of solid waste of environmentally acceptable specifications
to landfill. In practice, many sewage treatment station processes will include
bypasses, allowing untreated sewage to be dumped to waterways or sea in case of
equipment failure or overload – however, such operations would not be within the
service level definition.
Example description and definition of boundaries.
(a)

The service commences with a water-flushed lavatory in an apartment. This
initial operation also requires the availability of flushing water, which would
generally require the use of a booster pump to supply water to a high-level
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header tank in the apartment block, and would require the power supply to the
apartment building plus a level control system for the header tank.
(b)

Almost all city-scale sewage systems currently use gravity-fed systems, which
are commonly clay or ceramic pipe systems or concrete and brick-lined
tunnels in larger cities, to link dwellings to major pumping stations.

(c)

Pumping stations are commonly located in deep pits accessible from ground
level, and incorporate large-capacity, low-head pumps that are commonly
duplicated with changeover valve systems to allow maintenance. The
pumping station pumps would commonly require three-phase 415 V power
supplies, and a motor-start system operated by a control signal generated
either locally or remotely. Multiple pumping stations between any one
apartment and the local sewage treatment station may be required.

(d)

Sewage treatment commences with an initial coarse screen with a motorpowered system for extracting large pieces. Screened waste goes to a
sedimentation process with a powered scraper chain system for removing
initial settled sludge and a pump to transfer this to the sludge treatment
system. Waste from the initial sedimentation process is pumped to a trickle
filter to remove finer particles and allow decomposition. An aerobic digester
takes the trickle filter outlet and aerates this thoroughly using a powered air
blower and a sparged air-contact system (deodorisation). A final clarifier
allows spent digestate to settle and to be pumped to the sludge treatment
system, and allows clarified and treated water to be discharged to oxygenation
ponds. Oxygenation ponds allow natural oxidation processes to eliminate
bacteria.

(e)

Treated water is discharged to waterways.

(f)

Treatment plant sludge is commonly digested anaerobically to generate
methane and bio-solids.

(g)

Bio-solids are mechanically dewatered and conveyed into trucks.

(h)

Trucks convey the dewatered bio-solids to landfill.
Explanation. As electrical power supplies to sewage pumping stations and to

local flushing water supply pumps are unlikely to have multiple feeders, these must
be considered in the exemplar system, upstream to the nearest substation. The
substation can be expected to have multiple feeders and therefore it is not considered
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to be necessary for the exemplar systems to consider the electrical power supply
further upstream. Significant pumping stations would commonly have a "local/manual"
capability, in which a remote control is normal, but allowing an operator to select
"manual" at the pumping station and thereafter to operate the pumps and valves
locally. As the dewatered and treated solid waste is disposed to landfill, the example
must include the road transport aspects, the landfill capacity and the waterway
discharge and testing. Some treatment plants include embedded cogeneration using
the anaerobic digester gas; others do not. As the embedded cogeneration is not in
any way necessary to the operation of the sewage treatment station, it is not
considered here.
As electrical power supplies to sewage pumping stations and to local flushing
water supply pumps are unlikely to have multiple feeders, these must be considered
as contributing to E1 values downstream from the nearest substation. Although
substation configurations vary, these commonly have multiple in-feeds; thus, it is not
reasonable to assume that a representative substation has exposure at the E3 level.
Significant pumping stations would commonly have a "local/manual" capability, in
which a remote control is normal, but allowing an operator to select "manual" at the
pumping station and thereafter to operate the pumps and valves locally. As the
dewatered and treated solid waste is disposed to landfill, the example must include
the road transport aspects, the landfill capacity and the waterway discharge and
testing. Some treatment plants include embedded cogeneration using the anaerobic
digester gas; others do not. As the embedded cogeneration is not in any way
necessary to the operation of the sewage treatment station, it is not considered here.
Confirmation that example description is representative. An informal
survey of the configuration of sewage systems used by cities within this size range,
specifically Auckland, Melbourne, Sydney and also Wellington, reveals a level of
uniformity, and hence the configuration in the example is considered to be
"representative”. There are still some smaller cities that rely on the discharge of
sewage to the sea; however, this is neither common nor desirable practice. Some
treatment plants include embedded cogeneration using the anaerobic digester gas;
others do not. A representative cogeneration system is described, but no contribution
to the exposure is assessed.
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5.4.2

Example study #2: collaboratively developed work information
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the capability to store and

retrieve, view, edit and share information; although the title specifies work information
that could include client lists, design information, accounting records, reference
information, academic papers and contractual agreements, other vital information
such as family records, important writings, ethical, political and regulatory information
and music will be very similar. The "information" addressed by this example should
be considered to be complex, because the definition could be expected to include
text, music, images, design information and databases and should be considered to
have at least potential longer term significance. The definition also specifies storage
(although the storage term is not defined). The definition specifies sharing (hence
transmission to a defined recipient and an integrity check). The definition includes
"edit", implying that the information can be updated in some way that is intelligible to
self and others. The example assumes that the end-user has normal eyesight, that
material is in a mutually understandable language and that the user has the financial
resources to obtain communication services.
Very little editable information is truly analogue; almost all reference
information is in, or can readily be represented in, a digital form. Issues relevant to
the selection of "example information" include: is the format specified and whether
this is or is not publicly available; to a lesser extent, is the format commonly used,
versatile and capable of including complex information in an editable and storable
form? Options for "example information" would include a photograph, spreadsheet,
word document, engineering drawing or pdf file. The example that is selected is the
exchange and updating of a simple spreadsheet. The technological aspects of this
example will therefore be much broader and more complex than ephemeral
messages such as an SMS message or a shout of warning, and will include the
consumer electronics (end-user equipment ‒ hardware and software), the
communications network and the remote end-user equipment. The significant issues
to be addressed in the development of this example are defining the granularity of the
processes and streams and determining which processes and streams do not actually
contribute to the boundary level of exposure (E3), i.e. are massively duplicated.
Time-frame for analysis. As an “operational” time-frame is assumed, no
maintenance or replacement issues are considered. The operational time-frame
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means that there is no need to consider such issues or those of outdated and
unsupported software or of hardware, such as a digital video disk (DVD) reader,
maintenance or replacement. Although it does not impinge on the definition of the
current example, it is noted that much concern has been raised over the longevity of
current information storage approaches; this specific issue will be addressed when
hypothetical changes to the example study are considered – and is particularly
relevant for compressed and “lossy” representations such as JPG and MP3, which
are dependent on complex algorithms to restore information to a presentable form,
and for “closed” representational formats such as those used on current DVDs.
Justification for presentation of example. It can be observed that the
storage and transmission of information is foundational to civilisation ‒ the recording
of medical, veterinary and agricultural knowledge, the teaching of engineering, the
recording of contracts and commitments, and the recording of family history
information, cartography and chemical information are essential. A consulting
engineer without access to functional email, or file server facilities, is likely to be
unable to carry out expected tasks. Similarly, apartment dwellers are unlikely to have
the storage space to hold significant tomes of family history or reference material but
their lifestyles will be significantly impaired if that type of material is inaccessible and
future generations are impoverished if recent learnings cannot be incorporated into
the body of knowledge. The apartment dweller is also likely to be geographically
remote from a “tribal village” and hence is dependent on records rather than oral
history and local knowledge for life-context. For at least a significant portion of
apartment dwellers, employment requires immediate access to both means of
communication and stored and editable data. The inability to receive, store, update,
edit and pass on information, such as that defined in the example scope, would
effectively isolate a significant portion of the representative population from
employment in their selected fields of expertise; as such, the lack of this service would
effectively force significant lifestyle change upon the representative users.
Service and service level. The definition of service delivery implies that the
complex information can be read, seen and updated by more than one party, before
being read by the intended recipient. The service will be deemed to be delivered when
a representative user can read, at a convenient time, information created and updated
recently by a third party. “At a convenient time” implies some storage. “Created … by
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a third party” implies that at least recent edits are reasonably possible. Note that the
identification of a destination individual "alone" does not imply encryption, but that
"read" does imply that the recipient can comprehend the information in the same way
as it was sent, edited, sent and stored. The service definition can then be refined to
mean that a representative user can read, at a convenient time, a simple analysis
spreadsheet that has been transmitted to the representative user alone, and can in
turn edit the document and dispatch it to another party.
Example description and definition of boundaries. This example describes
a PC being used to view and edit a spreadsheet that has been developed by a remote
colleague and emailed.
(a)

User’s PC, with power supply, operating system and software.

(b)

Data communications, which has a local component, an internet transmission
path (which is considered to be a common subsystem by this thesis) and a
remote component to the remote user’s PC.

(c)

The remote colleague’s PC with power supply, operating system and software.
Confirmation that example description is representative. Statistics for

Australia and New Zealand show that a large proportion of the population have either
laptops or "smart phones", and hence are assumed to also have the financial means
to connect to the internet, and the intellectual capability to operate the devices.
Allowing for the percentage of population who are either too young or incapacitated,
this indicates that the exemplar end-user is representative of a large proportion of the
population. Not only are the example details considered to be representative of the
specific service that is considered, but also the example is considered to be
essentially identical to the case of an electronic (EFTPOS) financial transaction; in
that case, an EFTPOS terminal is used instead of a laptop and a piece of bank-owned
software is used instead of the second end-user.
5.4.3

Example study #3: local fuel supply
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the supply of petrol at a local

petrol station. The scope must consider the operation of the dispensing pumps, the
local fuel storage tanks, the metering and transactional services, the refilling of the
underground tanks from fuel stored in national reserves and the creation, from crude
sources, of national reserves. The bulk fuel is assumed to be available from only one
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source. New Zealand currently has only one refinery. As the station is unlikely to have
duplicated power feeders from the nearest substation, this supply must be
considered. The local substation will probably have at least dual in-feeds from the
national grid; thus, there is no need to consider power supply security further back
than it. The financial transaction subsystem (EFTPOS) is covered elsewhere. A
staffed station is assumed and hence staff facilities including sewage and water
supply are required.
Time-frame for analysis. An “operational” time-frame is assumed; hence
maintenance and replacement of components are not envisaged. Although petrol
stations have some storage, the refilling of the underground tanks from fuel stored in
national reserves can be accomplished by only a limited number of approaches, which
must occur frequently, and therefore will be considered to be an operational issue.
Justification for presentation of example. Within very large cities, the
population density generally makes good public transport economic and allows a
citizen to carry out normal functions, such as grocery shopping and commuting to
work, using public transport. For the size of city considered (of a population between
about 200,000 and 500,000), public transport coverage and frequency commonly
make such activities as grocery shopping and commuting to work only marginally
practical for many, and the distances are arguably too long for many to reasonably
walk. For such representative persons, the lack of an operational private vehicle will
certainly cause significant disruption to lifestyle.
Service and service level. The service is achieved when pre- or postpurchased petrol, whose quality is within the standard fuel specification limits, is
supplied at a normal flow-rate, to a vehicle parked in the forecourt of the petrol station.
Example detailed description and definition of boundaries.
(a)

Petrol pumps are operable if both fuel and electrical power to operate the
pumps are available.

(b)

The pumps can be operated if the fuel can be metered, a local control and
data collection system, to transmit the amount pumped to the cashier, is
functional and a capable operator is available. The fuel metering will be
possible if the meter is functional and power is available.
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(c)

As the station is not automated, the availability of a capable operator is
practical only if an operational water supply, an operational sewage disposal
system and power for lighting and security are available.

(d)

A customer financial transaction is required, and is proposed to be EFTPOS.

(e)

As the station storage is limited, the supply of the bulk fuel must be considered.

(f)

The production of bulk motor specification fuel from crude oil must be
considered, noting that New Zealand has a single refinery.
Confirmation that example description is representative. For the type of

petrol station described, the processes and equipment are observably very similar
across a wide range of locations internationally.
5.4.4

Example study #4: targeted first-aid
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the correct application of a

first-aid measure. A significant number of unpredictable medical events could possibly
affect an apartment dweller. In many cases, these can be life threatening; in a
significant proportion of examples, the correct application of first-aid can markedly
improve the probability of avoiding injury or death. Illustratively, these could include
electrocution, poisoning, acute allergic reactions, cardiac arrest, acute asthma attack
and arterial bleeding from an accidental cut. The accepted approach for treating acute
choking, i.e. a foreign body blockage of the airway, is known as the “Heimlich
manoeuvre” and is selected for this example. An acute airway blockage can present
itself unpredictably, quickly and without warning. In the context of a representative
apartment dweller, in a situation where a person’s airway has become blocked, the
person’s life is under threat within a matter of minutes. The remedy for this particular
situation is simple provided that the diagnosis is made quickly and accurately, and
that the procedure is described.
Making the assumption that the end-user does not have significant first-aid
training, they are reliant on a specific technological approach to get the “service”, i.e.
the diagnosis and the treatment information that is required. This example will
consider the contribution of the technological system to their vulnerability. The
example has similarities to the work information example and the financial transaction
subsystem – however, it differs because this system requires only one-way
information from a static source.
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Time-frame for analysis. Only an “operational” time-frame can be
considered. The essence of the issue is very short term access to critical diagnostic
and treatment information – the process is either successful or disastrous within a few
minutes, i.e. it has a defined time interval. There is no option for repairs or
maintenance to technological systems or components during the defined time interval.
Justification for presentation of example. Life-threatening medical
emergencies can certainly occur for the apartment dweller. For emergencies that
involve loss of airway, acute loss of blood or electrocution (to name a few), the time
interval between instantiation and death is an order of magnitude shorter than the
time for even a quickly dispatched paramedic to arrive. For such situations, life or
death will depend upon the ability of a co-dweller to diagnose the problem, identify
the appropriate life-saving measure and apply that measure. A targeted first-aid
example represents a case where the life and well-being of the apartment dweller is
critically affected and is therefore justifiably included. The diagnosis of choking is not
difficult but it may also not be trivial. The Heimlich manoeuvre is not difficult to perform;
however, it is not intuitively obvious – it needs a detailed explanation to be made quite
quickly available to the first-aider. The example illustrates a case in which some trivial
assistance may be required to fully understand a situation and, having achieved that,
where some very specific and detailed information must be transferred to a person
within a short period of time. As the apartment dweller has no real knowledge of
geographically close experts, and is dependent on technological approaches for
diagnosis and treatment method, the current technological means of providing the
“service” does contribute to the end-user’s current vulnerability.
Service and service level. The service is defined by the delivery of the
detailed description of the manoeuvre, to the first-aider, in a form that can be
appreciated. The service level is defined by time. If complete airway obstruction has
occurred, the choked person could suffer permanent brain damage within 4‒6
minutes and death within 10‒15 minutes.
Example description and definition of boundaries.
(a)

The first-aider communicates symptoms and understands the required action,
which is described by a remote expert.

(b)

The communication system is needed to identify and contact the remote
medic; this implies related topics of search, and confirmation that the person
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is qualified. Assuming that a qualified person or other knowledge source is
identified and contacted, he, she or it will probably have no problem in
diagnosing the problem or recommending the solution.
(c)

The provision of the first-aid advice depends critically on the availability of a
knowledge base that has the capability to understand symptoms, to allow
confirmation and refinement of these symptoms and to identify and describe
recommended actions in a form and timeliness to allow remedy.
Explanation. The example description is adequately covered in the initial

description. It might be significant to make a differential diagnosis between choking
and heart-attack, but this is unlikely – circumstances and history are likely to make
the diagnosis of choking clear. Therefore, the necessity is for the co-dweller (strictly
speaking, the Heimlich manoeuvre can be performed by the choking victim alone) to
access a source of information, identify the condition and receive detailed instruction
on the treatment – within the time-frame that will preserve life. The person making the
diagnosis and applying the treatment is likely to use a “smart phone” to access an
internet-based medical self-diagnosis service, and follow the treatment. The example
definition of service does not consider outcomes; simply, the information that is
necessary to enable an effective remedy to the medical condition is conveyed, in a
manner that can reasonably be expected to be comprehensible, to the co-inhabitant.
Confirmation that example description is representative. There are large
bodies of literature and institutions devoted to the named topic of “first-aid”, strongly
suggesting that the field is considered to be significant and there is the real possibility
of improving a medical outcome using minimal, i.e. non-specialised and nonprofessional, procedures. The general field is therefore considered to be
representative of a broad spectrum of “first-aid” procedures. As most first-aid
procedures require minimal equipment and rely primarily on diagnosis and simple
actions applied quickly, the Heimlich manoeuvre can be considered to be
representative of a first-aid procedure, because it requires no equipment, requires
immediate action and primarily requires diagnosis and knowledge. Although many
local or national medical services do offer “helpline” types of access to human experts,
and emergency calls to ambulance services are available to bring paramedics to a
location, recourse to online medical help is increasingly common (e.g. the WebMD
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(n.d.) service and the St Johns organisation’s first-aid advice (n.d.); therefore, the
technological approach presumed for the example is considered to be representative.
5.4.5

Example study #5: perishable food
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the supply of a perishable

food. Vegetables, fruit, dairy products, meat and fish and bakery products could be
considered. Fresh whole milk is selected because it is a staple food and requires a
technological system that is similar to that required by other nominally processed fresh
food. Nevertheless, the technological system is not trivial ‒ the pasteurisation step
requires close control if bacteriological safety is to be obtained without deterioration
of the nutritional and taste qualities. The example will therefore consider the
aggregation, processing, transport and retailing of milk. As a large number of cows,
located in a wide area, produce the raw material and a large number of tankers are
capable of farm collection, it is reasonable to consider that scope beyond the
processing plant's reception area is adequately duplicated. The example considers
that the availability of a consumer pack of acceptable quality whole milk, in the
refrigerator of the user’s apartment, is the correct end-point of the example.
Time-frame for analysis. An operational time-frame will be considered. This
implies that neither equipment maintenance nor equipment replacement is required.
Consumables such as “cleaning-in-place” (CIP) chemicals and fuel need to be
considered. Financial services are necessary for retail transactions and fuel, drivers,
vehicles and roads are necessary for transport, but maintenance is not considered to
be necessary within the operational time-frame.
Justification for presentation of example. The apartment dweller obviously
needs food, although it could be argued that it is possible to survive without any fresh
food and/or by eating out as an alternative to purchasing, storing and cooking food. It
would be very common for apartment dwellers to purchase, store for the short term
and use fresh food ‒ and deprivation of this capability would constitute a “significant
change to lifestyle”. This justifies the consideration of a fresh food example. Fresh
milk is a very common food ‒ alone or as an ingredient. Usage is common across age
groups, cultures and socio-economic classes. It can be considered to be a
representative fresh food. As moderately similar systems would be required for the
delivery of many short-shelf-life foods, it is argued that this example is representative
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of a category of goods or services whose non-availability would cause significant
lifestyle change.
Service and service level. The service and the service level are defined by
the availability, to a representative individual consumer, on demand, of whole milk
with acceptable bacteriological, nutritional and taste properties (and Codex standard
protein, fat etc. levels) at the point of use, which is the apartment refrigerator.
Example description and definition of boundaries.
(a)

At the delivery point (where the service and the service level are supplied), a
working refrigerator and electrical power are required. Transit to the apartment
requires electrical power to operate the elevator.

(b)

Transport from the retail outlet to the consumer location requires fuel, a driver,
an operational vehicle and roads.

(c)

The purchase requires availability of the product, a retail outlet and a
transaction system.

(d)

The retail outlet requires staff, electrical power, functional lighting,
communications and a stocktaking system.

(e)

The retail outlet requires a functional sewage system and a functional water
supply.

(f)

The retail outlet requires the bulk transport of consumer packages.

(g)

The processing and packaging system, pasteurisation equipment, control
system, CIP system, CIP chemical supply, pipework and valve changeover
system for CIP, electrically powered pumps, electrically operated air
compressors, fuel and fired hot water heaters, packaging equipment,
packaging material supplies, water supply, waste water disposal, sewage
system and skilled operators. As limited numbers of processing plants are
practically accessible for the retail outlet, these must be considered. Although
there will be variation in packaging equipment types, each of these can be
considered to be a single process and a single "weakness". Processing plants
are staffed and therefore require an operational sewage disposal system.
Processing plants require a substantial water supply for processing, CIP and
staff facilities.

(h)

On-farm processing is not considered; the scope boundary is at the outlet of
the farm milk vat.
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Explanation. Power is required for the processing facility, for the retail outlet
and for the end-user’s refrigerator. These power supplies can be considered to be
separate. As neither the processing facilities, nor the retail outlet, nor the apartment
would commonly have duplicated electrical power feeders, these and associated
protection systems must be considered back to the nearest substation. The substation
can be assumed to have multiple input feeders; thus, the electrical power system need
not be considered any further "upstream" than the substation. The hot water boiler
and hot water circulation system for the pasteuriser would commonly be fired with fuel
oil, but including enough storage that it would commonly be supplied directly from a
fuel wholesaler, hence applying a portion of the processes noted in relation to the fuel
supply example.
Confirmation that example description is representative. The processes
leading from raw milk collection, up to the point where pasteurised and chilled milk is
packaged, are defined in considerable detail by regulatory bodies such as the
International Dairy Federation and Codex milk formulations ‒ and can therefore be
considered to be representative. Distribution to supermarkets, retail sales and
distribution to individual dwellings are similar across most of the western world and
are considered to be adequately representative as are the processes from retail outlet
to end-user availability.
5.4.6

Example study #6: essential specific medicine
Initial description. The service, in this case, is the supply of an essential

medicine that enables an apartment dweller to continue to function at a normal level.
This example could consider either a new vaccine that is researched, developed and
distributed in response to a new disease or a well-known medicine that is required on
an ongoing basis for a chronic condition (e.g. insulin, Ventolin™) or a well-known
medication that is needed for a not-infrequent acute condition (e.g. penicillin). The
new vaccine example is not selected as an example to be studied because, although
there are standard processes for attempting to find or develop a vaccine, it is not
certain that these are sufficiently standardised that a described system will be able to
be confirmed to be representative.
The “vulnerability” criterion suggests the selection of a medicine that is needed
on a long-term basis by a significant section of the population, and whose non141

availability would result in significant lifestyle change for those requiring the medicine.
For useful analysis, a medicine should have a well-known composition and synthesis.
For regularly used medicines, the World Health Organisation (WHO) publishes a
model list of essential medicines. The medicine selected from this list for study is
salbutamol sulphate, commonly marketed as “Ventolin™”, which has been used
widely for the relief of acute bronchospasm (asthma). Without this common medicine,
many persons’ ability to function adequately will be affected. This example will
illustrate the synthesis, and delivery models, without the ill-defined discovery aspect
that is associated with developing a vaccine for a new epidemic. The service will be
considered to have been delivered when a fully charged metered-dose Ventolin™
inhaler is handed over to a user. It is useful to note that, although Ventolin™ is
commonly administered by metered-dose inhaler (MDI), it is actually quite possible
(although less convenient) to administer the salbutamol sulphate orally, intravenously
or using a hand-pumped nebuliser (atomiser) to provide fine droplets of dissolved
substance. The dose tolerance is high, allowing many alternative delivery options to
be considered to be feasible.
Time-frame for analysis. As an operational time-frame is to be analysed, no
significant maintenance or replacement of equipment or processes will be required.
Because MDIs are not refillable, they will be treated as consumable items. As
relatively large supplies of salbutamol can be produced with a fixed set of reaction
glassware, an operational time-frame clearly need not take account of the
maintenance or replacement of this equipment. As relatively large numbers of MDI
devices can be filled and sealed by a production line, an “operational” time-frame
clearly need not take account of the maintenance or replacement of the filling and
packaging equipment.
Justification for presentation of example. There are a number of medical
conditions that allow a person to live a reasonably normal life with treatment, but
would severely reduce their capabilities without treatment. Asthma affects a
significant portion of the western world’s population, and specifically about 800,000
New Zealanders are affected by asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder and
other respiratory conditions; if not controlled, they can lead to significantly decreased
ability of the individual to function. Certainly, for many people, the lifestyle that is
possible with the help of well-known medications would not be possible without them.
142

Within a longer time-frame, although asthma is defined as a reversible
bronchospasm, repeated episodes, i.e. as would occur without adequate medical
control, lead to progressively irreversible damage to the lungs and to longer term
impairment. The simple “Ventolin”™ bronchodilator, using the salbutamol sulphate
active ingredient, is very widely used and is generally effective in controlling
bronchospasm. The effects upon lifestyle and the significance of the proportion of the
population affected justify the inclusion of an example of this type, and the
effectiveness of Ventolin™ justifies its specific example.
Service and service level. The service level criteria are defined in terms of
delivery of the medication, of adequate purity and known strength, to the end-user, in
a form that the end-user can use. As the medication is normally self-administered, the
criterion is the availability of the active ingredient, in a form that allows selfadministration, using available equipment, as required. Because the medication is
normally administered via an MDI, this will be assumed to be the basis of the example.
It is noted that, although the active ingredient, salbutamol sulphate, is normally
administered using an MDI, it can be taken orally or given intravenously, and, because
the effects of exceeding the recommended dose are generally not severe, the dosage
is not particularly critical.
Example description and definition of boundaries.
(a)

User acquisition of MDI: financial transaction. Pharmaceutical dispensing
systems including financial transactions, as most countries have at least part
charges.

(b)

User acquisition of MDI: prescribing permission. Medical diagnostic and
prescribing systems, which include regulatory issues, financial transaction
systems and availability of skilled staff

(c)

MDI filling, packaging and distribution. The filling of MDIs requires loading with
the active ingredient formulation, pressurisation with propellant, assembly of
metering valve and sealing and swaging of the completed unit (under cleanroom conditions). Assembly of the consumer package requires attaching the
printed label to the MDI, folding and gluing the printed box, packing of the
inhaler and information sheet and the distribution of filled MDIs. Shipping and
distribution chain for filled MDIs available from multiple providers.
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(d)

Manufacture of MDI container and distribution. Manufacture and filling of MDI
containers. Components are container, propellants, formulation, metering
valve and actuator (plastic mouthpiece/holder). The container is manufactured
by a deep-drawing operation, taking an aluminium sheet as the raw material
and using an electrohydraulic deep-drawing press to create the container. The
metering valve is created using two pieces of equipment. The perforated
actuation tube that releases the dose when depressed, and allows the loading
of another dose of propellant plus active ingredient, when released from
depression, would normally be formed using an electrically operated CNC
lathe, from an aluminium or plastic tube stock. The metered-dose chamber is
formed by a deep-drawing operation that is similar to that used to form the
container (the chamber must hold a metered dose, at a pressure similar to that
in the main container but of smaller volume) and minor components such as
spring, tube seals etc. The container and cap are each formed by a common
electrically operated pressure-injection process using a thermoplastic. The
metering valve is assembled using common semi-automated processes.

(e)

MDI active ingredient distribution. Distribution via a traceable distribution
chain.

(f)

MDI active ingredient – synthesis, testing and dilution. Creation of the active
ingredient. Assembly of raw feedstock materials, which are available from a
large number of sources, for the synthesis of salbutamol. Synthesis of the
active compound, confirmation of purity and analysis. This process has been
optimised to a six-stage chemical process as described by Imperial College
(2016) "ChemWiki" ‘Synthesis of Salbutamol’. It is assumed that the active
compound is made in only one location. Steps include the creation of a
formulation, including dilution with an acceptable substrate, of the active
compound, packaging and cold storage of the active ingredient, ordering and
payment system and related communication systems to allow wholesale
distribution of the active ingredient, and the distribution chain for the active
ingredient to national level factories that are responsible for the manufacture
and filling of MDIs.
Explanation. As MDIs are normally carried on the person, and do not require

refrigeration, no final transport step for the MDIs is included in this example. Because
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multiple options for the pickup of MDIs by end-users are available, these are also not
considered to contribute to the defined exposure.
Confirmation that the example description is representative. The "enduser" is not a named individual, but must be demonstrated to be "representative". The
criteria for "representative" are set out earlier and, as current medical statistics identify
asthma as a very common condition, it is considered that an asthma sufferer can
reasonably be identified to be representative of a portion of the target population.
Ventolin™ is very commonly prescribed for the relief of even acute and severe
asthma, and can thus be considered to be a representative treatment.
5.4.7

Homogeneous system example
This section will describe the development of a representation of a

homogeneous system. This will be a completely hypothetical example, and will not be
verified by interviews etc. Its only purpose is to demonstrate that an exposure metric
can be developed for a homogeneous system example and to assess the insights
available from the analysis of exposure.

Figure 10 Example homogeneous system
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Considering the system shown in Figure 10, the individual streams and
dependencies can be represented as follows (using the notation “Pa” to represent
process node or vertex A, and “LM” to represent the edge from vertex L to vertex M).
Out

IF

(Pm AND (LM OR KM))

LM

IF

(Pl AND HL)

KM

IF

(Pk AND (JK OR IK))

HL

IF

(Ph AND (EH OR GH))

JK

IF

(Pj AND CJ)

EH

IF

(Pe AND BE)

CJ

IF

(Pc AND AC)

GH

IF

(Pg AND FG)

AC

IF

(Pa AND Input)

BE

IF

(Pb AND DB)

IK

IF

( Pi AND DI)

DB

IF

(Pd AND AD)

DI

IF

( Pd AND AD)

FG

IF

(Pf AND BF)

AD

IF

(Pa AND Input)

BF

IF

(Pb and DB)

Substituting the input conditions for intermediate streams, the complete system can
be represented by Equation 9:

Equation 9
It is to be expected that, as this is a homogeneous system, the resulting
Boolean expression is shown to be dependent only on the processes and the single
input stream. The total exposure of the system can be shown to be {2, 2, 4}, and the
analysis of exposure is shown to illustrate the actual vulnerability of the system.
Although this example does show that it is possible to represent a homogeneous
system as a Boolean expression and to calculate the associated exposure, it can be
noted that few, if any, systems are truly homogeneous; for example, a computer
communications network will require processors, power and memory at each node,
as well as connections to the other nodes.
5.4.8

Dynamic system example: newspaper vendor example
Many aspects of supply chains have been studied extensively, and the field of

study of this thesis has been carefully distinguished from those. It is however valuable
to apply the theoretical basis of this thesis to a classical problem in order to illustrate
the contribution offered.
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The “newspaper vendor problem” is a classical problem in the field of
operations research and supply chain theory. This example problem is described by
Khouja (1999), although many other authors have proposed variations to consider
risk aversion, resale discounting and limited stock exchange. In Khouja’s explanation
of this model, a newspaper seller purchases a stock of newspapers from a wholesaler
and sells them one by one to purchasers over the course of a day. The model’s
premises are: (a) the newspaper stock must be purchased once, at the start of each
day; (b) the demand for purchased papers is variable; (c) unsold papers have zero
value at the end of the day; (d) the vendor wishes to maximise profit.
This thesis investigates the technological barriers to the availability of the
nominated services, and how the technological aspects contribute to the vulnerability
of the end-user of the services. This example will be studied on that basis. An
“operational” time-frame for analysis is assumed, i.e. it is assumed that the newspaper
vendor’s shoulder bag, the roads and the newspaper production facilities remain
operational for the time-frame of the analysis and require neither repair nor
replacement. In this case, the service for the end-user is the acquisition of a
newspaper. In other examples studied in this thesis, the process for transporting
goods or services to the place of use has been considered; however, for this case, it
is equally likely that the purchased newspaper will be read on the train or bus, and
the final transport step is not normally considered in the models that are published in
the context of operational research. The classical “newspaper vendor” study does not
consider the capacity of the newspaper production plant, or its continued operation;
these are assumed.
Assumptions made in the current thesis study of this classical problem are as
follows.
•

There is no technological reason but only a profit maximisation reason why
the newspaper vendor cannot order sufficient papers. It is assumed that the
printer’s capacity is not limited.

•

There is no interchange of stock amongst vendors during the day ‒ if that were
possible, the process description would include a range of "OR" gates to
illustrate the fact that a vendor could have multiple potential suppliers of stock,
and, assuming good communication and logistics, there would effectively be
only a trivial problem remaining.
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•

The vendor's ability to purchase "sufficient" papers is not constrained by the
vendor’s financial capability.

•

Each purchaser has the financial means to purchase a newspaper.
The model for analysis within this thesis then reduces to the following.

(a)

The purchaser is assumed to be at a location used for retail sales by the
vendor.

(b)

The purchaser (end-user) carries out a minor financial transaction to purchase
the newspaper.

(c)

The vendor has transported himself or herself to the normal sales location,
carrying the stock of papers.

(d)

The vendor has completed a financial transaction with the newspaper supplier,
for the purchase of stock.

5.5

Conclusion to the definition of examples
The process for assembling the initial datasets must provide data that can be

analysed in following tasks, but must also be demonstrably valid and representative,
as set out in the project methodology. The assembly of data has been documented
sufficiently well to allow replication of the results by a competent researcher or
independent validation of the results by a review of the input data. This chapter
supplies all the material needed for the analysis to be documented in the following
chapter, and has carefully considered the granularity of the representations and the
configurations of the system, including the design redundancies. The subsystem
definitions align with the Chapter 6 tables that analyse the contribution of each
subsystem to the total user vulnerability.
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6.

CALCULATION OF EXPOSURE OF EXAMPLES

6.1

Introduction
Having developed a theoretical basis for the evaluation, and having selected

and described a suite of examples, this section implements the analysis and presents
the results. Several approaches to the calculation of exposure values are considered
in this section and, after examination, an approach that is appropriate for the
examples is selected and refined. The refinement includes the establishment of
reasonable limits of calculation. The implementation of the analysis method is
described. For the analysis of the examples, analyses at subsystem level are
presented – the subsystems are those described in Chapter 5. The full analysis that
considers all processes and streams, and all relationships, is presented in Appendix
B to this thesis. This section describes the steps taken to validate the analysis method,
and to verify the results. Chapter 5 included validation that the example descriptions
and scopes were valid for the purposes of analysis.
In addition to analysing the examples that have been specifically selected for
study, this chapter also applies the analytical method to an illustrative homogeneous
system and to a dynamic system (newspaper vendor) problem. The analysis of the
homogeneous system demonstrates that such a system can indeed be shown to be
a special case of the category of heterogeneous systems, and that the exposure of
such a system can be calculated and shown to offer useful insights. The application
to the dynamic system is presented simply to demonstrate application to a classical
supply chain optimisation problem – and, in this case, also shows valid conclusions.
The exposure metrics obtained for each of the example studies are discussed, in
terms of absolute values, significant characteristics and relative magnitude.
6.2

Application of the analysis method to the examples

6.2.1

Implementation of the analysis method
This section will refine the proposed analysis method. The process for

implementation of the analysis approach will also be developed as will the process for
the setting-up of inputs. This task and section will include the enumeration and
description of failure combinations that imply one, two, three or more weakness points
simultaneously, and will also address the question of the representation of
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intermediate streams that are required for multiple dependent streams ‒ this may
result in weighting according to the exposure reduction offered. Generating the
qualitative analysis outcomes will be by inspection, reasoning and deduction. Three
approaches to the generation of the quantitative outputs are considered.
(a)

Algorithmic approach. It is possible to construct an algorithm that will
systematically test each possible combination of inputs to the Boolean
expression representing the technological system. For a system with n inputs
(processes and input streams), this equates to (2n ‒ 1) combinations. It is
possible to design more computationally efficient algorithms that initially
establish, by testing, all of the (n) E1 values, then establish, by further testing,
all of the (2(n ‒ E1) ‒ 1) combinations, counting the E2 values (i.e. testing all twoinput combinations, and only counting those that did not trigger the E1 criteria)
and then establish, by further testing, all possible E3 values and only counting
those that did not trigger either the E2 criteria or the E1 criteria.

(b)

The progressively contributory approach. Noting the generalised calculation
approach presented in Section 4.5, it would be possible to develop a
methodology that started with the processes and streams that are most distant
from the end-user, to calculate their contribution to exposure and to apply this
approach recursively to processes and streams next closer to the end-user
until the exposure value applicable to the end-user is derived.

(c)

Inspection. The exposure metric can be derived by simple inspection of the
well-defined Boolean expression and the well-defined process definitions.
The selection of the process for the generation of quantitative results is on the

basis of "simplest approach, achieving fit-for-purpose". Initial estimates of the
numbers of processes and streams involved, and the complexity of the configurations,
suggest that the (c) approach is practical and can be shown to yield correct results.
6.2.2

Representation and verification of analysis results
Different descriptions of the exemplar systems appear in three places:

Chapter 5 establishes that the exemplar process is representative of processes used
in typical cities of the 200,000‒500,000 population range selected, and identifies
major subsystems, dependencies, design redundancies used in actual systems and
example boundaries. Chapter 6 describes the subsystems carefully. In the results
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appendix (Appendix B), each process and each stream associated with each
subsystem are identified, and the logical relationships (logical gates) that describe the
system configuration are defined. The exposure values derived in the spreadsheet
are then presented in Chapter 6. The use of a consistent set of subsystems between
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Appendix B make it less likely that key items are omitted or
incorrectly accounted for. The process therefore gives a good level of assurance that
the final derived values do represent the described and verified example.
6.3

Analysis of examples
Having described the example systems and confirmed that they are

representative of real systems and established example boundaries, the exemplar
systems and common subsystems are defined in Appendix B. The analyses of the
common subsystems and the exemplar systems are reported in this section.
6.3.1

Analysis of contributory systems
This analysis is of the exemplar common subsystems, as described in Section

5.3 of this thesis that contribute to various combinations of example studies. The
analysis is undertaken separately to ensure the consistency of treatment across
examples. The subsystems to be evaluated are internet communications and financial
transactions. Power supply, road transport and potable water supply are treated
separately within each example.
Internet communications. The basic systems of the internet are responsible
for an increasing proportion of total data transmission; this includes not only www
page requests and email but also much of the traffic associated with phone calls and
financial transactions; these include the software TCP/IP protocols that are used to
disassemble and reassemble files from the local and T1 packet routing protocols, and
the less visible but equally essential systems associated with domain name servers
and border gateway protocols.
Although the internet is designed to be able to survive multiple link failures,
several factors have resulted in a situation where a relatively small number of veryhigh-capacity transmission media actually carry a huge proportion of the total data
traffic, and a relatively small number of high-capacity routers, with associated routertable updating mechanisms, are responsible for a very large proportion of the total
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internet traffic. What was a highly distributed network of connections, each having
approximately equal capacity, has been refined by market pressures into a system in
which a very few linkages actually have the capacity for the imposed traffic – although
other paths for data may exist, they may be totally incapable of handling the traffic if
the main linkage became unavailable.
Technological contributor
Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

Exposure
contribution
E1

E2

E3

Household router exchanges packets via the simple telephone 2
system's copper wires to the roadside DSLAM system that
commonly serves a city suburb.

0

0

The roadside DSLAM facility multiplexes the packets exchanged 2
with the complete suburb's internet connections, and exchanges
these with the ISP's point of presence, which is commonly located
in a telephone exchange building serving a city.
The ISP's point of presence is also a "peering point", connecting 5
to other national "peering points". The ISP's point of presence
exchanges packets with other national peering points, allowing
full internet connections.
File transferred from network access point to peering point.
3

1

0

3

0

2

0

Data transfer via undersea cable. For offshore connections, ISP's 1
purchase bandwidth from organisations that provide and service
undersea cables, and packets are forwarded from the peering
point, via undersea cable, to the offshore equivalent of the
peering point.
At the distant end, a mirror image process leads to the exchange 12
of packets to the distant router's termination point.
TOTALS (not summed, because various examples use
different sections of this standardised system)

7

0

6

0

Table 8: Internet subsystems and exposure
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Financial transactions. EFTPOS transaction systems are ubiquitous in New
Zealand; few people carry cash and there are cases, such as the Huntly library in the
Waikato (2016), where cash is no longer accepted (this issue is in dispute).
Technological contributor

Exposure

Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel

contribution

proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream

E2

E3

The EFTPOS terminal, which fulfils a similar function to a 3
domestic router, obtains a merchant-to-user transaction request
and ensures the security protocols for the communication of
packets.

0

0

Communications from EFTPOS terminal to acquirer bank.

6

0

The accept message to the EFTPOS terminal will originate from 8
the acquirer bank. The acquirer bank will issue the accept
message once the user's bank has accepted the transfer of funds
to the acquirer’s bank and it has queued the transfer of funds to
the merchant’s bank.

0

1

Communications acquirer bank to user’s bank.

6

0

The user’s bank will confirm the transfer of funds to the acquirer’s 7
bank once it has confirmed that the EFTPOS transfer request
refers to an account whose user has accepted the bank
conditions, i.e. is valid, and has sufficient credit.

0

0

Communications acquirer bank to merchant bank.

0

0

0

The acquirer bank will confirm the queuing of the transfer of funds 7
to the merchant’s bank once it has confirmation from the
merchant’s bank that the merchant has accepted the bank terms
and has a valid account.

0

0

TOTALS

12

1

exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

E1

12

12

49

Table 9: EFTPOS subsystems and exposure
6.3.2

Analysis of example study #1: sewage system
The definition and analysis of the sewage system supplied to the apartment

user shows that the system can be considered in three sections: those closely
associated with the user and the apartment, the sewage pipework system and the
treatment plant.
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Technological contributor

Exposure

Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel

contribution

proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

Apartment systems
These contribute significantly to the E1 value, i.e. represent single
points of failure. These include the pump to supply water to the
header tank, its power supply, the apartment toilet and the
pipework to the local sewer header.
The sewage pipework and pumping system
This subsystem makes only a nominal contribution of 2 to the E1
value and of 2 to the E2 value: this observation illustrates a
contrast between the analysis of exposure as affecting the user
and the potential cost for a utility provider. The 2011 earthquakes
in Christchurch caused multiple breaks in a very large proportion
of the total pipework system, leading to a 2015 recommendation
to completely replace the city's sewage system.
The sewage treatment plant
There is variation between the extents of duplication of major
components in plants in different cities ‒ the example that has
been analysed is considered to be representative. In most plants,
major components are provided with various bypasses; these will
allow sewage to be removed from the apartment, but will result in
the discharge of untreated sewage to waterways.
Cogeneration system
Digested sludge – not essential.
Final disposal
The treated liquid.
TOTALS

E1

E2

E3

4

0

0

6

2

0

18

2

2

0

0

0

6

0

4

34

4

6

Table 10: Sewage example subsystems and exposure

Whether the definition of the service includes a requirement for
environmentally acceptable discharge will have a major effect on the exposure values.
If the definition of service allows the dumping of untreated sewage into waterways,
then the defined service is not affected by the availability of the sewage treatment
system. As skilled operators are required for sewage treatment plants, they contribute
to the exposure of these systems. Multiple vehicles and personnel are considered to
be capable of the transport of bio-solids; thus, this is assessed to contribute only to
exposures of higher order than E3. The local road system is required for the disposal
of dewatered solids; however, as it is reasonable to assume that multiple routes are
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available to trucks, this is considered to be a contribution to an “E” value higher than
E3.
The combined metric is analysed as {34, 4, 6}. The largest numerical
contributor to the evaluated “E” value is actually from the multi-stage process required
by the sewage treatment plant; this contribution is very closely associated with the
definition of the “service”, which stipulates “environmentally acceptable discharge”.
The pipework system from the user to the treatment plant makes a significant
contribution to the total exposure, because there is a need to account for the length
of the pipe sections. The significance of this issue has been demonstrated by the
experiences of Christchurch, following the 2011 earthquakes. Sewage disposal is
dependent on a power supply, which is local to the user, for a booster pump and on
a power supply for the treatment plant. The treatment plant power supply is more
significant and hence more difficult to substitute, but the necessity is linked to the
requirement for an environmentally acceptable discharge quality. As the end-user
payment for sewage removal services is via quarterly municipal “rates” bills, an
electronic financial transaction system is not a contributor to the end-user’s exposure
in this case. Road system and power supply requirements are in common with other
examples; however, the absence of an immediate need for a financial transaction
service is noteworthy.
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. Specifically, this analysis shows that,
as for many services, the contribution of services close to the end-user is noteworthy.
In this case, the gravity-fed pipework system from the user to the pumping station
represents a significant vulnerability for the end-user, a conclusion that is validated
by the experience of Christchurch citizens after the 2011 earthquake. The major
contributor to the numerical exposure is the multiple sequential stages of treatment
that are needed to transform the sewage into streams that can be discharged without
environmental damage.
6.3.3

Independent risk analysis of sewage system
An independent consultant was tasked with carrying out a risk analysis of a

sewage system. The scoping of the study was aligned with the example study, and
the results are included in Appendix A. The risk analysis failed to identify significant
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points of exposure that are identified as a result of the analysis in Section 6.3.2. It is
possible that these unidentified exposure points were considered by the consultant to
have a low risk of hazard; however, the value of that assumption is shown to be
limited.
6.3.4

Analysis of example study #2: collaboratively developed work
information

This example study can be considered to be two local operations and an internet
connection. The operations local to both of the end-users contribute, as might be
expected, significantly to the E1 value. Contributors include the power supply to two
computers and routers, data wiring via the telephone system, normally referred to as
the “plain old telephone system” (POTS), and to the two local internet points of
presence and the power supply wiring to the local substation. The internet system is
considered separately, as a standard subsystem.
Technological contributor

Exposure

Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

contribution
E1

E2

E3

Local end-user functions
The local end-user components and inputs include a functional
local PC (considered to be a single hardware unit), a local PC
power supply (which includes local and household wiring as
contributors to the E1 value), a local substation transformer that
contributes 1 to an E2 exposure and an assessed contributor to
the E3 value from the national grid power supply.
In addition to the PC hardware, the local PC operating system,
email client software and file display software (spreadsheet) are
considered to contribute separately to the E1 value, because each
can be targeted independently of each other and independently
of the PC hardware.
Data communications
This is the internet communication subsystem – from local router
to remote personal router.
Remote user systems
The remote user components and inputs are essentially identical
(in terms of their contributions to exposure) to those of the enduser.
TOTALS

6

1

1

25

19

0

7

1

1

38

21

2

Table 11: Work information example subsystems and exposure
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In considering the granularity of the analysis, it is noted that, for most current
PCs, as both the operating system and the applications are in volatile storage and
can be “attacked” separately, both contribute to the E1 value. The internet connection
that is sandwiched between the two users generates a significant contribution to the
higher E values, arising from the multiple parallel transmission paths of T3 and T1
carriers. This is true for the representative example; however, there are certainly real
cases where the level of redundancy is nil. In 2011, an old lady cut off Albania’s
internet connection with her shovel, while scavenging for copper. Local routers are
powered from the household 230 VAC power supplies and, as representative
examples do not have uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), the household power
supply contributes to system exposure even when the PC has a significant battery
life. The ubiquity of the internet system for data transfer needs to be noted; also,
although a representative configuration (i.e. an exposure value) can be defended,
actual situations can differ. At a public meeting to discuss disaster preparedness in a
small New Zealand town, locals expressed confidence that they had cell phones,
landline phones and internet communications – and then found that all of these
services were carried on a single fibre-optic cable.
In another age, the person generating the data (the topic of this example)
would have posted a hard copy to a colleague. That approach actually incorporated
many E1 values, and generates interesting comparisons with the internet. A letter that
has been destroyed cannot be recreated, whereas a corrupted data packet can be
resent until an ACK advises that the received message checksums are valid, and
hence error-free transmission has occurred.
6.3.5

Analysis of example study #3: local fuel supply
For the common case of an individual motorist seeking to refuel a vehicle, a

local distribution centre, i.e. a petrol station, retails a bulk commodity. The commodity
(petrol) is created in a centralised facility (refinery) and is distributed via a nationwide
supply chain.
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Technological contributor

Exposure

Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

contribution
E1

E2

E3

Petrol station pumping system
The system that pumps petrol from the underground storage
tanks to the client’s vehicle.
For the defined example, a skilled operator is required.
Pump control and metering system
A control signal is required to operate the pumps (on/off) and a
metering system is required to tally the quantity of fuel dispensed.
Petrol station staff facilities
A staffed station requires water, sewage and power (required also
for other systems).
Petrol station transactions
EFTPOS financial transaction required.
National bulk supply chain
Fuel is distributed nationally using road tankers; these require
vehicles, fuel, drivers and roadways, all of which contribute.
Production of fuel
In New Zealand, there is a single refinery, which accepts crude
oil and distills ISO standard petrol. There are also multiple points
at which refined petrol can be imported, and cross-availability
agreements between companies who retain stocks.
TOTALS

5

1

1

7

1

1

36

4

6

49

12

1

1

2

3

0

0

0

98

20

12

Table 12: Local fuel supply example subsystems and exposure

The systems at the forecourt make a significant contribution to the total
exposure; it is useful to note that metering and control systems for pumps contribute
as well as the actual pumps. The financial transaction (EFTPOS and banking) system
actually affects all examples that rely on a retailer-to-consumer transaction, and is a
major contributor to E values. Road transport uses vehicles that are commonly
available, and hence actually contributes little to the higher exposure values. A
manned petrol station has been selected for the example; the station cannot be
operated without staff present, and this incurs the vulnerability to the end-user of a
petrol station that is inoperable because staff facilities (sewage disposal, provision of
water and light) are unavailable. These facilities make a major contribution to the
exposure that the complete system incurs for the end-user.
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. Specifically, this analysis shows that,
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despite the statistical reliability of the internet, the end-user is vulnerable to the nonavailability of internet services, which includes not only the common subsystem that
has been defined but also the domestic router, the power supply and the PC operating
system and drivers. Non-availability is noted as involving not only technological
failures but also technological effects such as surveillance, which may make the
internet effectively unavailable to some users. This example considers the user’s
capability to view a file, and this incurs a vulnerability associated with file format
capability.
6.3.6

Analysis of example study #4: targeted first-aid
The technological system associated with this end-user need is actually very

similar to the “work information” example. In both cases, basic PC and internet access
technologies that are used directly by the end-user, who in this case is the first-aider,
contribute to the E1 values. The internet communications system itself is a significant
contributor to both the E1 values and the higher E values; this topic has been covered
in detail elsewhere.
Technology contributor
Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

Local end-user functions
The local end-user components and inputs include a local PC and
power supply, which includes local and household wiring as
contributors to the E1 value, a local substation that contributes to
E2 and E3 values. The local PC operating system and the
software contribute separately to the E1 value, because each can
be targeted independently.
Internet communications
In the way that the example is constructed, this requires the use
of a complete internet communications system.
Selected static response
At the remote “end”, this application reaches a different situation
from the “work” example: the input can, is simply a case of
identifying the correct diagnosis and presenting the response.
TOTALS

Exposure
contribution
E1
E2
E3
5

1

1

13

13

0

5

0

0

23

14

1

Table 13: First-aid example subsystems and exposure

A significant difference between this example and the work information
example is that the information required by the end-user in this case is relatively static.
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If the “Heimlich manoeuvre” can be identified as the information required, then a static
information source is quite adequate – nothing needs to be generated in real time at
the “end” of the technology chain that is furthest from the end-user.
As with the “work information” example, the exposure generated by the
internet data transmission hardware and protocols is a major contributor to this
example. The home PC “subsystem” is also a subsystem that contributes, but to a
lesser extent.
At the “far end”, i.e. the end furthest from the user, more than one option for
the identification of a diagnosis and for the provision of the first-aid information could
have been assumed with approximately equal validity. A human physician, for
example, and an emergency department specialist, could interact with the end-user,
or an expert system shell could be used to refine the diagnosis and provide advice.
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. Because the example proposes an
internet-mediated communication, the analysis shows that the end-user is vulnerable
to non-availability of the internet. The user, i.e. the first-aider, is also vulnerable to a
failure of the consultant system, whether human or artificial, that generates the
diagnosis and recommends treatment.
6.3.7

Analysis of example study #5: perishable food
This is an example where exposure is spread throughout a technological

system, with major local contributions from only the financial transaction system and
local power supplies. As the “service” is defined in terms of the product in the enduser’s refrigerator, contributors to exposure include the apartment power supply and
access to the apartment.
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Technological contributor

Exposure

Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

contribution
E1

E2

E3

User storage
The example also assumes that the user can store the milk in a
refrigerator that requires power.
User transport
Processes associated with transport of consumer quantities of
fresh milk to individual user’s premises make a limited
contribution to the end-user’s exposure as the example assumes
use of the user’s own transport.
Retail transaction
The purchase of the fresh milk in consumer quantities from the
retailer requires the full EFTPOS system, which is treated as a
subsystem and contributes to the exposure of the end-user.
Retailer system
The retailer requires power, stock checking and refrigeration
systems, which contribute.
Retailer staff facilities
The retail outlet, described in the example, is unworkable without
staff, and is therefore unworkable without staff facilities. Potable
water has been assessed to have only a low exposure (E1 = 1);
however, the sewage system, as previously analysed, makes a
very significant contribution to the total exposure.
Bulk transport to local retail facility
The transport to the retailer contributes little to the exposure down
to E3 levels because there are very many transport alternatives.
Raw milk processing
Processing phase – from reception of the raw milk to the
generation of the processed, quality-controlled and packaged
milk product in a form that can achieve a stated shelf life requires
testing to confirm quality and payment basis, pasteurisation and
standardisation. The example shows that a representative
processing plant packages the standardised and pasteurised milk
into consumer packs for dispatch to retailer.
Raw milk collection system
The supply of raw milk to the processing centre involves a very
large number of farms and a significant number of bulk transport
options. None contribute to exposure levels in the E1, E2 or E3
levels, these are not considered in this analysis.
The metering testing and billing systems do contribute.
TOTALS

4

0

0

0

0

0

49

12

1

3

2

1

35

4

6

2

1

2

22

2

0

13

1

2

128 22

12

Table 14: Fresh food example subsystems and exposure
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As there are very many farms, the supply of raw milk contributes to an “E”
value higher than 3. Similarly, there are enough alternative road routes, tankers and
drivers to ensure that no contribution to “E” values below E3 are made by these
processes and streams. For the representative example, it is assumed that, although
there may be more than three processing facilities in a country, as supply chains are
assumed to be regional, these facilities are deemed to contribute to E2 values. As one
of the essential input streams, for which not adequate storage technology exists,
electrical power remains a contributor to the exposure of this technological system,
and, although the national grid is likely to have many generators and significant
transmission line redundancy, local power supply options commonly do not include
those levels of design redundancy. Power is used at more than one point, even though
distinctly different power sources and distribution systems are involved, and therefore
these add separately to the exposure. As with all systems involving end-user
purchase, the financial transaction system (EFTPOS) contributes a large exposure to
the end-user. As with other examples, staff with particular skills are essential; if
unskilled staff can carry out tasks with the help of instructional material, this
significantly decreases the exposure to a lack of skilled staff; a fully automated retail
facility or delivery system would also reduce the exposure offered by the retail facility.
Staff facilities, and particularly sewage disposal systems, contribute significantly.
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. Specifically, this analysis shows that
the end-user is vulnerable to the failure of the financial transaction system (EFTPOS)
that has been used for the example, and this system, in turn, is vulnerable to failures
of the internet communications system. As noted previously, non-availability can
result either from a direct technological failure or from a technologically incurred
feature such as surveillance capability, which renders the system effectively
unavailable to the user. For a short-shelf-life product, dependence on a single
centralised processing facility incurs vulnerability for the end-user. Transport systems
have high levels of design redundancy and therefore incur minimal vulnerability. In
addition to the vulnerabilities associated with the transactional facility, the retail
facility’s dependence on staff, and hence staff facilities, incurs significant
vulnerabilities for the end-user.
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6.3.8

Analysis of example study #6: essential specific medicine
The supply of an essential specific medicine is a complex process. The

technological system that places an MDI in a user’s hands involves a local retail and
regulatory system, a distribution supply chain and a multi-component manufacture
and packaging system.
Technological contributor

Exposure

Legend: E1 is the number of single proc/stream failure exposure. E2 is the duel
proc/stream exposure (excluding E1’s), E3 is the triple proc/stream
exposure (excluding E1’s and E2’s).

contribution
E1

E2

E3

User acquisition of MDI: financial transaction
The delivery, into the user’s hands, of a filled and functional
Ventolin™ MDI is the end-point of this subsystem and the service
level assigned for this example. For Australia and New Zealand,
as part charges on medication such as Ventolin™ MDIs are
levied, a financial transaction is required.
User acquisition of MDI: prescribing permission
MDIs are acquired from pharmacies, which acquire wholesale
stock and require a prescription from a medical practitioner as a
prerequisite for dispensing.
MDI filling, packaging and distribution
Following manufacture and distribution of MDI parts, the
canisters are filled with the propellant and the active ingredient,
and the metering chamber with metering valve is assembled and
sealed to the canister. The completed unit is labelled and
packaged, and the individually packaged MDIs are distributed in
bulk packs.
MDI: manufacture of container and distribution
The design of MDIs has become reasonably standardised, and
manufacture requires deep drawing of the canister and the
metering chamber and the retaining cap from aluminium stripstock, and the CNC machining of the hollow metering valve
system. Near-identical MDI designs and a moderate number of
manufacturing plants exist.
MDI active ingredient – distribution
Trackable distribution chain for sterile, diluted active ingredient.
MDI active ingredient – synthesis, testing and dilution
A “six-step” salbutamol synthesis process has become common.
This uses commonly available chemical feedstocks and has a
good yield. The purified salbutamol is distributed in standardised
concentrations for packaging.
TOTALS

49

12

5

0

0

1

4

1

1

1

2

2

0

0

0

4

0

1

58

15

10

Table 15: Essential medicine example subsystems and exposure
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The aluminium strip, from which the MDI bodies are formed, is considered to
be available from very many sources, and to contribute to “E” values higher than E3.
Although there are alternative suppliers for the completed inhalers, in practice only a
single branded type is available in most pharmacies; therefore, it seems to be
reasonable to consider the production process. As with many other examples, the
processes closest to the end-user contribute significantly to the end-user’s exposure.
It is noteworthy that, although the MDI has become the most common method
of administration, salbutamol can be effectively administered either via nebuliser or
by intravenous injection: The vast majority of the contribution to the exposure value is
associated with the manufacture, filling and distribution of the MDI, rather than the
creation of the active ingredient or the dilution of the active ingredient into a form that
can potentially be administered. If the active ingredient were available to the user,
there is little technological reason why the basic user requirement could not be met
with a much lower level of exposure. Some countries do have completely free health
services, but most, including New Zealand, require a contribution from the end-user
which, as a reasonable representation of reality, requires the involvement of the
EFTPOS financial system; this system, plus the associated internet data transfer
mechanism, is a significant contributor to the end-user’s total exposure.
Summary. This analysis of the exposure of the technology chain evaluates
the vulnerability that it imposes on the end-use. For this example, analysis shows that
the end-user is vulnerable to the availability of the financial transaction system, which
in turn is vulnerable to the availability of the internet system. As noted previously, the
transport system has high levels of design redundancy and therefore incurs little
vulnerability. The manufacture of the MDI canister also incurs limited vulnerability, but
the local filling operations do incur notable vulnerability and the centralised synthesis
of the active ingredient also incurs significant vulnerability.
6.4

Application of theoretical basis to other examples

6.4.1

Application to homogeneous system examples
A single, completely hypothetical example of a homogenous system will be

analysed for weaknesses (exposure points). This analysis would be expected only to
confirm that the analysis of exposure points replicates similar analyses made using
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graph theory approaches. This analysis would also serve to demonstrate how the
proposed analysis of the exposure level can contribute insights in addition to those
available from graph theory approaches.
6.4.2

Analysis of the dynamic system (newspaper vendor)
Assumptions made in the study are as follows. (a) There is no technological

reason, only a profit maximisation reason, why the newspaper vendor cannot order
sufficient papers; there is assumed to be no limit to either the printery capacity or the
vendor’s purchasing capacity. (b) There is no interchange of stock amongst vendors
during the day ‒ if that were possible, the process description would include a range
of "OR" gates to illustrate the fact that a vendor could have multiple potential suppliers
of stock, and, assuming good communication and logistics, there would effectively be
only a trivial problem remaining. (c) The vendor's ability to purchase "sufficient" papers
is not constrained by the vendor’s financial capability. (d) Each purchaser has the
financial means to purchase a newspaper.
The model for analysis, then reduces to:
(a)

The purchaser is assumed to be at a location used for retail sales by the
vendor.

(b)

The purchaser carries out a minor financial transaction to purchase the
newspaper.

(c)

The vendor has transported himself or herself to the normal sales location,
carrying stock

(d)

The vendor has completed a financial transaction with the newspaper supplier
for the purchase of stock.
The exposure metric is shown to be {4, 0, 0}. The E1 value (4) reflects the

possible failure of the input stream, i.e. papers from the newspaper producer, failure
of fuel or road to allow transport from the point of bulk supply purchase to the point of
sale and non-availability of the newspaper vendor. As the model relates to a single
vendor, selling a single product that is sourced from a single point, there are no
contributors to E2 or E3 values, i.e. there are no combinations of two or three failures,
where neither failure alone would cause output failure that would cause a service
failure.
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The whole newspaper vendor “problem” is an operational research problem of
optimising a variable (profit) under conditions of uncertain demand and fixed supply
cost – a semi-dynamic effect. If the vendor could download an electronic copy of the
paper, a local printer could generate papers as required, paying the printery only the
royalty for each copy sold. Such a change would eliminate the problem of predicting
demand but this technological change would introduce the technological
vulnerabilities of the printing process, including the availability of power, paper and
communications to the newspaper file supplier. It is unclear whether the change would
actually decrease the exposure of the end-user.
Assuming that only cash transactions are possible, the newspaper vendor is
one of the examples that has the lowest technological exposure of all of the example
studies, and it is difficult to develop a technological solution that has lower exposure.
The example almost epitomises a case where the end-user is minimally vulnerable to
technological failures.
6.5

Conclusions
This chapter has summarised and interpreted the findings from the analysis

and review of the initial examples. This chapter has also summarised and interpreted
the findings from the analysis of the homogeneous system example and from the “risk
analysis” of the selected example studies. The detailed analysis has revealed
subsystems that contribute to more than one example, but are not common across all
examples. The examples have identified themes and issues that are common across
all examples, to various extents, allowing both generalised conclusions and a claim
that the conclusions can reasonably be further generalised.
The examples, as initially defined, have included a range of measures that
have already reduced exposure. The use of shipping containers has allowed
standardised handling equipment and the use of protection equipment has allowed
effective design redundancy in national power supply grids. The use of standardised
motor fuel specifications and standardised container road transport has allowed large
levels of effective transport redundancy to be achieved. Although the examples are
historical, it should be noted that almost all basic engineering standards, e.g. TEFC
motors, metric-standard nuts and bolts, fuel specifications, materials specifications,
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ISO OSI data specifications and open document format specifications, contribute
significantly to the reduction in vulnerability of engineering equipment.
This analysis and the summary have answered RQ(a): “For goods or services
delivered to end-users, what measure of vulnerability can be attributed to the
technological systems that are currently used?”
6.5.1

Limitations
The analyses have illuminated several difficulties with the actual determination

of exposure; these issues are worthy of comment. In particular, it has been found that
it is important to establish a reasonable granularity for systems such as a long sewage
pipe. Simplistically, such a pipe would contribute a "1" the end-user's E1 value. Such
a conclusion fails to recognise that sections of the pipe can fail independently of other
sections, and thus can be considered to be separate weaknesses. A reasonable
assessment of granularity has therefore been applied, assigning cumulative E1
contributions to defined lengths of collection pipework. Similarly, it is important to
establish a reasonable granularity for such items as a PC, which may contain billions
of transistors, yet only a few simple and easily replaceable major components, and
simple but large industrial equipment such as a trickle filter for sewage. The criteria
proposed in Section 5.2.2 have been adopted.
The analysis has asserted that some streams, including power from the
national grid, international shipping and the road network, commonly have more than
three independent sources and hence can be considered to be unconditionally
available. These assertions are justified, in detail, within the analysis of the specific
examples, although exceptions occur in real systems where, for example, a
community is served by a single road and a single power feeder.
The analyses have identified that issues of practical availability frequently
exist; these commonly involve situations in which a user can access a service only by
agreeing to specific contractual conditions. These situations need to be correctly
identified as contributors to the E1 exposure value.
6.5.2

Specific conclusions for initial examples
This section summarises the analyses of each of the examples studied,

drawing attention to significant issues arising from the analysis.
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Sewage system. Although the major contributor to exposure is the sewage
treatment plant, it is notable that this exposure is predicated on the definition of the
service, viz. the environmentally acceptable treatment of sewage. Had the service
been defined as "the removal of sewage from the apartment", then the existence of
bypasses for various stages of sewage treatment would have indicated a much lower
total exposure. The treatment actually applied to the sewage is not complex, but
economies of scale have led to the use of a single, centralised treatment plant.
The second largest contributor to end-user exposure is the pipework leading
from the apartment to the treatment plant and particularly the gravity-fed pipework
leading to the first pumping station. Following the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes,
multiple disruptions of sewage pipework were a source of considerable difficulty, and
cost estimates for repair were enormous. Sewage holding tanks for individual
dwellings are used in semi-rural locations, but are not commonly used for urban
locations or apartments; hence, the sewage collection pipework is a single point of
exposure. Similarly, there is some degree of holding capacity in the settlement ponds
and trickle filter tanks of the sewage treatment plant, perhaps sufficient to allow the
replacement of small motors, but the holding capacity is not large. Power supply is
essential to both the pumping stations and the operation of the sewage treatment
plant; some plants use methane from anaerobic digestion of sewage to operate a
cogeneration plant and provide power locally ‒ although common, this was not
considered to be sufficiently representative as to be included in the example definition.
Loss of power supplied from the grid is therefore still considered to contribute to the
exposure of the complete system. Although both are ultimately supplied from the
national grid, the geographical separation makes it reasonable to expect that the
pumping station supply and the sewage treatment plant supply will be sourced from
separate substations and will certainly use separate low voltage feeders.
Work information. As would be expected, the internet communications
system is the largest contributor to the system’s exposure, and it should be noted that,
although the internet was originally proposed to have large design redundancy, the
pressures to achieve economies of scale have resulted in increased dependence on
fewer and faster communications links; this dependence has increased the levels of
exposure. For individuals, access to the internet is via a commercial agreement with
an ISP, raising the possibility that access will be practically unavailable if commercial
168

terms, e.g. re privacy of communications, are unacceptable to the user. This issue is
also relevant for ISPs seeking access to international carriers. The user’s PC,
operating system, applications and power supply also contribute to the user’s
vulnerability and these contributors can be reduced, as indicated in Chapter 7 of this
thesis.
Fuel. As most petrol stations have more than four pumps, the petrol station
pumping equipment is massively duplicated and therefore does not actually contribute
to the end-user's vulnerability at the E3 level. The largest contribution in this example
is from the EFTPOS transaction requirement and the second largest is from the
services required to allow staff to operate the petrol station. In defining the example,
it was recognised that automated stations exist and require no staff, and that limited
facilities for automated cash payments exist; however, it was argued that the staffed
station using EFTPOS was representative of very many actual stations. The exposure
contributed by the EFTPOS system arises not only from the communications
requirements but also from an acknowledgement that such a transaction requires
several parties to enter commercial agreements that potentially are unacceptable to
them, and are therefore potential sources of practical unavailability. The staff facilities,
and particularly the provision of sewage disposal and power, are sources of exposure
and hence end-user vulnerability, but there is no real need to consider these as a
source of a "feedback loop".
First-aid. The details of the proposed system have been justified as
representative; however, other possible approaches to providing this particular
service could be considered to be equally representative. Under the described
system, the contributors to exposure are moderately similar to those for the work
information example, except for two important distinctions: (a) an automated search
facility rather than another user are at the remote end of the communications system;
(b) as the information supplied is static, i.e. generally will not change over a
reasonable period of time, only a lookup system rather than an interactive system, as
for the work information example, is required. This example requires care to describe
the "user" as the person seeking the diagnosis and remedy, and to distinguish this
person from the victim of the choking.
Perishable food. The fresh food example is distinguished by the need to
centrally process a short-shelf-life material (fresh milk), and to then package,
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distribute and retail the treated product. As the raw material is accumulated from a
large number of farms, the actual raw material supply does not contribute significantly
to exposure at the E3 level, but the impracticality of long-distance transport and
storage means that the processing plant does contribute to exposure, and the legal
necessities of pasteurisation do not allow the processing plant to be bypassed.
Pasteurisation, standardisation of protein and fat levels, and testing require close
process control, which increase the economies of scale available from a centralised
plant. The retail (EFTPOS) financial transaction necessities, and the retail staff facility
necessities are similar to those for the petrol station example and contribute
significantly to the end-user's exposure. As there are many transport options for raw
material supply and for the distribution of wholesale products, these do not contribute
significantly to the end-user's vulnerability.
Essential medicine. Although, the chemical nature of the salbutamol
molecule and the preferred method of synthesis are public knowledge, production of
the purified and tested salbutamol is typically highly centralised. This centralisation is
driven partly by economies of scale and partly by quality assurance requirements.
The design of the MDI canisters is patented and thus public knowledge ‒ and the
processes are standard metal production processes (deep-drawing, machining and
crimping). Both the active ingredients (salbutamol, dilutant and propellant) and the
MDI canister are high-value, long-life and low-volume items, and hence are readily
amenable to stockpiling. Perhaps surprisingly, therefore, the major contribution to the
end-user vulnerability is that associated with the final EFTPOS purchase transaction.
Although it is recognised that cash transactions are possible, the EFTPOS transaction
was justified as being representative in the example definitions. For a typical user, the
medical practitioner permission, i.e. the legal requirements for access to prescription
medicines, also contributes to the user's exposure.
6.5.3

Analysis of relative total exposure of actual examples
The total exposure of the analysed examples has been shown to be heavily

influenced by the precise nature of the scope boundaries and the assumptions
incorporated into the design of the examples. An objective of the thesis was to allow
effort between infrastructures to be prioritised. An outcome that has perhaps been
unexpected has been the highlighting of the need to prioritise effort on some common
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subsystems because their effect has tended to overshadow the exposure metrics
associated with the more central and obvious aspects of the examples.
6.5.4

Analysis of aspects that recur across examples
A small number of common subsystems have been identified. The exposure

contribution of each has been estimated and the values have been added consistently
to the examples using these standard subsystems. Some subsystems, notably road
transport and power supply, were not included as standard subsystems in the
analyses presented in Chapter 5 and the initial sections of Chapter 6. The decision to
treat these separately within examples, as opposed to treating them as standard
subsystems, was made because, although the subsystem services were common,
their delivery varied significantly between examples. Cross-checking between
examples has been used to ensure a consistent treatment of subsystems such as
road transport and power supply.
6.5.5

Analysis of generalisable features of each example
The examples that have been studied were chosen to illustrate a wide variety

of technological systems and were chosen specifically to cover high- and lower-tech
subsystems, and situations with offshore and onshore components. Each exemplar
system does include aspects that can be generalised, and their identification is
valuable. In particular, it can be noted that may of the studies show examples of cases
where economic considerations (economies of scale) have progressively led to highly
centralised production systems, whose final designs make large contributions to the
end-user's exposure.
Sewage system. The treatment of sewage is an example of a collection
system, with a single point of processing, with limited options for storage at large scale
(as for the fuel example) and with limited options for storage at the user end. The
system is distinctive because there are practical, although highly undesirable, options
for bypassing the treatment system.
Work information. The analysis of the work information example illustrates
the need for data formats that are mutually comprehensible by persons at distant ends
of a communications system. This example is obviously highly dependent on the
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communications system used. The example is generalisable to any field in which two
individuals exchange and mutually contribute to some dataset, e.g. a document.
Fuel. The fuel supply example is characteristic of a system in which goods are
created at a single point and are distributed via a supply chain, with retail facilities for
the end-user. Fuel could be considered to be a moderate value item, making
significant storage impractical at user premises. As fuel is considered to have strategic
value, there is large-scale storage at a national scale. There are standard
specifications for fuel, facilitating at least options for local production.
First-aid. The "first-aid" example is characterised by the need to access
essentially static information (diagnostic and treatment advice) quickly. In the
example, the data are held remotely and are accessed via a communications system
and a remote data-search facility. In the example, both the communications system
and the remote search facility contribute significant exposure. For any case in which
static information is needed locally, there is no need for the information to be held
remotely; it is entirely possible for reference information to be held locally. This
conclusion can be generalised and shown to be applicable to fields including
engineering and physics information, agricultural information, food processing
information, animal husbandry and more general human and animal diagnostic and
treatment information.
Perishable food. The fresh milk example is characteristic of many short-shelflife products, featuring progressive creation and limited options for storage because
of the characteristically rapid onset of spoilage combined with a low-value and highvolume, high-throughput product. Short-shelf-life products will generally require
frequent retail activity, and hence both transport and the use of cash or EFTPOS
systems.
Essential medicine. The essential medical supply example, examining the
salbutamol MDI supply, is an example of a case in which components, whose makeup
is public knowledge and that have a long shelf life, are progressively assembled into
a final consumer device. This example can be generalised to cases where long-shelflife streams are assembled. Stockpiling of intermediate and indeed final products can
be designed to exceed maximum expected times to recreate processes. Ventolin™ ‒
progressive creation, more than one distribution system and good potential for
storage.
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7.

EFFECT OF HYPOTHETICAL CHANGES TO EXAMPLES

7.1

Introduction
Two approaches will be used in the process of hypothesising changes to the

selected examples: (1) each example will be scrutinised for features that are specific
to that example and that could be changed; (2) a set of standardised approaches will
be considered. The examples that have been studied have been shown to be
representative, but have necessarily assumed defined service levels as a requirement
for the analysis. The exposure has not been re-estimated for different service levels
but, for some examples, such variations are expected to have significant effects on
the calculated exposure. As a notable example, if sewage can be discharged without
environmental consideration, all of the treatment plant processes can be bypassed
and the exposure of the user can be reduced. The examples as described have
necessarily included some specific choices and design features. Approaches to
decreasing the exposure for some of these features will be described in this section;
it could be argued that the analysis process has contributed to highlighting these
options. For each example, the hypothetical changes are described and their effects
on exposure and hence on the user’s vulnerability are assessed. A summary of
changes is provided, noting the type of each hypothesised change and an
assessment of the economic and technical effort required and of the magnitude of the
effect.
7.2

Common features likely to offer significant reduction of exposure
It is possible to identify several categories of hypothetical change. Examining

each such category helps to identify valuable hypothetical changes within the
examples.
7.2.1

Local storage
A static analysis of technological systems has been presented, because the

weaknesses of technological systems are static. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider
the possibility that a local store of some intermediate stream can, within certain
criteria, have a similar effect to a configurational change. Two scenarios are
examined. Firstly, a cache of an intermediate product can continue to supply that
stream to an upstream process until the downstream process is repaired or re174

established. Secondly, a cache of an intermediate product can continue to supply that
stream to an upstream process until an alternative source is found, if the normal
source fails.

Figure 11 Local storage effect

Robertson (2010) considered the relationship between time-to-disaster and
time-to-replace or time-to-repair. Figure 11 illustrates the effect of a cache on a
system and shows that, if a cache, i.e. a local store of an intermediate stream, is
sufficient to allow the repair of a supplying process before the cache is exhausted at
the normal usage rate, then the local cache can be considered in the same way as
an alternative process, with E2 being equal to 1. If a local stockpile of an intermediate
stream is sufficient to allow the implementation of an alternative supplier of the
intermediate stream before the store is exhausted at the normal usage rate, then the
local cache can be considered in the same way as an externally available stream,
with no contribution to E1. This criterion also implies that the supplying system has
sufficient over-capacity with which to build up the cache. For cases where local
storage cannot practically cover the time required to institute an alternative supply, it
may still be valid to mention some qualitative decrease in vulnerability. The household
storage of food supplies, water and fuel is highly significant for disaster situations,
noting that disaster preparedness plans generally assume a relatively short period
until normal supply modes are restored.
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7.2.2

Technological substitution
In many cases, alternative technologies may be substituted for existing

technologies; such alternatives may allow significant reductions in exposure. This
option is distinguished from the next by referencing only extant technologies. This
category is particularly relevant to cases in which a current allocation of costs has
resulted in one technology being preferred but not superior in any other way. In the
context of this type of technological change, it must be noted that the existence of a
durable and public specification for an intermediate stream will significantly promote
alternative options for the stream’s supply. As practical availability contributes to
exposure, a technological substitution that does not affect exposure to technological
failure can reduce the total exposure by eliminating contributors to practical nonavailability.
7.2.3

Technological breakthrough
It is reasonable to at least consider the effect upon a particular example’s

exposure should a specific technological capability become available. “Become
available” could include several categories.
(a)

A technological capability that does not currently exist, e.g. a technology
capable of the economical storage of MWh of electrical power at household
scale. “Flow batteries” exist but are technically immature; pumped hydro is the
only technically mature option for the storage of large quantities of power, and
is restricted to very specific geographies.

(b)

Technology that is immature (in the terms of the NASA technology maturity
index (2015)), e.g. “lab-on-a-chip” or “universal chemical fabrication”
capabilities, or three-dimensional printing with engineering materials.

(c)

Technologies that are moderately mature but require optimisation for largescale use (macro-algae for sewage treatment and transport fuel production, at
“village” scale).
Hypothesised changes identified under this category do need some comment

on both scientific possibility, i.e. precluding those that contravene laws of physics, and
practicality, but that leaves a wide scope. It seems to be quite reasonable in the
context of this study to consider advances that are currently only mentioned in SciFi
literature, yet do not contravene any laws – e.g. technology that can synthesize fresh
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food that is indistinguishable from “real” fresh food, but is synthesised from very basic
raw materials. A number of technologies could be considered in this category, and
would therefore include solar pyro-metallurgy, lab-on-a-chip, small-scale generalpurpose chemical synthesis and small-scale micromachining and fabrication.
7.2.4

Re-purposable components
The analysis of exposure considers the “availability” of a stream or process,

with the general implication that a process is single purpose. It is quite possible to
hypothesise a case where a multi-purpose component is substituted for a singlepurpose component, and thus reduces the “exposure”. Well-written instructions
allowing a member of the public to carry out the functions of a specialised employee
would be an example of this type. The human being is perhaps the best example of a
re-purposable component. The level of diagnostic capability, tailored instructions and
operational capability of the common external cardiac defibrillation units are an
excellent example of the implementation of this principle.
7.2.5

Repair priority or inherent difficulty of attack
It is possible to consider that a specific failure would have such a major effect

that heroic repair efforts would immediately be launched; hence repair would probably
be completed before the effects of the outage were fully felt. It is also possible to
hypothesise a case, such as the severance of an undersea cable, where the
preliminaries to an attack would be very likely to attract attention before they
succeeded. Such cases would allow hypothesising that, even though an exposure
locus exists, its significance should be deprecated, on the assumption that either a
hazard would be avoided or repair would be rapid and certain; for example,
consideration that the outage of a very large utility will attract major repair efforts,
whereas a localised sewage pipe defect may take a utility many weeks to address if
there are thousands of others. This is a matter for comment within the analysis, rather
than offering a hypothesis for change, and hence is not noted as a category of
hypothetical change. Local bodies will give high priority to maintaining the function of
sewage systems, but, following the Christchurch earthquakes in 2011, untreated
sewage has leaked from the system for over 5 years; “portaloos” on residential street
corners were still in use 4 years after the earthquake, and the whole pipework system
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is to be abandoned and replaced by a new pressurised system. Despite urgency,
quick repairs have not been possible. Under this heading, it is also relevant to note
that commentators have periodically drawn attention to significant factors that are
easily omitted from even well-structured analyses. Examples include the
preponderance of internet services that are totally dependent upon advertising
revenue for continuance, as no effective mechanism to enable user-funding has been
set up.
7.2.6

Standardised independent units and interfaces
Where there are standardised components and/or standardised interface

specifications and/or very many readily available substitution units, the actual
exposure is reduced. Where publicly available interface specifications exist, the
production of multiple options for use of the interface will tend to be encouraged. It
may be argued that the success of the internet has been possible because the
packetising of information allows standardised handling approaches and the wellpublicised TCP/IP protocols and mail, http, ftp etc., as defined by W3C, the Worldwide
web consortium. All services allow very many suppliers to offer interoperable
equipment. Other examples would include ISO-standard nuts and bolts, international
fuel specifications, containerised shipping, micro-USB charging plugs and voltages,
and Ethernet standards for communications protocols. An equally important
application of this principle is the design of components for operation by multiple
readily available tools – examples range from standardised nut and bolt sizes to a
DVD format that can be read using a microscope rather than relying on a completely
opaque specification plus firmware plus hardware and software. This concept is well
understood in the mechanical engineering field, but has not yet been assimilated in
the IT field. Programming languages appear to fail to implement this principle,
although Java™ and, to a lesser extent, Microsoft’s .Net™ framework have attempted
to do so. For data representation, the use of mark-up languages implemented in
software is a good example of such an approach, because a text reader will allow a
user to discern and edit the information represented. Open source document formats
such as ODF (ISO/IEC 26300-3:2015 – “Information technology – Open Document
Format for Office Application”) are another example of such an approach.
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7.2.7

Minimise exposure contributed by common subsystems
Contributory systems: The analysis of examples has shown that large levels

of end-user exposure are incurred when the provision of the goods or services is
dependent on a significant technological subsystem that itself incorporates large
levels of exposure. Use of a standardised subsystem such as internet
communications may offer utility to the end-user, but the utility is associated with a
very significant exposure. Technological alternatives that preserve the essential utility,
but avoid the exposure contribution, need to be considered carefully. Small sensors
and single-purpose devices can be created at low cost and can be connected to the
internet; the functionality added by each is small, but the “exposure” added by each
is significant and avoidable. Although disruption of major T1 links and associated
routers is unlikely except briefly, the “Internet of Things” (IoT) allows burgeoning
points of exposure for even local networks and other connected devices. Of particular
concern are implanted medical devices, for which “exposure” is life threatening, and
for which the addition of a significant contributory exposure (by internet connection)
is a very dubious trade-off against functionality.
“Effectively unavailable”. This thesis has already noted that various quite
disparate categories of fault or event can cause a system to become “effectively
unavailable”: these can include physical fault, but can also include situations in which
other factors make the “system” become effectively unavailable. Although such
"effective unavailability” may be manifested as a contractual issue, the technological
basis is clear: economies of scale and non-availability of user-controlled technological
options have led to a highly centralised privately owned technological system with
many users. Those technological drivers have, almost inevitably, provided the
foundations for situations in which either contractual practices or known operational
practices of the owners, e.g. data sharing, blatant snooping, censorship or the
injection of information intended to entrap or mislead, exist and may cause the service
to be effectively unavailable to a user. The applications of internet services are
currently resulting in the carriage of both very broad and very fine-grained data
relating to individuals. It has been noted elsewhere that “unavailability” can mean
“unacceptable availability” as well as non-availability. Media reports (e.g. "NSA slide
shows surveillance of undersea cables" (Washington Post, 2013)) have strongly
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suggested that various powers have taken advantage of the common landing points
of several high-capacity undersea data cables to install surveillance equipment; this
cannot be confirmed with certainty but end-users with concerns for privacy may
consider that the internet communications system is effectively unavailable to them.
The data generated by electronic financial transactions provide a very detailed picture
of users' life patterns and the users have no effective control over the usage of the
information exchanged. It is not hard to envisage situations (a citizen of a totalitarian
country making regular donations to a democracy advocate or climate change
scientists in a country ruled by climate change sceptics) where such a system could
become effectively unavailable to a user. It can be observed that an individual living
in a typical urban environment would find existence without a bank account very
difficult – a situation that allows banks to impose terms and conditions with very little
regard to user wishes.
Reduction of specific internet exposure. Individual users’ subscriptions to
ISPs allow the funding of access, and contributions are aggregated to generate
revenue for such commercially driven ventures as the provision of undersea cables.
Internet infrastructure, e.g. administrative controls, router update costs, DNS server
costs etc., are also funded by user contributions. Some indirect revenue, e.g. access
to cable corridors, is still likely to originate from government sources. Internet services,
which include major news providers and services offering free web searching, free
web-based email and free document processing and storage facilities, are still
generally funded by advertising and an economic downturn would put pressure on
advertising revenue and perhaps drive content providers towards pay-to-use content.
Reduction of financial system exposure. The analysis of the EFTPOS
system’s exposure shows the very large level of technological exposure incurred by
this system. Previous notes on the potential for such a system becoming effectively
available provide a quantitative basis for supporting the continued legality of a
physical medium of exchange, whether cash or bullion. The recent emergence of
machines capable of recognising large-denomination banknotes will assist this option.
It may be observed that calls for the abandonment of cash as a legal tender have
never gained wide support. Arguments that the tracking of financial transactions assist
with the detection of criminal activity are commonly used; an equally valid argument
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that such an aim does not require total and ongoing surveillance of all transactions
can be made.
Reduction of transport system exposure. Many aspects of transport
systems are already standardised: fuel specifications, vehicle dimensions, vehicle
speeds aligned with road design standards and the use of containers for bulk material
movement. A private motor vehicle with a full tank of fuel has a very low level of
"exposure" within an operational time-frame ‒ it is noteworthy that many persons
perceive a private motor vehicle as giving them freedom and options. It seems to be
possible that the future availability of easily hired utility vehicles will offer yet lower
exposure for the user, but the current low levels suggest that transport vehicles are
not a high priority for the reduction of user vulnerability. Bulk fuel supply has been
shown not to be a major source of exposure for the short term, i.e. within an
operational time-frame, as several strategically mandated stores offer alternative
sources. For a longer time-frame, the supply of bulk fuel would contribute to the user's
exposure and options for local fuel synthesis would offer attractive options.
7.3

Hypothesised modifications to examples
In this section, changes are hypothesised. Not all hypothesised changes are

considered as worthy of analysis. For changes considered to be useful, the
incremental change to exposure is noted. As hypothesised changes are identified,
changed aspects rather than the complete system are described and incremental,
rather than full, analyses of exposure are reported. The identification and assessment
of hypothesised changes to each example will be considered under four headings.
(a)

Observations on example analysis, particularly large contributors to
vulnerability, and specific features of note.

(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change, considering possible
changes within each of the identified categories.

(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical system re-designs, in sufficient detail to allow
analysis, and presentation of the assessed effects

(d)

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes, commenting on the effectiveness
and implications of the proposed changes.
The effort required to effect a given change will be categorised as “Major”, i.e.

widespread replacement of high-cost infrastructure, “Moderate”, i.e. requiring partial
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changes to infrastructure, or “Minor”, i.e. works that can be accomplished with little
more than maintenance budgets and without major disruption. The effects of
hypothesised changes are also categorised as “Major”, “Moderate” or “Minor”
according to the proportional change in the total exposure.
7.3.1

Effect of hypothesised changes to communications
Options for eliminating or reducing the exposure incurred by any contributory

system should be investigated. The high values of exposure incurred by the internet
communications system justifies efforts to reduce its contribution.
(a)

Observations on example analysis
The packet transmission protocols allow detection of corrupted packets and

hence requests for resends, acknowledgement of valid packet receipt and robust
protocols for reassembly of files from packets without regard to arrival times and
routes. Commentators have noted that the protocols contain good error detection and
correction approaches; they are inherently unencrypted and hence the contents are
insecure. ISO OSI protocols (ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, Information technology—Open
Systems Interconnection—Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model) have never
achieved significant uptake, particularly compared with TCP/IP protocols, but, unlike
the TCP/IP protocols, the ISO OSI protocols were designed to allow both open
standards and seamless integration across all process "layers" ‒ an outcome that has
not been achieved with TCP/IP. The internet originated as a highly decentralised
network that would allow messages to be re-routed over many optional routes with
semi-automated route selection, in response to outages. It has evolved into a state
where a very large proportion of data is transmitted by a relatively small number of
high-capacity undersea fibre-optic carriers. As well as increasing exposure to physical
failures, this centralisation increases the exposure to practical non-availability
because of issues such as surveillance.
High-capacity overland data transmission has also evolved, driven by
economy-of-scale considerations, into a situation where small numbers of highcapacity lines carry the majority of data, and incur significant exposure. Although the
re-routing of data transmissions is the mechanism that provides the internet’s
robustness, and the DNS lookup methods are the key to usability for many
applications, effective re-routing of packets depends upon the updating of router
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tables and protocols and valid DNS lookups are essential for finding data. The
mechanisms for reliably updating router tables and DNS server tables are both
weaknesses within the definition developed in this thesis. In addition to the
centralisation of data transmission paths, the internet has also progressively evolved
into a state where large portions of the total online data storage are provided by a
small number of well-resourced companies. The effects of this situation have been
noted, e.g. New Scientist (2016).
(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Local storage. Although many routers will include limited storage, increased

storage will result only in excessive re-send requests rather than significant actual
changes to exposure. This option is not considered further.
Technological substitution. Wireless access is used increasingly and,
assuming that wireless communication modules are readily replaceable, these reduce
the vulnerability associated with last-mile cable access.
Technological breakthrough. It is possible to consider a completely ad-hoc,
self-discovering wireless network that will allow completely automated re-routing
without cables. Self-discovering networks have been proposed, and are certainly
feasible. Provided that a funding mechanism were developed and nodes were solar
powered, a genuinely self-discovering network would reduce a user's exposure to
negligible levels.
Semi-dynamic effects. Although store-and-forward systems could be
considered, the current protocols have extensive provision for detecting and rerequesting corrupt packets. This approach appears to offer limited opportunities for
significant gain. The use of uninterruptible power supplies for routers is the most
promising application of this type of option.
Re-purposable components. The internet already makes extensive use of
re-purposable components including PCs and hard drives, and this approach seems
to offer limited additional opportunity for vulnerability reduction.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. The internet already
makes extensive use of standardised independent units.
Minimisation of contributory systems. For many large components of the
internet system, e.g. undersea cables and high-speed router centres, uninterruptible
power supplies and un-manned operations are normal, reducing two common
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contributory causes of exposure. The issue of commercial access and personally
acceptable terms and conditions make very significant contributions to the issue of
internet service availability
(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical system re-designs
No claim to consider all possible changes is made. No claims for economic

desirability or affordability are made. Options must not be clearly impossible, i.e.
violate basic scientific principles, but may not necessarily be technically feasible at
present. The following list has been developed from a consideration of the sources of
exposure identified in the example study, and the identified change categories. It must
be noted that the scope of these changes applies to systems from the outward-facing
domestic router port onwards, i.e. within the scope of the internet communications
subsystem.
Last-mile wireless. The last-mile cable between the DSLAM router and
multiplexer and the household router is exposed to breakage, corrosion and other
hazards. It would be possible to use a secure wireless carrier between the domestic
router and the DSLAM router, with no changes to the remainder of the system. This
change would eliminate a current E1 vulnerability for the user.
DSLAM power. The power supply to the DSLAM router and multiplexer is a
locus of exposure. Provision of a backup power supply to each DSLAM router reduces
that exposure, with no changes to the remainder of the system. Provided the backup
power supply met the criteria for a local storage solution, this change would eliminate
a current E1 vulnerability for the user.
Redundant

paths.

The

original

internet

design

provided

multiple

reconfigurable paths, and, although this design concept has survived, economies of
scale have led to a situation in which the bulk of the total internet traffic is carried by
a relatively small number of very-high-speed fibre-optic cables. These high-speed
links have achieved high levels of availability but each represent a point of exposure.
Even nation states may actually depend on a single high-speed connection to the rest
of the world, and there have been cases (The Guardian, 2011) when a nation was in
fact disconnected from the internet by the disruption of a single cable. Additional
transmission routes, most probably additional undersea cables, with backup to
satellite paths, with no changes to the remainder of the system, reduce this exposure.
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The hypothesised change ensures that E1, E2 and E3 are all zero for transmission
paths between peering points.
Acceptable access, the issue of practical availability. The user currently
requires the services of an ISP, who sets terms and conditions for the provision of
services. The ISP will purchase transmission services and bandwidth from national
and international providers, each of whom will offer services under set terms and
conditions. Both the local ISP and the upstream providers are subject to the legal
framework of the various jurisdictions in which they operate. Collectively, these
commercial and legal conditions all represent loci of exposure that may make the
service practically inaccessible to the end-user. Although it has been proposed that
internet access should be considered to be a human right, these issues have not
actually been addressed. It is reasonable to hypothesise a situation in which all users
are assured of the privacy of their data and metadata and are required to offer terms
and conditions that meet minimum standards, possibly via a "bill of rights" for
consumers, and certainly by an acceptance of the acceptability of strong encryption.
This hypothesised change would require contractual, technical and commercial
aspects, as commercial provision would be required to ensure the provision of
resources for expansion, repair and maintenance and operation, with no changes to
the remainder of the system. This would reduce a current E1 vulnerability to users.
Widely distributed wireless access. The hypothesised wireless link
between the domestic router and the DSLAM would eliminate the exposure
associated with the last-mile cable. A more generalised approach envisages
modifications to the DSLAM to allow services similar to the GSM cell phone system
to be offered, allowing any device to connect wirelessly, and hence offering mobile
and near-anonymous wireless access to the current DSLAM level of connection. Such
a change would also eliminate the "practical availability" E1 contributor and would
provide massively redundant access points.
Alternative router table update. According to Mr. Christopher Williams,
Technology Correspondent (The Guardian, 2011)
"Organisations that track global internet access detected a collapse in traffic in to and
out of Egypt at around 10.30GMT on Thursday night…The shut down involved the
withdrawal of more than 3,500 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routes by Egyptian
ISPs, according to Renesys … BGP routes are one of the most vital parts of the
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internet. They are mostly used by ISPs so their networks can exchange information
about how to best route the packets of data that make up all internet communications”.

This action, carried out for political reasons, illustrates the issue of “exposure”. The
internet was technically capable of routing data internationally but, once the
government of the day decreed the non-availability of BGP information and the nonacceptability of alternative data routes, citizens of the country effectively had no
internet access. The BGP router information was a point of exposure, and provision
of an alternative approach would allow the removal of a contributor to user
vulnerability.
Ad-hoc, self-discovering routing system. All of the previously hypothesised
options assume packet transmission through a set of semi-automated routers
connected by high-speed physical links. Re-routing is possible by arranging for the
routers to select alternative paths, i.e. alternative cable or fibre-optic lines, en-route to
the same destination. Although alternative paths decrease exposure, the total number
of paths cannot be expected to be large. Significant work has been carried out, e.g.
by Robertson (2007), to develop principles for self-discovering, ad-hoc free-field
networks that effectively comprise a massively parallel network of independently
powered, radio-connected and identical nodes with no interconnecting cables. A
system using ad-hoc networks established by nodes using a self-discovery approach
is effectively a significant internet re-design. However difficult technically, much has
been learned about self-discovering ad-hoc networks and such are possible. This
hypothesised approach would assume wireless access from the user’s router to the
nearest available network node. Such a change would represent almost a complete
technological development and substitution, but would remove all practical
vulnerability from communications systems.
(d)

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes
Simple and technically feasible approaches are able to reduce several (E1)

contributors to vulnerability. More costly and difficult approaches, such as router
updating and the provision of redundant capacity, are able to reduce exposure but
rely on commercial and statutory enablers. Despite having been proposed as a "basic
human right", the internet grew from a small network within a friendly environment,
and the lack of inbuilt security and privacy measures have frequently been
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commented upon. An invulnerable communications system is possible technically, but
would require the transition to a significantly changed technological approach.
Measure

Type

Effort

Effect

1

Last-mile wireless.

TECH_SUB

Minor

Minor

2

DSLAM power

TECH_SUB

Minor

Minor

3

Redundant paths

TECH_SUB

Major

Major

4

Acceptable access

CONTRIB’Y

Minor

Major

5

Widely distributed wireless access

TECH_SUB

Minor

Minor

6

Alternative router table update

TECH_NEW

Moderate

Major

7

Ad-hoc, self-discovering routing TECH_NEW

Major

Major

system
Table 16: Effect of hypothesised changes to internet system
7.3.2

Effect of hypothesised modifications to financial transaction systems
Several of the studied examples, and many examples that have not been

studied but that clearly affect users, depend upon financial transactions. This justifies
consideration of these systems as standard contributory systems. The studied
examples assume the use of an EFTPOS transaction system.
(a)

Observations on example analysis
Considering the EFTPOS system used in the representative example, the

computer hardware systems of two banks need to operate to allow the transaction.
The acquirer-to-merchant transaction can be run in batch mode and hence does not
incur the same exposure as the acquirer and user bank systems. Of equal importance,
both the user and the merchant can have any access to the EFTPOS system only if
the merchant accepts the acquirer bank’s conditions and their own bank’s conditions
– and the end-user can access the EFTPOS system only if the user accepts their
bank’s EFTPOS card conditions, which may include disclaimers regarding the
accessibility of data to either official or commercial entities. The EFTPOS system
makes use of the internet and the example assumes the subsystem boundaries
identified for the internet communications subsystem, but also requires secure
processing systems at each of the three relevant banks.
(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Local storage. No useful contributions.
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Technological substitution. Several media of exchange avoid the use of the
EFTPOS system entirely; ensuring that these media remain available and acceptable
will eliminate all of the vulnerabilities associated with the EFTPOS system. The
electronically verified credit card systems eliminate few of the vulnerabilities of the
EFTPOS system.
Technological breakthrough. Currency notes and coins are generally only
recognised within a single country; an internationally recognised medium of exchange
that is suitable for consumer transactions could be developed. Legal tender currency
is storable, but is subject to theft; cryptocurrencies are less vulnerable to physical
theft, but incur vulnerabilities associated with bitcoin wallets, cryptographic schemes
and other hardware and software components.
Semi-dynamic effects. None identified.
Re-purposable components. None identified.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. See above.
Minimisation of contributory systems. As the EFTPOS system depends
upon internet communications, it incurs that contributory system's vulnerabilities.
(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems
Several options are considered to be worthy of analysis.
Credit card transaction. Many modern credit cards include electronically

readable systems within the user’s card to ensure identification of the user. An
EFTPOS transaction involves a real-time interaction between the terminal, the user’s
bank and the acquirer’s bank and a batch-mode interaction with the merchant’s bank.
In contrast, a transaction using such a card requires only a real-time interaction with
the card-issuer’s bank and batch-mode interactions with the user’s bank and the
merchant’s bank. All of the exposure values associated with real-time interactions with
user and merchant banks are eliminated, because transactions with the user and
merchant banks are stored and executed whenever possible. Practical availability
issues are not avoided and, as the credit card issuer carries some risk, the practical
availability vulnerabilities may actually increase.
Paper-based credit notes. For credit card systems using “zip-zap” machines,
effectively the merchant collects a promissory note from the user on the credit card
issuer. The credit card issuer’s conditions could become unacceptable to the user,
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rending the system effectively unavailable. The effect on vulnerability is the same as
for the credit card option.
Cash transaction (notes or coins). Cash transaction options include
banknotes and coins or tokens (legal tender), all representing agreed physical media
of exchange. Notes and coins are tokens of wealth, and their usage and acceptability
are dependent upon banks or national exchanges and incur exposures related to
issue and acceptance. They are generally recognised only within one country. The
use of cash eliminates all of the vulnerabilities associated with an EFTPOS system,
but is dependent upon the merchant's willingness to accept cash and to tender
change. It does incur an exposure to physical theft.
Cash transaction (bullion). Cash and coin depend on national or local bank
issue. It is possible to consider a transaction system based on rare metal (bullion).
Confirmation of authenticity is feasible based on physical properties including density
and resistivity, and no dependence on external bodies is required. A technological
development, capable of issuing small but accurately measured quantities of 99.999%
gold, is possible and would offer an internationally acceptable payment system,
eliminating all of the vulnerabilities of the EFTPOS system although incurring an
exposure to physical theft.
Promissory note (cheque). This is a document that is signed or otherwise
authenticated by the user, authorising the bank to pay the bearer the transaction
amount. In some countries, bank cards would be issued to users, guaranteeing the
honouring of transactions up to an agreed limit (a limit of ₤50 was common in the
1980s). Technologically, this system involves no more than paper, pen and bankcard
at the point of transaction, and thus avoids the vulnerabilities of the EFTPOS system;
however, as for credit card systems, vulnerabilities associated with practical
availability are likely to be onerous as the bank bears some risk.
Personal debit system to phone. In many developing countries, particularly
regions of Africa, it is common for users to treat their cell phone prepay balance as a
personal bank, and find it convenient and simple to make transactions either from or
to their prepay balance. Such a system avoids the vulnerabilities of an EFTPOS
system but incurs the vulnerabilities of the cell phone system. The vulnerabilities of
the cell phone system avoid the last-mile vulnerabilities; also, the fact that this is a
debit system will tend to reduce the practical availability issues.
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Personal debit system. The concept of a personal debit system is that the
user carries a smart card or equivalent that both retains a verifiable record of the
user’s credit balance and the means of authenticating this and a transaction. Such
systems are not commonly available, but require only technology that is currently
available. Such a system requires the card technology and also vendor technology
that can transfer credit securely and reliably between the parties. This avoids almost
all of the vulnerabilities of the EFTPOS system but incurs the few vulnerabilities of the
card electronics and the vendor's card reader.
Bitcoin transaction. The “bitcoin” transaction (as an exemplar of several
blockchain-based “cryptocurrencies”) approach effectively requires both users and
merchants to have access to bitcoin wallets. The hypothetical approach assumes that
the user carries a hardware version of the bitcoin wallet, whereas the merchant has
access to an online version. Both need access to the blockchain system. The
technology for this system is available although not widely used. Although this
hypothesised approach still requires access to the internet and computing power, it
does not rely on the acceptance of financial institution terms and involves only two
parties directly. The internet vulnerabilities remain, the additional vulnerabilities of the
bitcoin wallet and the merchant wallet-reader are added, and the practical availability
vulnerabilities of commercial and contractual access to EFTPOS and/or credit card
systems remain.
Barter. Simple transactions between willing buyer and willing seller, with
personal agreement on the value of dissimilar goods/services are possible and have
effectively no exposure to technological systems.
Regulation of terms and conditions. Terms and conditions offered by
financial institutions as a condition of holding an account may cause such accounts
be practically unavailable to either users or merchants. Regulation constraining such
terms and conditions may effectively remove such issues and allow users to consider
the existing EFTPOS system to be available. Such regulation could remove one
contributor (E1) to the user's vulnerability.
(d)

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes
Measure

Type

Effort

Effect

1

Credit card transaction

TECH_SUB

Minor

Moderate

2

Paper-based credit notes

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major
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3

Cash transaction (notes or coins)

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

4

Promissory note (cheque)

TECH_SUB

Minor

Moderate

5

Personal debit system to phone

TECH_NEW

Minor

Moderate

6

Personal debit system

TECH_NEW

Minor

Major

7

Bitcoin transaction

TECH_NEW

Minor

Major

8

Regulation of terms and

CONTRIB’Y

Minor

Major

conditions
Table 17: Effect of hypothesised changes to EFTPOS system
7.3.3

Effect of hypothesised modifications to sewage system

(a)

Observations on example analysis
The largest contribution to the E1 values is from the non-duplicated major

components of the sewage treatment plant. As far as the apartment dweller is
concerned, most of those systems could be bypassed, allowing service to continue,
but with raw sewage discharged to waterways. This observation illustrates the
importance of clarifying the “service”. The second largest contribution is from the
extensive pipework system that is required to transport sewage from the apartment to
the treatment plant – this is effectively a result of the highly centralised nature of the
processing – which requires an extensive collection mechanism. Power to the
pumping stations contributes to exposure and, although some pumping station
equipment is duplicated, this still contributes to user vulnerability. Although the
sewage treatment station discharges treated solid waste to landfill, as there are
storage and alternative transport options for this function, its contribution to
vulnerability is relatively small.

(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Local storage. Local storage of sewage, i.e. close to the apartment, is actually

quite practical for terms of a few days or weeks. “Pump-out” systems are actually
increasingly commonly in peripherally urban areas where septic tank discharges are
unacceptable but pipework and centralised treatment systems are also not practical.
The exposure analysis demonstrates the contribution of local power supplies, and the
difficulty of avoiding such exposure in the absence of an adequate power storage
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technology. For typical industrial processes (requiring MWh power levels), there are
currently no processes for the storage of power that are technologically mature and
close to economically viable. A capability for storing MWh quantities of electricity
would have a significant effect on the exposure of processes such as this. Noting the
value of standardised approaches, it would be possible to consider a system using
local storage in container-sized vessels, allowing either pump-out or transport
substitution.
Technological substitution. The 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch, New
Zealand, caused very extensive damage to the clay pipework of the original gravityfed sewage system, with very large numbers of fractures within the estimated 1400
km of pipes and major damage to the 16 pumping stations and also to the downstream
facilities. Christchurch has decided that the cost of replacing the system is too great
and has elected to install a completely new “pressure” system in which householdscale disintegration and pump units allow the use of small-bore flexible pipework
rather than large-diameter and inflexible gravity-fed clay pipe systems. This avoids
the huge repair costs of gravity reticulation and the disruption to other infrastructure.
Technological breakthrough. The development of an economical and
convenient local (i.e. toilet) sewage breakdown technology is certainly technically
possible and such technologies as composting toilets exist. It is not currently practical
to use macro-algae to treat sewage and to generate biofuel at a village- or suburbscale system. However, as the power requirements of such a system are modest, this
could be considered as a target for a technological advance. A smaller scale system
of this type would possibly allow consideration of local power sources such as a solar
photovoltaic system plus battery systems.
Semi-dynamic effects. Raw sewage could be stored at the treatment plant,
pending the repair of a component. When the volumes to be stored and the likely
repair times are considered, this approach is not practical for other than the very short
term at a city level. However, the storage of a few days’ volume is quite practical in
the medium term at a household level.
Re-purposable components. It has been assumed that at least three
persons at the treatment plant are able to operate each item – hence E3 contributions.
If plant item operating instructions were readily available, this contribution could be
taken to below the E3 level. Trucks for the disposal of landfill waste are assigned to
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the E3 level; if compaction and dewatering allowed the use of standard shipping
containers, then this contribution could be moved to beyond the E3 level.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Many components of the
sewage system are already standard mechanical components.
Minimisation of contributory systems. Although power and transport
systems are used in many sections of the sewage system, the specific sources of the
power vary, reducing the gains possible by substitution of a specific contributory
system. The road transport system already has many alternative service options and
is not considered to be a large contributor to exposure.
(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems
Storage systems. Containerised local tank systems would allow options of

either pump-out or transport substitution; even at apartment scale, the criteria of
sufficient storage to allow repairs to critical components would be feasible. At
household or apartment locations, modest volumes would allow significant repair
times and would meet the criteria to deduct the exposure associated with pump
system failures and treatment plant failures, although it is unlikely that the storage
volume could practically allow major pipeline repair.
Pressure system. Historically, the primary causes of failure to the nominated
service level have been physical damage to the pipework leading to the treatment
station, or overloading because of excessive storm water ingress. Power failures and
equipment failures have not been significant contributors to failure. For small
communities installing a sewage system for the first time, and even for Christchurch
replacing its extensively damaged “conventional” sewage system following the 2011
earthquakes, it is common to select a “pressure” system in which household-scale
pumps/disintegrators are used to process sewage and forward the low-viscosity liquid
at pressure via a small-diameter flexible pipe. Such a system reduces capital cost,
and decreases the maintenance cost and repair time of the pipework system;
however, it depends upon the operation of the local disintegrator, the power supply
and controls. This system effectively replaces all systems up to the main feed into the
treatment plant. Combined with minimal local storage, such a system can reasonably
be claimed to avoid the exposure of the pipework and local pumping systems.
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Pumping station power supplies. Large-scale electrical power storage is not
currently practical. If such a technology is developed, the exposure associated with
both pumping stations and sewage treatment plants can be reduced.
Pumping station alternative power. Pumping station exposure can be
reduced by providing either ICE-based backup power or additional power feeds. The
economics of such approaches are not considered in this analysis.
Treatment station power supplies. Reductions to E2 values associated with
power supplies are possible, by providing alternative power supplies to the treatment
plant distribution board. It is technically feasible at present to provide most of
treatment plant power from biogas generated from sewage and, although the
cogeneration and digester plants have vulnerabilities, as these are alternative power
sources, they effectively move the E1 contributors to E2 levels.
Power storage for pumping stations and treatment plants. The storage of
several hours’ power for pumping stations and treatment plants would require a
technological breakthrough. If such a technology became available, the associated
exposure at both treatment plant and pumping station would be avoided.
Treatment plant manual control. Reductions to exposure are possible by
providing manual control of all pumping station, sewage treatment station plant and
bypass functions, and instructions for operation by non-specialised staff. These
changes do not affect the remainder of the system.
Solar-powered local system. As the development of an apartment-scale
treatment system, requiring no more power than could reasonably be produced by
solar thermal plus a photovoltaic system and generating environmentally acceptable
waste streams, is technically feasible, this approach is proposed as a hypothesis to
be examined. Although the hypothesis requires technological development, it is
reasonable to postulate a gravity-fed system that uses solar-powered controls to
maintain optimal conditions for biological degradation, uses solar-powered materials
handling

including

pumping

and

aeration

functions,

and

thus

generates

environmentally acceptable discharges at an apartment scale. Such a hypothetical
system would avoid the need for extensive pipework, pumping stations and
centralised treatment processes. Transport of treated waste would be required, but
this contributes little exposure. An advanced treatment system, similar to this, but on
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a household scale, can also be postulated, with identical exposure reduction for the
individual end-user.
Hybrid fuel system. Household or suburb-scale macro-algae fuel generation
would require a complete technological change, providing the processing of sewage
using either high-rate ponds or a photo-bioreactor with the generation of
hydrocarbons suitable for raw fuel feedstock, using solar power and technology that
is feasible on a suburb scale. This eliminates all major pipework systems, centralised
power supplies and treatment plants. The treatment of the exposure of such a system
requires care, because the production of treated sewage is not the only output and
redefinition of the "service level" would be required. The overall exposure of the user
would however be reduced.
(d)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes.
Measure
Storage systems
Pressure system
Pumping station power supplies
Pumping station alternative power
Treatment station power supplies
Power storage for pumping and
treatment stations
Treatment station manual control
Solar-powered local system
Hybrid fuel system

Type
TECH_SUB
TECH_SUB
TECH_SUB
TECH_SUB
TECH_SUB
TECH_NEW

Effort
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Major
Major
Major

Effect
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
Minor
Major

REPURP
TECH_NEW
TECH_NEW

Minor
Major
Major

Minor
Major
Major

Table 18: Effect of hypothesised changes to sewage system

7.3.4

Effect of hypothesised modifications to work information system

(a)

Observations on example analysis
It is important to note the major differentiation between this example and the

first-aid example: in the first-aid example, both the diagnostic information and the
treatment information are generally static and hence durable non-volatile storage is
possible; in contrast, work information is volatile, i.e. frequently created and/or edited,
and commonly has a limited temporal relevance. The major exposure contributors are
the remote server holding the work information, the internet (all aspects) and the local
PC. The local PC can simply be duplicated, and its real exposure points are the
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remotely changeable operating system, a situation where all duplicated PCs are
affected by the same change, or local power supply issues. The remote server
exposure can be at least reduced by continuous backup systems. The internet is the
single largest contributor to exposure; the extent and the nature of the exposure have
been considered elsewhere, and changes could be considered. The local PC
operating system can be attacked separately and hence is identified as a contributor
to E1; an operating system can be implemented in firmware and signed by a trusted
supplier. PC applications (software) can also be attacked separately and hence are
identified as a contributor to E1; standardised file formats (ODF) and adequately
robust development can, in principle, allow software applications to be implemented
in firmware and signed by a trusted supplier. Reductions in the power consumption of
PCs is progressively allowing operation from USB power supplies (power packs),
which will reduce exposure to domestic 230 V power supplies. Currently, most
household routers are still powered directly from 230 V supplies and could be
operated via a power pack (battery with trickle charge). The data format for
spreadsheets has achieved a degree of standardisation, and a significant number of
applications allow users to view and update spreadsheets. Full adoption of publicly
available ODF standards will further reduce both current exposure to the possibility of
being unable to view and edit data, and future exposure to an inability to access
today’s data, i.e. avoiding the "digital dark ages" issue.
(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Technological substitution. The internet communications subsystem has

been identified as the subsystem that contributes the largest single exposure to the
end-user in this case. The internet’s exposure contribution arises from the relatively
small number of T1 lines, the centralised process for distributing key international
routing information and the multiple single points of failure close to the end-user.
Several interlinked socio-economic factors also add to the exposure
contributed by the internet: centralisation allows the internet to be subject to
surveillance that may make the system practically inaccessible to groups; the
anticipated proliferation of connection points (IoT) will significantly increase the
number of sources of malicious software and/or surveillance. The ubiquitous nature
of internet use makes it an attractive target, and commentators such as Bruce
Schneier have noted sophisticated activities that are likely to be unfriendly (Schneier,
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2016). Media commentators have also drawn attention to the vulnerability of
accessible data, caused by the lack of a robust funding model; this causes two types
of exposure. Large providers such as “Facebook” and “Google” are funded by
advertising revenue, and will try to maximise this revenue by making strong efforts to
give their advertisers the best-targeted access to users. It is noted that infrastructures
such as undersea cables are funded as investments by international carriers, who
obtain revenue directly from consumers but are subject to national regulation
(including access to users’ information), which may also make the network
unavailable to a specific user.
Technological breakthrough. A truly ad-hoc peer-to-peer network protocol,
with self-discovery of alternative routes.
Semi-dynamic effects including local storage. Adequate IT provisions for
the duplication of user files across geographically remote servers is quite practical
using existing technologies.
Re-purposable components. Although it cannot be assumed for the
purposes of this study, it can be noted that many households do have more than one
device, e.g. a PC and a smart phone that is capable of internet access and basic
messaging. The progressive reduction in power requirement is allowing more
communications devices to operate from low-capacity battery systems and to allow
realistic charging from photovoltaics.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Although progress has
been made towards the standardisation of file formats for word processing,
spreadsheets, presentations and database files, a more complete standardisation
would reduce the exposure of all users, and would contribute to the long-term
accessibility of material. Less than two decades ago, 8 inch floppy disks were used
by Wan Corporation word-processing stations, audio cassettes were used for data
storage and punched paper and cards were not uncommon. Equipment to read data
from such sources would be exceedingly rare today and it cannot be assumed that all
data have been moved to more modern formats. Even within the last two decades,
common data formats have become inaccessible. This issue has been mentioned by
authors, including Cerf (2015), who have proposed the term “digital dark ages” to
describe situations in which data become inaccessible when the storage method, e.g.
on closed-format storage systems such as DVDs, is no longer available. In the context
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of this thesis, it is useful to observe that old data storage media such as microfiche
have very low exposure (as defined in this thesis), and could be read using an
improvised microscope. An open-format, non-volatile data storage technology would
make very significant long-term reductions in exposure to data loss; the approach
proposed by the Longnow Foundation’s (020163) “Rosetta project” concept is
noteworthy.
Minimisation of contributory systems. A significant approach to reducing
exposure is to eliminate the subsystems that contribute huge levels of exposure.
(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems
The portion of the internet system that has been defined in Chapter 5 of this

thesis as a standard subsystem has been considered to include all aspects between
the outputs of the domestic routers, i.e. communications to city ISP, intra-national
peering systems, connections to international undersea cable service providers etc.
Options for a reduction of exposure of this internet subsystem are considered
separately.
Backup power for household router. As the household router is generally
powered from a 230 VAC power pack, it is un-usable if a mains power failure occurs.
An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) or battery backup reduces one point of
vulnerability without requiring changes to the remainder of the system.
Backup power for PC. Household PCs are generally powered from a
230 VAC supply and, even for PCs with batteries, a PC is commonly un-usable after
a few hours if a mains power failure occurs. A UPS or significant battery backup
reduces one point of vulnerability without requiring changes to the remainder of the
system.
Online storage. Data storage is a significant locus of exposure for users at
both ends of this example. A duplicated (RAID) approach to local data storage will
eliminate the exposure to local hardware failure causing data loss.
Hardened router. Router operating systems and applications are currently
exposed to malicious changes, and hardwired “admin” access options have
occasionally been found. The router applications could be hardened, checked and

3

It seems entirely appropriate, for an organisation whose projects include the design of a

“10,000 year-clock”, to use the date format “02016” instead of “2016”.
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signed. Such a change would effectively eliminate the exposure associated with the
router software.
Hardened PC. PCs currently have components including operating systems
and applications as well as drivers that are potentially remotely alterable, either by
targeted intrusion or by malware. Whether arising from poor design or oversight, all
of these incur vulnerabilities to the user. There is no fundamental principle that
prevents the construction of a secure, un-alterable suite of operating system plus
system and application software that will ensure that these components will not be
vulnerable to external threats. The implementation of such a system would eliminate
the exposure contributions currently noted for PCs.
Standardised data formats. Data formats for spreadsheets have achieved a
degree of standardisation, and a significant number of applications allow users to view
and update spreadsheets. A full adoption of publicly available ODF standards will
further reduce both current exposure to the possibility of being unable to view and edit
data and future exposure to an inability to access today’s data, thus avoiding the
"digital dark ages" issue.
(d)
1

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes
Measure

Type

Effort

Effect

Backup power for household

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

router
2

Backup power for PC

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

3

Online storage

TECH_SUB

Minor

Minor

4

Hardened router

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

5

Hardened PC

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

6

Standardised data formats

INDEP’T

Minor

Major

Table 19: Effect of hypothesised changes to work information system
7.3.5

Effect of hypothesised modifications to local fuel supply system

(a)

Observations on example analysis
Although the example is designed to be broadly representative of typical

systems, real systems vary significantly. Some options for improvement are already
found occasionally, and it is reasonable to note them and assess their effects. The
representative system could be characterised as being “semi-automated”, with
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requirements for staff, but with many functions that can be carried out only via the
automated subsystems. The staff systems, including potable water supply and
sewage removal, and the EFTPOS transaction system are the main contributors to
system exposure. The road and vehicle systems required for bulk supply are
considered to contribute little additional vulnerability because of their high level of
duplication. Many petrol station forecourt systems include four to six replicated
systems, but forecourt control systems are not duplicated and contribute to
vulnerability. For short-term operation, multiple national reserves of bulk fuel reduce
exposure, but, for longer time-frames, the capability to generate fuel onshore would
reduce New Zealand’s exposure to multiple vulnerabilities associated with our single
refinery.
(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Local storage options can be applied to some of the staff facilities, allowing

these to be provided on a temporary basis, pending repair, rather than forcing an
immediate “failure” of the service. This option was covered when the sewage system
was considered.
Technological substitution. Alternative technologies for many of the
functions required by this example, including electrically powered pumps and
electronic reading of amounts dispensed, can be offered.
Technological breakthrough. The science required to produce fuels, within
standard specifications, from macro-algae sources, is close to maturity and is
potentially practical at city or village scale. The practical availability of such technology
would affect the exposure of national refining systems and bulk delivery systems.
Semi-dynamic effects. The example station requires staff and hence is
inoperable without basic staff facilities including sewage and water systems.
Re-purposable components. As with many other examples, in this case, the
human being is the most versatile component; thus, any capability for enabling human
intervention is likely to reduce the actual vulnerability incurred.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Limited opportunities of
this type have been identified for this example.
Minimisation of contributory systems. Subsystems that make significant
contributions to the exposure of the example include the sewage subsystem and the
financial transaction subsystem. Both are addressed elsewhere.
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(c)

Proposal

of

actual

hypothetical

re-designed

components

and

subsystems
Staff service options – sewage. All optional changes to the sewage system,
as proposed under that example, can be considered.
Staff service options – water. Potable water is also required to enable staff
occupancy. Rainwater collection to offer a supply for perhaps 3‒7 days’ usage would
eliminate the exposure to a potable water supply failure. This is an eminently practical
measure.
Staff service options – automation. The example has considered a petrol
station that is fully manned. A fully automated station must be considered. The
elimination of requirements that are essential for staff presence will allow the exposure
of those contributory systems to be eliminated. If the provisions for a reduction of the
exposure of computing systems, financial transaction systems and communications
systems were also eliminated, exposure would be very substantially reduced.
Manual operations. Provision for the manual operation of dispensing pumps
and the manual recording of amounts dispensed would eliminate the exposure to both
metering and pumping systems and local power supplies for these.
Financial transaction options. Options for a reduction of exposure to
financial transaction systems have been considered separately.
Alternative fuel sources. It is possible to hypothesise a future technological
option to generate standard-specification fuels from a macro-algae source. A likely
technological option would also use sewage as part of the nutrition for the macroalgae, although the energy source is actually solar. This is noted as a “technological
breakthrough” option; however, the components are at about 6 or 7 on the NASA
scale of technological maturity (NASA, 2015), and hence this is a technological option
that could reasonably be contemplated within a 10-year term. Macro-algae strains are
already capable of achieving over 30% by weight of hydrocarbons. The generation of
standard-specification fuels from macro-algae is not economically attractive at
present, but the process engineering and chemical processes are known and
technically feasible. The existence of multiple national reserves of fuel mean that bulk
fuel is considered to contribute to user exposure in the shorter term; however, a
consideration of fuel supply disruptions on a longer time-frame would require
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consideration of this exposure, and the potential for reduction by local fuel supply
synthesis.
(d)

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes
Measure

Type

Effort

Effect

1

Staff service options ‒ sewage

CONTRIB’Y

Minor

Major

2

Staff service options ‒ water

CONTRIB’Y

Minor

Moderate

3

Staff service options ‒ automation

TECH_SUB

Minor

Moderate

4

Manual operations

REPURP

Minor

Moderate

5

Financial transaction options

CONTRIB’Y

Moderate

Major

6

Alternative fuel source

TECH_NEW

Major

Major

Table 20: Effect of hypothesised changes to local fuel supply system
7.3.6

Effect of hypothesised modifications to targeted first-aid system

(a)

Observations on example analysis
The example differs from the work information example because the service

delivered to the user is specific information selected from a static information storage
system. Apart from the integrity of the storage system, the exposure is primarily
associated with the selection and the transmission of the information, and with the
systems for searching and identifying the information to be supplied. This example
therefore offers a range of options for a reduction of exposure.
(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Technological breakthrough. The need is for a store of medical knowledge

that can be searched based on symptoms. Although a colonial medical encyclopedia
achieved this function, carrying such a tome is marginally impractical for the
representative urban-dwelling user. The use of appropriate software and storage
facilities in a mobile electronic device is possible and would avoid the exposure
incurred by the communications system, although retaining the exposure associated
with the mobile electronic device. Taking the hypothesising process further, it would
be possible to consider a high-density portable storage system similar to the
microfiche systems used in the mid‒late 20th century, with a portable reader system
requiring backlight and lenses only. Several other long-term and dense storage
technologies have been proposed, including the Longnow Foundation’s “Rosetta” disk
approach and the “1000 year storage medium” proposed by Kazansky et al. (2016).
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Many media commentators and notable thinkers, including Cerf (2015), have noted
that media such as DVDs may have quite short commercial lives and that, if
proprietary technologies and software are required to read data from them, these
technologies add to the exposure incurred by those storage media. This particular
type of exposure illustrates the possibility of a “digital dark age” characterised by a
lack of capacity to access large stores of information contained on media using
inaccessible format or encoding systems. Both the Rosetta disk and the durable
storage approach proposed by Kazansky et al. (2016) reduce this exposure.
Technological substitution. The use of a paper-based first-aid manual is
certainly possible and, for simple first-aid issues, would represent a technology with
negligible exposure.
Semi-dynamic effects. Limited applicability to this example.
Re-purposable components. Limited applicability to this example.
Repair priority. Limited applicability to this example.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Although marginally
applicable to this example, the use of standardised and open-source data formats will
reduce exposure.
Minimisation of contributory systems. The approaches described under
“technological breakthrough” are effectively approaches to avoiding exposure arising
from contributory systems.
(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems
PC hardening. PC hardening has been proposed under the work information

example and should be considered here, although these proposals now apply only at
one end of the communications chain.
PC power, router hardening, router power. These options have been
considered within the work information example. Proposal details and conclusions are
identical, although they apply only to one end of the communications system.
Local electronic storage. Software allowing the diagnosis of first-aid issues
by the individual user, and showing recommended approaches, based on locally
stored electronic data and data search, is currently available. Such an approach would
avoid the exposure associated with internet communications, but the local device and
the associated storage and search mechanisms still contribute exposure.
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Local experts’ options. The example has defined a representative situation
in which the diagnosis and the proposed approach are obtained via an internet
communication with an automated diagnostic tool, perhaps making use of an artificial
intelligence technology. The proposed alternative is a telephone call to a number
obtained from a hard-copied set of emergency contacts. The telephone hardware
(POTS) is the only contributor to the user's exposure, provided this is not routed
through the internet.
Local hard storage – paper. Paper-based local storage is made practical by
the static nature of the information. As long as an adequate indexing system is
available, a local, static information source is quite adequate. A printed first-aid
manual is hypothesised, and avoids all of the exposure sources within the described
example.
Local hard storage ‒ Rosetta. For the storage of static information, a book
has two disadvantages – its volume-to-weight ratio is high and it has specific
vulnerabilities, including damage by water, fire, insects and small children.
Organisations such as the Longnow Foundation (02016) have proposed storage
media that can be read using simple microscope technology; the information storage
is minute images on media that are very significantly more robust than paper,
specifically a metal disk encased in polycarbonate. As the technology for simple lens
creation has been shown by Lee et al. (2014) to be simple, this hypothesised
approach is realistic and offers an approach that requires only modest technological
development, and a significant reduction in exposure.
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(d)

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes
Measure

Type

Effort

Effect

1

PC hardening

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

2

PC power, router hardening,

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

router power
3

Local electronic storage

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

4

Local experts’ options

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

5

Local hard storage ‒ paper

TECH_SUB

Minor

Moderate

6

Local hard storage ‒ Rosetta

TECH_NEW

Moderate

Major

Table 21: Effect of hypothesised changes to targeted first-aid system
7.3.7

Effect of hypothesised modifications to perishable food system

(a)

Observations on example analysis
For public health reasons, pasteurisation is normally required for fresh milk,

and

the

process

and

the

process

control

requirements,

particularly

for

homogenisation, which requires heating to a point within a closely defined
temperature range and then holding for a fixed time followed by rapid chilling, have
commonly led to a centralised factory approach. Similarly, as supermarket retail
facilities have become the norm for common foodstuffs, these are assumed in the
example. Analysis of exposure for the example shows the effects of power and staff
requirements for the factory operation, the effects of refrigeration, lighting and staff
facilities for the retail facility and the effects of the financial transaction function. As
the product is a relatively short-shelf-life and low-value product, it is not possible to
store significant volumes.
(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Technological substitution. Alternative technologies for pasteurisation, for

example UV-C irradiation, have achieved acceptance in some countries and their
lower power consumption could decrease dependence on centralised factory
processes if these were assumed to be accepted for the example. Storage of power
for small consumption items such as cash-transaction tills and EFTPOS terminals is
possible by substituting UPSs for local low-voltage power supplies. Options for the
substitution of financial transaction technologies is discussed elsewhere.
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Technological breakthrough. Considering the analysis of exposure, a
breakthrough technology allowing the achievement of bacteriologically safe milk using
small-scale and low-energy-use processes would allow consideration of milk sales
from closer to the point of production, avoiding most of the points of exposure
associated with the processing factory. Options for financial transactions and
communications that require technological breakthrough are covered elsewhere.
Semi-dynamic effects – local storage option. There are currently no
technologies that allow the storage of electrical energy at MWh levels, and that are
technologically mature and close to economically viable. Such a capability would have
a significant effect on the exposure of this example. However, the storage of heat and
cold (ice banks, eutectic capsules) is technologically mature and capable of useful
durations of storage.
Re-purposable components. Although the operation of factory processes
could be made accessible to unskilled persons (re-purposable units), the contribution
of specialised staff to the total exposure is initially small.
Repair priority. No options identified.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Although milk tankers are
designed for a single purpose, the number that are available means that these
contribute little exposure. The use of containerised systems would allow further
reduction.
Minimisation of contributory systems. A significant approach to reducing
exposure is to eliminate the subsystems that contribute huge levels of exposure,
specifically financial transaction systems and systems needed to provide staff
facilities.
(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems
Factory operation. Manual operation alternatives for the factory, and

provisions to allow unskilled operators to carry out functions, will allow reduction of
specialised staff exposure points.
Factory power options. Either further duplications of the power source by
using additional line feeds or fuel-operated generators would reduce the exposure
associated with the power requirement, but are unlikely to be economically attractive.
Factory power storage. The capability to store several hours’ power supply
would require a technological breakthrough – this capability is not currently
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technologically available but would make a very large reduction in exposure if it were
possible.
Factory heat and cold storage. Much energy usage in the factory, except for
that used in pumping and automation, is related to the supply of heated and chilled
product. Technologies for the storage of significant heat and cold (ice banks) are
available and marginally economic. Even if this technology were used, it would offer
limited reduction in exposure because the heating and chilling services require
pumping as well as the storage of heat and cold.
Local pasteurisation. Factory level pasteurisation is used to achieve
economies of scale, but results in a need for significant power input. It is reasonable
to hypothesise lower energy pasteurisation approaches (e.g. UV-C) using solar power
sources, at farm scale. Although milk standardisation would not be practical at farm
scale, this is of less concern to the user than food safety, which could be achieved.
The primary functions of the factory and the associated exposure can be avoided.
Direct sale. Assuming that farm-scale pasteurisation can be achieved, direct
sales can avoid all of the exposure issues associated with the factory treatment, and
the wholesale and retail systems.
Financial transaction options. Options for technological change and
associated reductions in exposure have been treated elsewhere.
Local storage options. Product shelf-life limitations preclude significant local
storage of the foodstuff. Refrigeration is nevertheless the main power use at the retail
location and ice bank technology effectively allows local storage of “cold”, reducing
the exposure to power supply continuity. The storage of power for PCs and routers,
associated with the completion of financial transactions, has been covered elsewhere.
Staff facilities options – sewage. All the options hypothesised for a reduction
of exposure of sewage systems have been considered elsewhere.
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(d)

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes
Measure

Type

Effort

Effect

1

Factory operation

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

2

Factory power options

TECH_SUB

Moderate

Minor

3

Factory power storage

TECH_NEW

Major

Major

4

Factory heat and cold storage

TECH_NEW

Moderate

Moderate

5

Local pasteurisation

TECH_NEW

Moderate

Moderate

6

Direct sale

TECH_SUB

Moderate

Moderate

7

Financial transaction options

CONTRIB’Y

Moderate

Major

8

Local storage options

TECH_SUB

Minor

Minor

9

Staff facilities options – sewage

CONTRIB’Y

Moderate

Major

Table 22: Effect of hypothesised changes to perishable food system
7.3.8

Effect of hypothesised modifications to essential specific medicine
system

(a)

Observations on example analysis
The long shelf life of the raw and intermediate streams in this example allow

economies of scale to be achieved by a centralised production system. These same
economies of scale have made possible a highly specialised approach to the delivery
of the goods to the end-user, which in turn has created a very large number of points
of exposure. This is a principle that can be observed for many cases, and suggests
decentralisation as a primary approach for a reduction of exposure. The high value,
long shelf life and small volume of both the intermediate product and the final product
suggest a primary option of local storage. Although the synthesis of salbutamol is
specialised, the processes are well publicised and are within the capabilities of a
moderate chemical synthesis facility. The broad tolerance of the dosage of salbutamol
makes local synthesis and distribution possible within safe usage parameters.
(b)

Review of applicability of types of hypothetical change
Local storage. All of the raw and intermediate streams for this product have

long shelf lives, i.e. can be stored without degradation for long periods. Local storage
at the input to and output from any process can therefore reduce the actual
vulnerability of that process and ultimately the vulnerability of the complete
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technological systems. Local storage options are possible for the aluminium stripstock, the bar-stock, the salbutamol synthesis feedstocks and reagents, the propellant
and the packaging components. For the financial transactions (which include internet
communications), the significance of small-scale power storage using available
technologies has been covered under the hypothetical improvements for those
subsystems. For typical industrial processes, there are currently no technologies for
the storage of power at MWh levels that are technologically mature and close to
economically viable. Such a capability would have a significant effect on the exposure
of processes such as this.
Technological substitution. Within the example system, technologies for
financial transactions can be substituted. These options are covered under the
heading of contributory systems. Considering the end-user requirements, it is noted
that salbutamol can be administered by several means (nebuliser, atomiser and
intravenously) and that the safe dosage level is quite broad ‒ hence the technological
option of local synthesis, with relatively simple and/or standardised equipment and
publicly available formulation and preparation information, is feasible.
Technological breakthrough. Small-scale, general-purpose chemical
synthesis approaches have been mooted in the literature, and are possible in
principle. A well-equipped chemical laboratory would be capable of synthesising
salbutamol using common equipment.
Re-purposable components. No obvious options in addition to those stated
above.
Standardised independent units and interfaces. Currently a small range of
MDI canister sizes and configurations are produced; standardisation of these would
facilitate the use of alternative manufacturing facilities for the canisters.
Minimisation of contributory systems. A significant approach to reducing
exposure is to eliminate the subsystems that contribute large levels of exposure; these
include the financial transaction system used at the retail level.
(c)

Proposal of actual hypothetical re-designed systems
Financial transaction option. Financial transaction options and associated

exposure reductions have been explored elsewhere.
Local storage of empty MDI. As the filling and packaging of MDI canisters is
generally less centralised than their manufacture, a reduction in exposure can be
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achieved by local stockpiling of empty MDI canisters plus metering valves and
chambers.
Local storage of diluted salbutamol. As both salbutamol and the diluent
have long shelf lives, it is possible to reduce the exposure of the complete supply
system by stockpiling these at the locations at which the canisters are to be filled.
Standardised MDI manufacture. Currently, several sizes of MDI are made.
By standardizing these (which might require adjustment of the diluent and dose
numbers), the exposure from the non-availability of empty canisters, and also from
incompatibility of the filling lines with available canisters, can be eliminated.
Local major power storage. For typical industrial processes (MWh levels),
there are currently no processes for the storage of power that are technologically
mature and close to being economically viable. Such a capability would have a
significant effect on the exposure of processes such as this.
Local creation of salbutamol. Most example intermediate streams (except
electrical power) have long shelf lives. Canister manufacture and filling facilities are
also moderately standardised. Nevertheless, the use of a filled MDI to deliver
salbutamol does involve very many specialised steps. Salbutamol can be effective via
many different delivery approaches, and human tolerance to a varied dosage is high.
The exposure associated with the specialised production can therefore be
significantly reduced by a local creation of pure salbutamol. Although the technology
for completely generic chemical synthesis is still not mature, proof-of-concept has
been demonstrated and it is reasonable to examine the effect on exposure of the
availability of a general-purpose synthesis technology that would allow the production
of pure salbutamol from readily available feedstocks. Such a process, which is
dependent only on open-source information and basic feedstocks, would eliminate all
of the exposure points of this example.
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(d)

Summary of effect of hypothesised changes
Measure

Type

Effort

Effect

1

Financial transaction option

CONTRIB’Y

Moderate

Major

2

Local storage empty MDI

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

3

Local storage of diluted

TECH_SUB

Minor

Major

salbutamol
4

Standardised MDI manufacture

INDEP’T

Moderate

Major

5

Local major power storage

TECH_NEW

Major

Major

6

Local creation of salbutamol

TECH_NEW

Major

Major

Table 23: Effect of hypothesised changes to essential specific medicine system
7.3.9

Effect of hypothesised modifications to newspaper vendor model
The “newspaper vendor” example is included in this thesis purely as an

illustration of the effect of treating a simple dynamic model using the exposure theory.
The exposure metric of the original model is shown to be {4, 0, 0}. The E1 value (4)
reflects the possible failure of the input stream (papers from the newspaper producer),
failure of fuel or roads to allow transport from the point of bulk supply purchase to the
point of sale and non-availability of the newspaper vendor. As the model relates to a
single vendor, selling a single product that is sourced from a single point, there are
no contributors to E2 or E3 values (there are no combinations of two or three failures,
where neither failure alone would cause output failure that would cause a service
failure. The whole newspaper vendor “problem” is an operational research problem of
optimising a variable (profit) under conditions of uncertain demand and fixed supply
cost – a semi-dynamic effect. If the vendor could download an electronic copy of the
paper, and use a local printer to generate papers as required (paying the printer only
the royalty for each copy sold), the problem of predicting demand would become
irrelevant, but this technological change would introduce all the technological
vulnerabilities of the printing process, which include the provision of power, paper and
communications to the newspaper file supplier, and would probably actually increase
the exposure of the end-user. It is concluded that, assuming that only cash
transactions are possible, the newspaper vendor is one of the examples that has the
lowest technological exposure of all of the example studies, and it is difficult to develop
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a technological solution that has lower exposure. The example almost epitomises a
case where the end-user is minimally vulnerable to technological failures.
7.4

Conclusion: exposure reduction from changes to examples
This chapter has set out the results of the analyses of hypothesised changes

to the technological systems described in the initial examples. The effectiveness of
these changes (in terms of vulnerability reductions) will allow conclusions both on the
options for reducing the vulnerability of specific systems, and also on the most general
approaches to a reduction of technological vulnerability. This analysis and the
summary have answered RQ(b): “For goods or services delivered to end-users, what
reductions of vulnerability can be obtained by changes to the technological approach
or configuration”?
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8.

CONCLUSIONS

8.1

Vulnerability of end-users to existing technological systems

8.1.1

Description of vulnerability
Published definitions of “vulnerability” have been extensively examined in

Chapter 2 and also Chapter 4 of this work. Significant divergence and lack of clarity
among published definitions have been noted. The proposed approach to improving
the precision of these definitions is to constrain the term resilience to describing the
dynamic response of a functioning system to a specified perturbation. Resilience
improvement measures, which are not analysed in this thesis, would then take
account of the instantaneous state of all system components and the magnitude of
nominated perturbations, and would assume that the system will not actually fail.
Metrics of resilience would measure the response of a system, starting at a defined
status, to a defined perturbation.
Once a level of service output to users is defined for a technological system,
the capability of a system to deliver or fail to deliver a service can be considered. This
thesis is concerned with the failure of technological systems to deliver, at identified
service level, their designed outputs and the thesis scope is thus distinguished from
a consideration of the resilient, dynamic response of a functional system. A recursive
application of a defined service level output will also establish the nominal state of all
streams and processes "upstream" of the final delivery of goods or services. This set
of states, which corresponds to nominal operating conditions for the defined service
level, allows a clear definition of a maximum tolerable disturbance for each stream or
process variable, as the perturbation from the nominal state that will cause failure to
achieve the service level output.
Having defined “resilience” in terms of described dynamic and continuous
responses and having defined the scope of that term, the term "vulnerability" has been
proposed to describe the combination of risk and exposure. The research question
upon which this thesis is based, relates to vulnerability and, for the situation where
risks are considered to have p = 1.0, the “vulnerability” of an urban dweller to the loss
of a specified service can be equated with the exposure of the technological system
supplying that service. The work of Chapter 4 has been to show that the proposed
exposure metric is a valid measure of vulnerability.
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Under these definitions, exposure is a precise antonym of robustness, noting
that robustness is commonly associated with the design and configuration of a
technological system, rather than the margin between design and overload
performance. These definitions fall within the scope of other published definitions,
whose scope in some cases is very wide, but the refined definitions allow clear
distinctions to be made. The clear distinctions demonstrate both the specific
contribution of this thesis and the alignment of the work of this thesis with other related
works.
8.1.2

Distinctive aspects of end-user vulnerabilities and exposures
End-user vulnerabilities have several distinctive aspects: there are differences

in the attribute being measured, distinctive scope elements, distinctive types of
vulnerability and distinctive effects.
Difference in what is measured. Failure options within an infrastructural
system could potentially include geographically localised failures, percentage
reduction in full performance or reduced annual availability. For a supply chain,
decreased capability, temporary delays in supply or the inaccessibility of an optimal
route could all be considered to be possible vulnerabilities. The variety of possible
definitions of infrastructural system and supply chain vulnerabilities leads to a
corresponding difficulty in defining the level of exposure to failure, or the infrastructural
system. The end-user’s static vulnerability is distinctively and relatively easily defined
in terms of the non-availability of goods or services at a specified service level. The
relatively clear definition of the vulnerability of the individual user also allows the
development of a clear definition of the actual exposure of that individual to the
systems providing the vulnerable services. Although many end-users may be served
by a technological system, all will be subject to the same vulnerability; thus, the
distinctive end-user vulnerabilities are applicable to the full complement of end-users.
Difference in scope. Chapters 5 and 6 of this work argue that typical and
representative individual end-users are subject to a range of “exposures” in addition
to those that affect the major infrastructure and typical supply chains. The scope of
the technological system that supplies the end-user includes not only the "last-mile"
systems that are outside common definitions of national infrastructure, but also
connected and contributory subsystems.
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Difference in nature. The theoretical basis of analysis has deprecated the
importance of identifying specific hazards that may cause a non-availability, but has
drawn attention to the effect of non-availability. The analysis has included the
observation that “non-availability” can result from causes that are related more to the
interface to a component than to the technological functionality of a component. In
specific cases – communications systems and financial systems ‒ it has been
observed that a system can become practically unavailable to a user, as a result of
unacceptable terms of use imposed by system owners. Contracts for services
therefore contribute exposure because the user may be offered terms that are
unacceptable, in situations where service options with acceptable terms are not
available.
Difference in effect. This thesis has argued that the individual’s vulnerability
is clearer, i.e. more readily defined, than the infrastructural system vulnerability. This
thesis has also argued that the magnitude of the end-user vulnerability, i.e. the effect
upon the user if the event to which they are vulnerable comes to pass, is qualitatively
different from the magnitude of the same vulnerability for the infrastructural system
owner. The non-availability of a working sewage system will force the apartment
dweller to relocate, but the non-availability of a single-dwelling sewage connection will
be of limited consequence to the system owner or operator. This qualitative difference
justifies the focus of the thesis on the vulnerability of the end-user.
In summary, it is argued that there are a number of distinctive aspects to the
end-user's exposure in regard to the supply of specific goods or services. These
distinctive exposures are described and considered in this thesis.
8.1.3

Investigation of vulnerability of end-users to selected technological
systems
This work has considered the effect of technological systems on an individual

user, and has justified the consideration of a representative individual user, dwelling
in an apartment in a city of about 200,000 to 500,000 people. For each of the
examples studied, it has been shown that the lack of the goods or services supplied
would force significant changes to the lives and lifestyles of the intended recipients.
This is sufficient justification to study the examples, as the research question did not
anticipate studying more than a selection of goods or services. However, the
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examples have been selected to demonstrate a broad range of types of goods or
services.
For each example studied, the technological system has been justified to be
typical of that used in cities of the size proposed. As the systems studied are "typical",
it is inevitable that some actual examples will have already incorporated at least some
of the hypothesised changes ‒ this does not negate the conclusions from the study of
the exemplar systems and hypothesised changes.
Several technological sub-systems were considered to be sufficiently common
as to warrant separate analysis. This approach also ensured identical treatment for
each case where these sub-systems contributed to a studied example. Internet
communications and EFTPOS financial transaction systems were considered to be
standard contributory subsystems. Road systems, power supply and potable water
were considered for analysis as standard contributory systems but did not appear to
be sufficiently standardised across the studied examples. For an end-to-end transfer
of data over the internet, an exposure metric of {25, 19, 0} was calculated, however,
some variation is needed for systems that do not involve end-to-end international data
transfer. Exposure points include "last-mile" communications issues, router and
national transfer systems and international transfers via undersea cables. The
commercial issues of acceptable access to ISPs also contribute to this vulnerability.
An EFTPOS transaction includes interactions between an EFTPOS terminal, three
banks and several communications paths, generating an exposure of {49, 12, 1}. That
exposure scope includes the power supply, standard communications and bank
processes and the commercial acceptances for the parties involved in the transaction.
Example study #1: sewage system. The sewage evacuation and treatment
system has been calculated to have an exposure metric of {34, 4, 6}. This level of
exposure considers the apartment systems, the pipework system connecting to the
treatment plant, associated power supplies and control systems and the significant
treatment plant systems. It is noted that the exposure of this system is significantly
affected by the specification that "service" includes the treatment of sewage to an
environmentally benign state.
Example study #2: collaboratively developed work information. The work
information exchange is calculated to incur an exposure of {38, 21, 2}, the metric being
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dominated by the internet communications contribution, but also reflecting the
contribution of the PC hardware, the PC software and power supplies at each end.
Example study #3: local fuel supply. The supply of fuel at a local petrol
station is calculated to have an exposure of {98, 20, 12}, which reflects both
dispensing functions that include pumping, control and metering systems, financial
transactions, the amenity functions including water provision and sewage evacuation,
which are required for a staffed facility, and the provision of bulk fuel supplies.
Example study #4: targeted first-aid. Obtaining a diagnosis and treatment
instructions in the specific first-aid example is calculated to incur an exposure of {23,
14, 1}. International internet communications are not required, but local
communications, a local PC and a search system for information to be returned (firstaid instructions) contribute to the total exposure.
Example study #5: perishable food. The supply of perishable food (fresh
milk) has been calculated to have an exposure of {128, 22, 12}, with contributions
from a financial transaction (which includes communications), the milk treatment
factory (including power supply, staff, equipment and fuel), the wholesale processes,
the retail facilities (including staff amenities (sewage, water and power)) and the user's
transport and local storage facilities.
Example study #6: essential specific medicine. The supply of a selected
specific medicine has been shown to have an exposure metric of {58, 15, 10}.
Although several specialised processes are involved, these are duplicated and
moderately standardised. The user must use a financial transaction, and also a
permission (a doctor's prescription) process in order to access the medication.
Clearly, these values will be specific to the selected medicine; however, the selected
example has been justified as being reasonable.
This section has described the vulnerabilities of the examples studied, and on
the causes of the vulnerabilities identified. As such, this section has provided
interpreted answers to the first part of the research question (RQ(a)).
As all the studied examples represent items whose non-availability would have
significant effects on the lifestyle of the representative individual, and have been
selected to illustrate a broad variety of technological systems, the study has
demonstrated that the representative apartment-dwelling end-user is significantly
vulnerable to a range of technological systems.
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8.1.4

End-user vulnerability to other systems
Table 6 sets out a selection of examples that could be studied, and makes the

final selection. Of the candidate examples that were not studied, arguably the
international travel example includes the largest range of components that are not
covered in the studied examples. These include international travel permissions,
several skill sets that cannot be substituted, equipment that is not duplicated, e.g.
aircraft, and such items as navigation satellites. This example is mentioned as one
that appears, upon superficial inspection, to incur a very high vulnerability for the enduser.
An initial examination of a small selection of other examples, such as water
supply, power supply and the supply of non-perishable foods, strongly suggests that
analysis would reveal very similar issues to those found in the selected examples,
and in many cases the same contributory subsystems are relevant. For these
reasons, it is considered that the conclusions developed for the selected examples
can be applied more generally.
8.1.5

End-user vulnerability conclusion
The basis for the selection of the example technological systems is presented

in Section 3.4.1. Although the research question for this thesis only requires the
examination of selected systems, it is useful to consider the extent to which the
selected systems are representative of other systems that supply goods or services
to the target category of end-users. The target category of end-users has been
described as apartment dwellers in cities of approximately 200,000 to 500,000
individuals. A broad inventory of the needs of the target group could be generated by
several approaches; one such approach could involve identifying each service or
stream of goods that falls within a category in the hierarchy of needs proposed by
Maslow (1943). Less rigorously, it is possible to simply itemise needs starting with
shelter, warmth, food, water, sanitation, the means of earning a living, mobility,
communication, security for possessions and resources, including material and
financial resources, storage and communication of information.
The exemplar technological systems studied in this thesis are shown to be
broadly representative of the categories of needs of the target group. The short-shelflife food example is expected to be broadly similar to many other short-shelf-life items
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such as fresh vegetables, fresh meat and fruit; each will have post-harvest treatment,
packaging, wholesale and retail functions with financial transactions and the need for
user transport. The sewage example is expected to be broadly similar to services
such as water and power supply systems, incorporating centralised bulk supply, with
progressive change and distribution, e.g. voltage breakdown for the power system,
and a “last-mile” supply line, without immediate pay-for-service. This thesis has
intentionally not considered long-life items such as the dwelling itself, clothing or
vehicles, where the expected lifetime is significantly greater than the time required to
recreate the technological system for the production of the item.
Two important conclusions can be drawn: firstly, that the studied examples are
likely to be representative of other examples of goods or services supplied to the enduser, and without which the end-user is faced with significant and unwanted lifechanges; secondly, that the vulnerability of the end-user to the technological systems
(as measured by their exposure) is very high.
8.2

Contribution of exposure analysis approach

8.2.1

Contributions to the analysis of vulnerability
Many published studies and popular media articles include degrees of

acknowledgement of the vulnerability of individuals to technological systems. Specific
examples are sometimes quoted, but generalised analyses are rare. The definitions
of vulnerability that are used in these studies vary considerably. Specific examples
are sometimes quoted, but generalisations are rare and the term vulnerability has no
definition that is well accepted, constraining or quantitative. Not only do definitions of
vulnerability vary, but also the authors who supply definitions of vulnerability do not
always supply definitions of other terms such as resilience, risk etc. The result is that
not only are there a variety of published definitions of "vulnerability", but also these
varied definitions do not align with definitions of other related terms. There is a need
for a set of definitions of all common terms that preserve internal consistency and are
related to the field of this thesis topic.
Section 4.7 of this thesis develops a set of definitions that are internally
consistent and precise. These are necessary for the development and defense of a
metric that will answer the research question. In particular, the definitions establish
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that resilience may be defined in terms of a system response to a perturbation that is
below a maximum tolerable level, and hence refers to a system that has not failed.
This definition allows the field of study of the thesis to be clearly distinguished from
the study of dynamic responses, which are outside the scope of this thesis. The
definitions establish that both vulnerability and harm are indexed to a "failure to
deliver" concept and are not related to the concept of "consequences of failure to
deliver". The consequences of failure to deliver justify the study of the field. The
definitions proposed in section 4.7 also establish that "risk" refers to the probability of
a hazard occurring within a time-frame and that, within the context of this thesis, a
hazard is any event that can threaten a weakness in a technological system. The
description and definition of vulnerability and the indexation to an end-user enables a
quantitative analysis of vulnerability.
8.2.2

Contribution from the measure of exposure
The "exposure" metric was developed within a well-defined context. The field,

linked to the research question, assumes a technological system supplying goods or
services to a user. A heterogeneous system consideration was essential, because
the "technological system" included the creation of the goods or services rather than
just the delivery. The technological system was understood to be a system that
creates and finally delivers the target service or supply of goods, and hence is clearly
heterogeneous. A metric relevant to the research question therefore had to be
applicable to a heterogeneous system. To achieve clarity of the analytical results, it
was proposed that the delivery of a single, defined service or supply of goods, to a
single end-user, at a defined rate should be the basis for the analysis metric. This
approach did not preclude separate analyses at different supply rates but allowed the
system output to be represented by a simple yes/no variable indicating successful
supply at the defined rate. The definition of a single output also allowed the scope of
the technological system under consideration to be unambiguously defined. The
definition of vulnerability developed in Section 4.7 of this thesis has clarified the scope
of the research question and distinguishing this from any consideration of the dynamic
response of the technological system. The research question is therefore also clarified
to relate to static contributions of the technological systems studied. It is argued that
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the clarification of these contextual principles allows a clear and valid metric to be
developed.
Starting from the observation that any hazard is only such if it is aligned with
a weakness, it has been argued that the number and the types of weaknesses are
significant and are reasonably described as the "exposure" of a defined technological
system. It has also been argued that, for either guided hazards or long time-frames,
the probability of any hazard occurring approaches 1.0; hence, using the definitions
from Section 4.7, "vulnerability" is measured by the supplying system’s "exposure"
and this exposure metric is mapped directly from the configuration of processes and
streams within the technological system.
The exposure metric is refined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, by categorising
weaknesses and summing them according to the number of simultaneous failures
required to cause the system's output to fail. Refinements to clarify the granularity of
representation are presented, and it is noted that appropriate re-drawing and
representation of the Boolean expression will allow subsystems (e.g. power supplies)
that affect more than one part of a technological system to be correctly represented.
Many practical systems are dependent upon inputs from specialised (sub)systems;
the basis for calculating the effect on the total exposure, for contributory subsystems,
is developed. The effect of the contributory systems is shown (in Chapters 6 and 7)
to have a major effect on the total system exposure.
Section 4.6 of this thesis considers whether the proposed quantification of
"exposure" can be claimed as a valid metric to answer the research question. The
validity is considered by reference to "measurement theory", and it is argued that the
metric meets criteria proposed by Hand (2004). The theoretical basis for the
calculation of exposure is shown to reasonably represent the issues raised in the
research question, and is also shown to achieve the fundamental goals of the
measurement, i.e. allowing informed decision and allowing comparison of alternative
technological systems.
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8.3

Reduction of vulnerability

8.3.1

Identification of options
The description of the example cases, in terms that can be translated into an

exposure metric, has allowed the identification of the points, e.g. streams and
processes, within the examples that contribute to the exposure metric. As the metric
is demonstrably correlated with vulnerability, an inspection of the contributors to the
metric clearly and quickly identifies the aspects that can most profitably be modified
to reduce the end-user’s actual vulnerability. A standard set of categories of possible
exposure reductions has been proposed. These are: "local storage" "technological
substitution", "technological breakthrough", "re-purposable components", "repair
priority or inherent difficulty of attack", "standardised independent units and
interfaces" and "minimisation of exposure contributed by common subsystems".
These categories are not shown to be exhaustive, and hence other opportunities must
be considered for the elimination of each identified point of exposure. The categories
are also not mutually exclusive, and overlap in their definitions. Nevertheless, the use
of a standardised set of categories is helpful in identifying practical hypothetical
approaches to the elimination of exposure; of equal importance, the use of
standardised categories is helpful in identifying generalised conclusions.
8.3.2

Effectiveness of hypothesised approaches
This section describes notable findings resulting from the analysis of

hypothesised changes to the example cases and hence summarises the answer to
the second part of the research question (RQ(b)). The fresh food (milk) and the
essential medicine (Ventolin™) examples illustrate the relative effects of local storage
options for short- and long-shelf-life goods. For high-value, low-volume and longshelf-life goods such as Ventolin™ MDIs, local stockpiling at a level that will allow new
supply options to be identified is shown to allow a substantial reduction in exposure.
For the first-aid example, the static nature of the information allows a major reduction
in exposure by using local information storage. Local storage of such reference
information on a common personal electronic storage device (cell phone) is quite
practical, and devices allowing optical reading of dense storage, such as microfiche
or the University of Southampton’s (2016) “5D glass”, allow exposure to be brought
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to a very low figure for this example. The work information example describes the
exchange of an editable spreadsheet via the internet and two (remote) PCs. The
delivery of the "service" actually depends on standardised data formats at several
levels, i.e. file formats, data packet formats and routing information formats. Exposure
within this example is contributed by the internet, by each local PC and by the "lastmile" communication between the PC and a central internet system. For both petrol
and fresh food, dependence on EFTPOS systems contributes significant exposure to
the examples as described, and this exposure contribution can be avoided by
ensuring the acceptability of other legal tender such as cash. For the time-frames
considered, the raw materials (such as raw milk and bulk petrol) were, perhaps
surprisingly, shown to have several alternative sources and hence did not contribute
to high "E" values.
The analyses have deliberately considered some options for which practical
implementations are not yet available, or where implementations are at a low level of
technological maturity. Of particular note is the large reduction in exposure that would
become available if large-scale storage of electrical power became feasible.
Significant reductions in exposure could also be achieved (without awaiting
technological breakthrough) should the internet transition to an anonymously
accessible network with increased design redundancy for such components as DNS
servers and router information updating, as well as international transmission paths
and widespread use of end-to-end strong encryption.
8.3.3

Development of general principles
The analysis of hypothesised changes to the example studies allows some

broad principles for a reduction of end-user vulnerability to be proposed.
Exposure is contributed by system components close to user. Single
points of failure (contributors to user E1 value) commonly occur close to the point of
service delivery. Although this result may be expected, it does focus attention on
options for exposure reduction, and it also justifies the distinction between end-user
vulnerability and national infrastructural vulnerability.
Exposure is contributed by connected subsystems. The study has shown,
both in theory (Chapter 4) and for particular examples (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), the
extent to which subsystems contribute to the total exposure value. Where some output
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of a large subsystem is required in order to deliver some specific goods or services,
this will contribute all of its exposure metric to the final exposure. This observation has
important effects: to reduce exposure and hence end-user vulnerability, it is important
to avoid creating dependence on large contributory systems, either by ensuring
options for bypassing these systems or by simply avoiding their connection. There is
currently much interest in an “internet of things”, which assumes multitudes of internetconnected sensors and even implanted medical devices; whatever the utility of having
such devices connected, the connection contributes very large increases in the
exposure of the delivery of goods and services. Considering the specific case of an
implanted medical device that is essential for life, connection of the device to the
internet significantly increases the exposure of the patient to failure or unplanned
operation of the device.
Exposure is contributed by dependence on large centralised systems.
The sophistication of some technological systems, plus opportunities for achieving
economies of scale, has contributed to a very marked trend for large and sophisticated
technological systems to be owned and operated by corporates. These drivers may
or may not still be valid but, in any case, the user seldom has options for selecting
more robust and less-exposed options.
For large technological systems owned by either a public or private entity, the
consequences of a failure for the owners may be orders of magnitude less than the
consequences for the end-user. A commercial entity that is responsible for a complex
technological system is quite likely to conclude that a level of loss-of-service for endusers is an optimal commercial position; the user’s economic resource is limited and
the cost of the provision of high levels of reliability is high compared with the likely
financial penalties for service failure. Commercial entities such as banks and petrol
stations also have no obligation to provide facilities at all and can decide to cease to
offer services or change terms of offer, on purely commercial grounds.
Alternative sources of supply of, for example, water, sewage, internet
connection and power for the user may or may not be available, and are unlikely to
be readily available. With the exception of civil-defense-type measures, public policy
seldom considers the capacity of the individual to continue their lifestyle, on a longterm basis, without current centralised systems. By definition, a large system includes
many points of weakness (even if only because the commercial viability of a large
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system depends on many paying customers – undersea fiber-optic cable is a good
example); therefore, it is possible to generalise a conclusion that dependence on a
large and centralised system always results in large exposure for the end-user.
Exposure tends to be decreased by use of decentralised systems.
Although many systems are highly centralised, there are notable cases where
powerful components are sufficiently accessible to allow decentralisation and hence
decreased exposure of users for specific services. Notable cases include threedimensional printers, allowing the fabrication of complex objects by individuals. The
Royal Society of Chemistry's journal "Lab-on-a-chip" is devoted to disseminating
developments in the field of highly integrated and portable analysis systems.
Chemical unit operations are often relatively simple, and the availability of process
simulation software, public information on compounds and synthesis methods does
make the synthesis of complex substances possible for individuals, e.g. the synthesis
of aspirin, salbutamol and Daraprim as reported by the New York Post (2016). More
versatile (and less technologically mature) options for general chemical synthesis
have also been proposed, e.g. a “molecular assembler” as envisioned by Drexler
(2007). Taken to a logical conclusion, this trend will result in fully capable von
Neumann machines as envisioned by such authors as Freitas and Merkle (2004).
Although such concepts have been the diet of science fiction literature, they are
actually close to technological maturity, and allow a very highly decentralised society
with very low technological exposure to be envisaged. It is therefore entirely
reasonable to hypothesise systems based on foreseeable technology, which enable
functionality that was previously confined to national-scale systems to be available at
household or suburb level. Such hypotheses show the real possibility of significantly
reduced exposure of not only a representative individual but also potentially ALL such
representative individuals.
Practical unavailability contributes exposure. Access to highly centralised
systems is generally via commercial contract, and users are vulnerable to systems
being practically unavailable or inaccessible because of unacceptable contractual
terms. The analysis has, for example, highlighted the reduction in exposure that is
possible by retaining cash-payment options rather than enforcing dependence on
electronic payment systems.
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Standard and re-purposable components decrease exposure. Many
useful examples of standardisation, including simple mechanical and electrical
components, fuel specifications etc. exist; however, the analysis has also drawn
attention to the high levels of long-term exposure arising from issues such as nonstandardised data storage formats, leading to the threat of a "digital dark age". It could
be argued that the most versatile component of any system is the human operator,
and the consideration of re-purposable components has drawn attention to the value
of including options for human intervention wherever possible in a technological
system. Because people can re-purpose and re-configure, their capability to intervene
in a technological system offers a primary approach to decreasing exposure; at almost
any point, introducing a “person” means that the criterion of “no contribution at the E2
level” is met.
Deprecation of importance of specific nature of attacks. This study has
deprecated the importance of characterising the specific nature of possible attacks
upon a process or stream within a technological system; it has not even distinguished
between technological and commercial failure. It is valid to consider that there is a
very wide range of possible issues that can result in a process becoming effectively
unavailable to the end-user. In addition to physical failure, strictly non-technological
issues such as unacceptable terms of business, inevitability of unfriendly surveillance
and a lack of security may be significant factors in causing the effective nonavailability of a process or subsystem. The “exposure” metric can take account of
such potential sources of unavailability, which contributes to its validity as a true
measure of the end-user’s vulnerability.
Importance of definition of scope. The analysis of the examples and the
hypothesised changes to each have emphasised the importance of carefully
describing the boundaries and service levels under consideration. Applying adequate
definitions of these constraints has allowed hypothesised changes to be investigated;
less precise definitions would probably result in indeterminate conclusions. It has also
been shown that consideration of common time-frames is essential for useful results.
The petrol station example assumes the availability of bulk petrol; however, a longer
time-frame could lead to consideration of a scenario where this was not necessarily
available and hence contributed exposure.
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8.4

Contributions of the research
The research contribution is considered under three subheadings: contribution

to academia, contribution to practice and contribution to society.
8.4.1

Contribution to academia
The introduction to this work identified that a large group of persons live in

urban environments, and are likely to be vulnerable to systems that are commonly
used to supply essential goods and services. The work has described two distinctions
between the individuals who are representative of the target group and the owners of
supply chains and of national infrastructure. These distinctions are described in terms
of the comparative effects of adverse outcomes, and the specific threats that may be
relevant to the end-user but not to either the infrastructural owner or the supply chain
owner or operator. The description of these distinctive features and the identification
of a defined field of interest is considered to represent a contribution made by this
work. Having established that a distinct field of study exists, specifically that the
described representative end-user is vulnerable to the loss of several essential goods
and services, the introduction has also established that there is a need for an
analytical method for assessing the vulnerability incurred by current approaches to
the supply of these services.
A number of criteria for assessing the technological contribution to end-user
vulnerability have been identified, and this work has presented a tabulated
assessment of the capabilities and limitations of (many) techniques appearing in the
literature. The techniques considered include graph theory, risk analysis and various
accumulated scoring approaches. The classification has also considered whether the
techniques offer static or dynamic analyses, and whether these are applicable to
systems in which a single service is transported, or where a service is progressively
created from intermediate streams and a range of processes within homogeneous or
heterogeneous systems. The comparison of assumptions and the fields of
applicability of a diverse range of published analytical techniques (considerations of
applicable time-frame, homogeneity of technological system, accuracy of definition,
classification of hazards, result type and nature of input data) is considered to
represent a contribution. This work has concluded that the published material has not
fully or quantitatively considered the significance of the configuration of the
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technological systems under consideration. This work has developed a practical
approach to quantifying the exposure of a technological system and has provided a
good theoretical basis for concluding that the metric is indeed a valid measure of the
contribution to end user vulnerability. This is proposed to be a specific contribution to
the theoretical basis of the field of study.
It has been noted that, whenever any process or stream is essential for a final
delivery of goods or services, its presence is a potential locus for a hazard(s);
conversely, if the necessity of a process or stream is eliminated (for example by the
elimination of a contributory sub-system), then the hazards previously associated with
it are no longer valid and it is no longer a potential locus for disruption or denial. This
work has drawn attention to the significance of a technological system's component,
process and stream configuration, for the assessment of the end-user's vulnerability.
Ancient military wisdom noted the dangers associated with long supply chains:
defining the basis for this observation and applying it to technological systems upon
which people depend is considered to be a contribution.
Risk analyses commonly assess the probability of a particular hazard
occurring, and sometimes identify a time-frame for that occurrence. This work has
argued that, for either guided (i.e. intentionally generated) hazards or long timeframes, it is more realistic to assume that a hazard will occur, and therefore a
probability of 1.0 is the reasonable value to be applied to the probability of occurrence.
It is noted that there is no specific limit on the number of possible hazards that could
be associated with an essential process or intermediate stream. When the probability
of at least one hazard having a probability of 1.0 is assumed, then the existence of a
critical locus for the hazard becomes the factor that actually determines the final
vulnerability of the user.
A number of published definitions of vulnerability have been analysed; these
vary considerably. Although all contain recognisable elements, there is no definition
that either would be accepted as authoritative or would provide the rigour of a
definition required for a quantitative analysis of a technological system.
This work has proposed that a service level be defined for each service or
supply of goods to be studied. Such a definition allows a rigorous study, and does not
preclude studies of more than one service level (e.g. "normal supply" and "emergency
rationed supply"). Defining a service level does allow the state of the supply to be
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quantified as "true" or "false". For many services, e.g. the supply of electrical power,
a Boolean representation of the state of supply is obvious. However, a Boolean
representation can also be applied to any nominated service level.
A technological system supplying goods or services will require inputs, and
the achievement of a service level output will also require the supply of service level
inputs. By applying the "service level" criteria recursively, this work has illustrated that
it is possible to describe a complete technological system by a Boolean representation
of all the processes and streams. The correlation between the inputs and outputs of
a Boolean expression (describing an actual system) can be described and
demonstrated by a "truth table" that shows the correlation between any combination
of input conditions, i.e. the status of processes and input streams. The nature of the
exposure metric, including the business rules such as dealing with streams that are
essential at more than one location, has been defined and justified. This, together with
the practical experience of application to examples, is evidence that the definition is
both practical and adequately complete.
The theoretical background for this work has been developed in Chapter 4,
and describes a metric of "exposure", detailing not only the rationale for the metric but
also the proposed method of calculation, and the justification for using the "exposure"
descriptor. It is not claimed that this approach supersedes other approaches, but it is
claimed that, as it is well founded and allows the demonstration of valuable results,
this represents a contribution to academia.
Starting from the assertion that end-user vulnerability is an "attribute of
interest", the discipline of measurement theory has been applied to the proposed
"exposure" metric, and this application has shown that the proposed metric is indeed
a valid metric representing the attribute of interest. Several other theories or concepts
related to personal vulnerability have been published; these include "normal accident
theory" applied to complex and interlinked systems having large potential
consequences, as noted by Perrow (1984), chaos and complexity theories linking
small perturbations to large changes in output conditions and utilitarian theory applied
to populations rather than individuals. Some less academic approaches have been
proposed in specific fields ‒ e.g. the "bus hit factor" applied to software development
teams. The relationships between these approaches and the exposure analysis
approach are explored and are considered to offer a contribution. Of equal
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importance, the relationships between terms such as “robustness”, “survivability”,
“resilience”, “fragility” and “exposure” have been explored. Although the lack of fully
accepted and adequate definitions of terms precludes an unambiguous analysis, it is
particularly proposed that robustness is synonymous with low levels of exposure and
that a reduction in exposure can be stated to imply an increase in robustness. This in
itself is considered to be a useful contribution.
8.4.2

Contribution to practice
The topic of this work is applicable to public policy, technological system

design and application, and public interest. "Practitioners" can therefore be claimed
to include policymakers concerned with the vulnerability of citizens and the use of
public monies to decrease that vulnerability, persons engaged in the design of
systems, e.g. those designing implanted medical devices and those considering the
application of IoT devices, and members of the public concerned for their own
vulnerability and wishing to make effective changes to it.
A "contribution to practice" will therefore assist those who "practice" in one of
these fields, i.e. policymakers, designers and members of the public. The actual
contribution to practice is similar for all these categories of "practitioner". It is the
additional insights available, and specifically those arising from the more complete
identification of the nature and numbers of contributions to vulnerability, and the
analysis of the effectiveness of hypothesised changes. In the course of the
investigation, a classical risk analysis was commissioned for a system identical to the
exemplar sewage disposal system. Care was taken to ensure that the scope of the
risk analysis was identical to the representative system, and was carried out by a
professional engineer. The risk analysis did, as argued, proceed via a brainstorming
of hazards without initially clarifying the nature and the interdependencies of the
processes and intermediate streams that were necessary to deliver the service. The
results of the analysis failed to identify specific processes whose disruption would
have caused the service delivery to fail. The exercise of comparing the practice of a
classical risk analysis with an analysis of exposure has demonstrated the practical
gains achievable from representing the complete technological system in terms of
processes, intermediate streams and interconnections and the quantification of
exposure that this representation enables. A defensible approach has been set out to
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define a technological system and to ensure its completeness within defined
boundaries, and hence to define the processes and streams contributing to the
provision of the defined services or goods. Practitioners of each type share a concern
at the possibility of failures caused by hazards to un-identified vulnerabilities, despite
expenditure to reduce vulnerability associated with previously identified hazards and
points of exposure. A detailed consideration of exposure for the system will generate
some confidence that all significant points of exposure have been identified.
The evaluation of hypothesised changes to exemplar systems (Chapter 7 of
this work) has shown that changes that effect significant reductions in actual end-user
vulnerability are often simple and should be relatively inexpensive. The detailed
evaluation of cost was not in the scope of this study but the observation suggests a
need for detailed evaluation by the practitioner. The exemplar systems analysed are
representative of real systems, and hence the analyses of these specific systems do
provide guidance for practitioners. As the exemplar systems also address subsystems
that will be common to the systems that supply many other goods and services, the
results from the analysis of hypothesised changes will have a wider validity.
The analysis of representative systems has demonstrated clearly that the
vulnerability of end-users is greatly reduced by attention to the single-source-of-failure
loci that are commonly found close to the point of consumption ‒ and hence beyond
the scope of more conventional analyses of infrastructural or supply chain systems.
The analysis of representative systems has also drawn attention to the exposure that
a technological system accrues from contributory systems. Whenever a subsystem is
made essential to the function of a system, the exposure of the system is
incrementally increased by the exposure metric of the contributory subsystem; this
accrual can be defined mathematically. The accrual actuality can, and should,
contribute to the practitioner's design process. As a primary example, the creation of
an internet-connected essential input to any process will essentially and inevitably
cause the exposure of the host system to be increased by the exposure of the internet.
For technological systems delivering goods or services to an end-user, the
practitioner’s leaning should be that contributory systems need to be non-mandatory
in every case and no more than informative. The process of hypothesising changes
to the representative example systems has also proposed a set of categories of types
of change. These have been shown to generate useful options, leading to the
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reduction of exposure of the exemplar systems. As such, these categories of
hypothetical change are proposed for practitioners.
8.4.3

Contribution to society
This work has considered the vulnerability of end-users, noting that this group

has concerns and vulnerabilities that are different in nature and personal impact from
those of the authorities controlling national infrastructure and the owners of supply
chains or large systems. This work has further considered the particular group of endusers who live in cities, and has given particular attention to those living in apartments.
The proportion of the world’s population living in an urban context increased to over
50% in 2016 and is predicted to reach 75% by 2030. The total number, and the total
proportion, of users whose vulnerability is represented by this study is therefore both
large and increasing. The issues contributing to the vulnerability of the end-user have
been distinguished from those affecting the owners or operators of national
infrastructure, and from the owners or operators of supply chains. These distinctions
are primarily the large difference between the consequences of supply failure and the
specific hazards that apply distinctively to the end-user. The end-user is vulnerable to
significantly different consequences from the failure of a technological system
supplying services: an inoperable sewage system will make an apartment
uninhabitable, whereas the same failure will probably cause no direct consequences
to the city authorities who are responsible for the installation and operation of the
sewage system. A user who is, for whatever reason, unable to make electronic
financial transactions is effectively confined to a mode of life that is very significantly
different from that of others. The individual user actually has few advocates:
corporates focus on profitability (revenue-to-expenditure ratio); public policy focuses
on utilitarian principles (greatest good for greatest number) and assumes a
continuation of major systems. With the exception of civil-defense-type measures,
public policy seldom considers the capacity of individuals to continue their lifestyle, on
a long-term basis, without current centralised systems. For the representative
individual, there is nevertheless a significant suite of needs that, if not supplied, will
require immediate, major and unwanted lifestyle changes. The user can therefore
quite simplistically be described as vulnerable.

232

Sophisticated technological systems have commonly become centralised and
of large scale, driven by the economies of scale available from mass production (the
per-unit costs of production, which decrease with plant capacity) and the related
technological impracticality of small-scale operation. A high-bandwidth undersea
fibre-optic cable illustrates the issue well: the capital cost of such a cable can be
justified only when spread across many users for many years ‒ and there is no
technology for single-user bandwidth with a pro-rata cost. Although this has been a
trend since the start of the industrial age, there are significant reasons to explore
options to reverse this trend: the consideration of end-user vulnerability studied in this
work, is one such reason. Chapter 7 of this work has considered hypothetical changes
to the example studies.
Those analyses have specifically examined change options that involve either
technological breakthrough or technological substitution, and the consideration of
options under these categories has shown that there are currently many examples of
technological

decentralisation.

Manufacturing

that

would

have

required

a

sophisticated factory can be achieved with a garage-scope three-dimensional printer;
household-scale solar power options are rapidly maturing. Other capabilities such as
on-demand chemical synthesis are less mature but are under active investigation,
and the analysis of the specific medicine example has illustrated the effect on the
vulnerability of drug users of such capabilities. No approach to small-scale fabrication
of computing components is realistic at present, and technological substitution or
technological breakthrough approaches to reducing dependence on very-large-scale
facilities for the production of CPU, memory etc. devices are not available. As
computing elements are moderately standardised components, the very widespread
availability of mass-produced units and their longevity have however reduced that
associated exposure.
Within the category of technological breakthrough, the analysis of the fuel
supply example has examined the option of creating in-specification motor fuel from
macro-algae, at a "suburb or village" scale. This approach is technically feasible at
present (i.e. the required technology exists but the fuel can be assumed to be
significantly more expensive per litre than that from current supply systems). It is not
within the scope of this work to examine the relationship between vulnerability
reduction and acceptable cost increase but this relationship certainly exists. Although
233

sales of household-scale photovoltaic cells have increased markedly in New Zealand
and Australia since about 2014, the full price of power from a photovoltaic system is
judged to be significantly higher than that from the grid, for the foreseeable future.
The analysis of actual vulnerability incurred, and the reductions available from
options, should usefully inform the social question of price versus vulnerability. A
facility that serves many end-users also is likely to be financed and operated by a
corporate entity whose function will be to maximise ongoing financial return for that
entity and hence ensuring both ongoing permission to operate with high availability.
These dual requirements almost inevitably lead to the assignation of low priority to
each individual user’s needs.
This work has drawn attention to the distinction between guided and random
hazards. The entity who purposely determines to disable a technological system will
search out processes or streams and will create hazard(s) ‒ i.e. probability 1.0 ‒ to
target those weaknesses. This phenomenon is qualitatively different from an extreme
weather event. Whether the motivation is terrorism, vandalism, or civil disobedience
does not change the essential difference between a (mis)guided hazard and a random
hazard. It can be observed that, for very large and near-monopolistic systems
(national power, telecommunications and finance), the potential effect of disruption is
very high; hence, these will be perceived as high-value targets by any contemplating
disruption. This observation must be distinguished from the "normal accident theory"
proposed by Perrow (1984) because it is not simply the complexity of the large system
per se that is responsible for an incurred vulnerability but the attractiveness of the
"target" that leads ill-wishers to expend effort on identifying weaknesses.
This work has also highlighted the issue of potential "practical non-availability",
which is relevant for individual users of near-monopolistic systems. Particular fields of
concern are financial and communications systems. In addition to profit-to-loss
considerations, owners or operators of such systems are themselves vulnerable to
statutory requirements (good or bad) and hence are likely to impose non-negotiable
terms of access upon individual users. If those terms of access are unacceptable to
the individual user, the service becomes practically non-available or inaccessible, and
there is no certainty that an alternative system with different conditions will be
available. Highlighting this issue is considered to be valuable, because such systems
are increasingly common (New Zealand has one motor fuel refinery, there are only
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two main EFTPOS clearing systems, there are only two undersea fibre-optic cables
and there is almost monopolistic ownership of power and "last-mile" communications
systems). Within a city, there is generally a single owner for sewage systems. A
“practical non-availability" might occur as a result of unacceptable terms, inevitability
of surveillance or lack of security. It is significant that the “exposure” metric measure
is applicable regardless of the cause of the unavailability, and hence is a valid
measure for the end-user.
The analysis of the example systems has shown that local power supplies and
local communications systems contribute significantly to the end-user's vulnerability.
Perhaps the most significant observation from the analysis of the example studies is
the significant vulnerability incurred by the electronic financial transaction system, and
the marked reductions in exposure that can be achieved by simple retention of cashbased systems or other systems that do not force major "contributory system"
exposure values. A more general conclusion, which has been clarified by the analysis,
is the end-user's vulnerability to the simple availability of services provided on a strictly
commercial, rather than statutory, basis. A number of trans-national banks and
national petrol retailers have recently withdrawn services from rural towns; such
actions have occasioned much public outcry but have starkly clarified the fact that the
banks and the petrol retailers have only one duty, which is to maximise the profit of
their shareholders ‒ they have neither obligations to communities nor even a legal
"duty of care" to make services available, regardless of the consequences for endusers.
The analyses in this work have also shown many cases where an exposure
point is created by the use of a single specific-purpose component such as a person
with particular skills. It has been noted that, in many of these cases, simple design
changes will ensure that multi-purpose components can be used, eliminating a single
point of failure. For examples that include intermediate or final products that can be
stockpiled, the analysis has noted both the previous work of stockpile effects on
supply chain vulnerability and also the previous work by Robertson (2010). The
analyses have also drawn attention to the significant cases where stockpiling is not
currently technologically feasible, e.g. MWh storage of electrical power or long
storage of perishable foods.
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There has been a great deal of effort on the theoretical and practical
approaches to minimising natural disaster effects. That work has noted that natural
disasters are characterised by the disruption of multiple services that have key
components within a defined geographical area. The focus of this work has been on
functionally connected systems regardless of geographical proximity. Those who
prepare for either natural or politico-economic disasters do anticipate the cessation of
many services that are considered to be essential to their lifestyles; to this extent, the
interests of the "preppers" do somewhat overlap with the concerns that have
motivated this work. In contrast, this work does not assume geographically multiple
failures, and has illustrated the vulnerabilities that are not strictly geographically
bounded as for natural disasters.
This work has explored mathematically the relationship between the exposure
values of a contributory subsystem and the exposure of the individual end-user. This
conclusion has significant effects for the design of all systems that are essential to the
life and lifestyle of the individual, and is of particular concern to such issues as the
“Internet of Things”, implantable medical devices etc. This analysis has particularly
drawn attention to the effects upon the end-user's exposure of "internet-connected"
services. Explaining this example simply, in each case where a service to an enduser is made to be dependent on an internet-supplied input, the end-user's service
becomes exposed to each and every locus of vulnerability on the connected internet.
Attention has been drawn to cases where an individual user may effectively be unable
to access a service because of quasi-technological issues (e.g. a service that routinely
makes private information available to inimical users). For near-monopoly services,
e.g. internet use and international banking, this could generate a situation where large
numbers of users are affected, yet where it is unlikely that a pure "market forces"
approach will encourage the development of an acceptable service. Current debates
over the acceptability of strong end-to end encryption are closely related to this issue.
The capability of national governments to technologically prevent citizens from
accessing selected internet services is another clear example of this issue.
A review of the hypothesised options for reduction of exposure has
demonstrated that there is no longer any absolute need to equate sophistication of
services with a high degree of centralisation and exposure. Household-scale
equipment both for analysis (diagnosis) and for sophisticated fabrication are quite
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foreseeable. A sophisticated and highly reconfigurable capability also offers the
possibility of von Neumann machines having the capability to self-replicate, and
completely obviates the economy-of-scale issues that have driven our current
centralisation of services. The banking system or, more accurately, the systems for
holding financial reserves and carrying out electronic (EFTPOS, online banking)
transactions have been shown to contribute a very large level of vulnerability to the
end-user. The study has shown the value of retaining provision for a cash- or bullionbased transaction system, specifically offering a huge decrease in exposure, and for
a system such as bitcoin, which is decentralised and independent of a centralised
provider. The "internet" has become essential to so many normal functions that there
have been serious proposals, e.g. by La Rou (2011), to include "internet access"
within a list of basic human rights; however, the capability of state and other bodies
to either technologically deny access to services or to create practical unavailability
by ubiquitous surveillance causes significant exposure to all user-systems reliant on
the internet.
Much information used by individuals is actually relatively static. The analysis
of the first-aid example illustrated a case where exposure could be realistically
reduced by exchanging an online information option for a local reference source. Such
an option is technologically feasible, and it is likely to be economically practical to
store large volumes of non-transient information in robust formats that are directly
accessible to users. Such an approach is contrary to the current trend to move all
information online, and illustrates both the exposure incurred by online information
sources and the reduction in exposure that is possible by local storage.
By hypothesising changes that are reliant on major technological
breakthroughs, this study has also highlighted specific advances that would allow
major reductions in the exposure of technological systems and the resultant end-user
vulnerability. The specific examples include large-scale (MWh) electrical power
storage capability, general-purpose chemical synthesis capability, general-purpose or
re-purposable chemical processing capability and ad-hoc point-to-point network
communications capability.
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8.5

Future work
Much valuable work is beyond the scope of this thesis; this includes further

development of the theoretical basis and further application of the theories. This
section describes the further work that can currently be envisaged. The definition of
the exposure metric means that E1, E2 etc. values impose limits on each other. If a
system has n processes plus inputs and E1 = m, then ∑(E2..En) ≤ 2^(n ‒m). It can also
be observed that, if En = 1, then E1..E(n ‒ 1) = 0. These rules could be further developed.
An algorithm to examine each line item of a truth table and to generate the exposure
values could be developed. For the real studies examined, this was not considered to
be necessary. Similarly, a computerised approach to generating exposure values for
a parent system, from an arbitrary combination of contributory systems, could be
developed. This was also not considered to be necessary for the real studies
examined. This thesis has examined the exposure of a (representative) end-user.
However, in many cases (e.g. the fresh food example), the same systems supply
many users and it would be possible to extend the concepts to reflect this.
Authors such as Alderson and Doyle (2010) refer p, 849 to the "new sciences
of complex networks (NSCN)" and refer extensively to the learnings that technological
system might derive from complex biological systems. Noting the long-term survival
of biological system despite complexity and multiple threats, this must indeed be
considered as a fruitful field for additional work.
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